The resource king is dead! Long live the resource king! by Towse, John N. et al.
Introduction
Research in psychology has provided considerable evi-
dence for a division between long-term memory, in which
memories of large numbers of facts and autobiographical
events are maintained for up to years, and short-term mem-
ory, which is capable of retaining small amounts of infor-
mation for very short periods of time (Squire & Zola-Mor-
gan 1991). Baddeley and his colleagues introduced the
powerful concept that the appropriate way to characterize
short-term memory is as a “working memory” system (Bad-
deley 1976; 1986; 1995; Baddeley & Hitch 1974). Working
memory is conceived of as a short-duration, limited-capac-
ity memory system capable of simultaneously storing and
manipulating information in the service of accomp-lishing
a task (Baddeley 1995). Appeal to the notion of a limited-
capacity working memory system (or to equivalent con-
cepts, such as “processing resources”) to account for fea-
tures of human cognitive performance is widespread in
cognitive psychology, with respect to both normal functions
(Just & Carpenter 1992) and the abilities of subjects with
developmental and acquired cognitive disorders (Gather-
cole & Baddeley 1993).
Baddeley and his colleagues proposed the first model of
the functional architecture of human working memory. In
their model, working memory is made up of three main
components – the central executive, the articulatory loop,
and the visual-spatial scratch pad (Baddeley 1986; 1990a;
Baddeley & Hitch 1994; Baddeley et al. 1986; Gathercole
& Baddeley 1993). The articulatory loop and the visual-
spatial scratch pad are “slave systems” in which verbal and
visual information, respectively, is stored when the central
executive is overloaded. One can conceive of these compo-
nents as responsible for maintaining short-term informa-
tion availability. The central executive is the workhorse and
mastermind of human cognition. It allocates attention to a
task and performs information storage and computational
functions within a given task.
To determine the working memory requirements of a
task, Baddeley’s theory of the functional architecture of
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working memory must be supplemented by specific mod-
els of the computational demands that individual cognitive
processes make on the central executive. Current models of
cognitive processes provide such measures. Implemented
models provide specific quantitative measurements of the
computational and storage demands of a task. For instance,
in procedural models (e.g., Lewis 1996a), a measure of the
working memory requirements of a computation might be
the number of procedures required to reach a subgoal and
the number of elements maintained in each procedure [see
also Newell: Précis of “Unified Theories of Cognition,” BBS
15(3) 1992]. In contrast, measures of working memory re-
quirements derived from neural net models would be quite
different and might consist in the number of steps needed
to gravitate toward an attractor in a neural network (Tabor
et al. 1997). The working memory demands exerted at a
given point of processing in a task are usually taken to be
the sum of the working memory requirements of the func-
tions active at that point in the task (Just & Carpenter
1992). Many valuable models of cognitive phenomena are
not implemented, but they still provide guides to the rela-
tive complexity of one operation, or set of operations, com-
pared to another (Gibson & Thomas 1996). Research into
the role of working memory in cognitive processes regularly
appeals to all these types of models to provide the basis for
determination of the processing demands of a task and of
those demands at a particular point of processing within a
task.
Many basic questions about working memory in human
cognition remain unanswered. This target article examines
possible specializations in working memory. There is consid-
erable evidence for a division of the central executive of the
working memory system into visual and verbal components
(Shah & Miyake 1996). We focus on a finer division, the pos-
sibility that the verbal working memory system is composed
of subsystems devoted to different types of verbal tasks.
Our particular interest is in the distinction between the
extraction of meaning from a linguistic signal, which we
call “interpretive processing,” and in the use of that mean-
ing to accomplish other tasks, such as storing information
in long-term semantic memory, reasoning, planning ac-
tions, and other functions, which we call “post-interpre-
tive processing.” By “interpretive processing,” we refer to
the processes of recognizing words and appreciating their
meanings and syntactic features; constructing syntactic
and prosodic representations; and assigning thematic
roles, focus, and other aspects of propositional and dis-
course-level semantics (see below for further discussion).
Many linguists and psycholinguists have argued that the
processes involved in interpretive processing are distinct
from those involved in other verbally mediated functions
(e.g., Fodor 1983; Forster 1979; Frazier 1990). Argu-
ments regarding the “modularity” of interpretive pro-
cessing have centered largely on the issue of what types of
information are used in the initial determination of lin-
guistic form and meaning (MacDonald 1997). We will ad-
dress the question of a cognitive specialization for inter-
pretive processing from the point of view of the structure
of working memory.
Our empirical focus is on the process of sentence com-
prehension. We will review the results of a variety of ex-
periments suggesting that the working memory system that
is called on in interpretive processing at the sentence level
– assigning the syntactic structure of a sentence and using
that structure to determine the meaning of the sentence –
constitutes a separate subsystem within verbal working
memory. After presenting this evidence, we will set the
topic in a broader context and advance the hypothesis that
this subsystem of verbal working memory is involved in the
set of related operations responsible for identifying linguis-
tic elements and structures and determining the preferred
literal meaning of an utterance.
This paper is divided into four main sections. First, we will
review the evidence that processing resources are involved in
sentence comprehension. We will then review evidence from
normal subjects that bears on the nature of the working
memory system involved in syntactic processing in sentence
comprehension, followed by a presentation of similar evi-
dence from several groups of patients with central nervous
system (CNS) disease. We will end this target article with a
statement of our theory, including its neurological aspects.
1. Sentence comprehension and working memory
There are several pieces of evidence indicating that com-
prehension of sentences requires verbal working memory
resources. To begin with anecdotal evidence, consider the
following sentence:
1. The man that the woman that the child hugged kissed
laughed.
In sentence (1), most readers have trouble assigning the-
matic roles (who did what to whom). They can assign the-
matic roles much more easily in the two sentences that
combine to form it, shown in (2):
2a. The man that the woman kissed laughed.
b. The woman that the child hugged kissed the man.
The trouble that normal English users have understanding
sentence (1) is thought to arise because they do not have
sufficient working memory to retain the intermediate prod-
ucts of computation that are produced in building the com-
plex syntactic structure of this sentence (Chomsky 1957;
Gibson 1997; Johnson 1996).
A variety of implemented models of syntactic processing
(parsing) have been developed. These models produce
measurements of the computational demands of assigning
syntactic structure and using it to determine aspects of sen-
tence meaning. These models have taken many forms,
ranging from deterministic parsers associated with Chom-
sky’s (1981; 1986; 1993) model of syntactic representations
(Berwick & Weinberg 1984) through Abney’s (1989) prin-
ciples-and-parameters parser, Johnson’s (1996) logical
parser, connectionist models (Tabor et al. 1997), and vari-
ous hybrid models such as Just and Carpenter’s cc-
reader (Just & Carpenter 1992). Nonimplemented mod-
els of how sentences are parsed have also been developed
(e.g., Frazier & Clifton 1996; Gibson, in press). Although
there are considerable differences among the types of op-
erations and complexity metrics found in these models,
there is a remarkable degree of similarity in the measure-
ments they produce of the relative complexity of the pars-
ing process in many different types of sentences.
With partial exploitation of these models, experimental
results have provided evidence beyond intuitions that syn-
tactic processing in sentence comprehension requires the
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allocation of processing resources. Considerable research
has found evidence that sentences that have more complex
syntactic structures are more difficult and time consuming
to understand (see papers in MacDonald 1997). The evi-
dence that syntactic structural complexity is associated with
increased difficulty in sentence processing extends to mea-
surements made internal to the sentence-processing
process. Eye-fixation durations, self-paced word-by-word
and phrase-by-phrase reading and lexical decision times,
and self-paced listening times increase at points in a sen-
tence where models of sentence processing predict an in-
creased processing load (Caplan et al. 1994; Ferreira et al.
1996a; 1996b; Ford 1983; Frazier & Rayner 1982; King &
Just 1991). Lexical decision reaction times to visually pre-
sented words and detection times for extraneous noises and
phonemes increase at these points during the auditory pre-
sentation of a sentence (Cohen & Mehler 1996; Frauen-
felder et al. 1980; Zurif et al. 1995), consistent with the view
that local processing load is higher at these points. These
and many more studies suggest that syntactic analyses and
the use of these analyses to assign sentence meaning re-
quire processing resources.
As noted above, we contrast the process whereby a lis-
tener or reader extracts the meaning of the sentence from
the signal with the process of using the meaning that has
been extracted to perform other tasks. To appreciate the
difference intuitively, consider sentence (3):
3. Please pick up four tomatoes, a pound of apricots, prune
juice, shallots, six apples, and a bag of carrots on the way home.
In comparison to sentence (1), it is relatively easy to un-
derstand what sentence (3) means. However, certain oper-
ations that one could perform on the meaning of the sen-
tence would be difficult, such as carrying out the request
from memory. We draw a distinction between these types
of operations, which include remembering the content of a
sentence, using the meaning of a sentence to plan action,
reasoning on the basis of sentence meaning, and other as-
pects of what we call post-interpretive processing, and sen-
tence interpretation itself.
Utilizing the propositional content of a sentence to ac-
complish tasks usually involves controlled, conscious pro-
cessing, as opposed to the largely unconscious processes in-
volved in sentence interpretation. Controlled, conscious
processes constitute the domain of verbally mediated tasks
that is thought to require processing resources (Schneider
& Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider 1977). There are
many different purposes to which the propositional content
of a sentence can be put, and it is widely thought that, to
the extent to which these purposes involve controlled, con-
scious processing, they all make demands on verbal work-
ing memory (Baddeley 1986).
In many experiments on working memory, researchers
have contrasted performance on pairs of sentences that are
selected to vary in their complexity. In most of these exper-
imental manipulations, there is some effect of the change
in sentence type on both interpretive and post-interpretive
processing. Some of these contrasts, however, increase the
working memory load primarily at the interpretive stage of
sentence processing, others at the post-interpretive stage.
Two contrasts in particular will recur in the presentation of
data to follow: that between sentences with subject versus
object relatives (The boy that hugged the girl kissed the
baby; the boy that the girl hugged kissed the baby) and that
between sentences with one proposition and two proposi-
tions corresponding to each of two verbs (The boy hugged
the girl and the baby; the boy hugged the girl and kissed 
the baby). Although both of these contrasts involve changes
in both the syntactic structure of a sentence and aspects of
its meaning, we will present evidence indicating that the
first of these contrasts increases processing load primarily
at the syntactic level and the second increases processing
load primarily associated with different aspects of post-
interpretive processing.
2. Sentence comprehension and working memory
capacity in normal subjects
As noted above, our focus is on the nature of the working
memory system involved in the interpretive aspect of sen-
tence processing. One possibility, advanced by Just, Car-
penter, and their colleagues, is that humans have a set of ver-
bal processing resources that can be devoted to all verbal
tasks (Just & Carpenter 1992; King & Just 1991; MacDon-
ald et al. 1992; Miyake et al. 1994). An alternative view is that
part of the verbal working memory system is specialized for
interpretive aspects of sentence comprehension, specifi-
cally, assigning syntactic structure and using it to determine
the meaning of a sentence (Caplan & Waters 1995; 1996;
Waters & Caplan 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; Waters et al. 1995).
There have been two basic approaches to investigating
the possible specialization of working memory for sentence
interpretation. One has been to determine the relationship
of individual differences in verbal working memory capac-
ity to the efficiency of sentence interpretation. A second has
been to investigate the pattern of mutual interference (or
noninterference) of sentence interpretation and concur-
rently holding a verbal load in short-term memory.
With respect to the individual-differences approach, the
single-resource (SR) theory predicts that having a low work-
ing memory capacity will reduce the resources available for
sentence processing and make it less efficient; a separate-
sentence-interpretation-resource (SSIR) theory predicts
that performance on general verbal working memory tasks
will not predict language processing efficiency. The SR
model is therefore supported by significant correlations be-
tween measures of working memory capacity and measures
of sentence processing efficiency. Many studies correlate
working memory capacity and performance on verbally me-
diated tasks (see Daneman & Merikle, 1996, for review).
However, almost no research into the role of working mem-
ory in sentence processing has used correlational analyses.
Instead, research into this question that uses the individual-
differences approach has been based on experiments in
which performance on a working memory task serves to di-
vide subjects into those with high and low (and sometimes
medium) working memory capacity, and sentence process-
ing performance is measured. The single-capacity model
predicts that, in the absence of ceiling and floor effects, there
will be a main effect of working memory capacity in experi-
ments of this type, with high-capacity subjects performing
better on the sentence processing task than low-capacity sub-
jects. The SSIR theory might be thought to predict that there
will be no main effect of group in such analyses. However,
there is another issue that complicates this prediction: low-
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capacity subjects would not be expected to be as adept at ac-
complishing many psycholinguistic tasks as high-capacity
subjects. For instance, King and Just (1991) had subjects
carry out a self-paced reading task while simultaneously re-
membering the last word of each of a set of sentences (sets
ranged from one to three sentences). Poorer performance by
low-span subjects could be a reflection of difficulties they
had with dividing their attention in this task. Even tasks that
are relatively simple in experimental psycholinguistics, such
as self-paced reading coupled with answering questions at
the end of each sentence (MacDonald et al. 1992) or rapid
serial visual presentation (RSVP) with end-of-sentence ac-
ceptability judgments (Waters & Caplan 1996b), might be
harder for subjects with low working memory capacities. In
general, poorer performance by low-capacity subjects is not
necessarily due to their inability to accomplish the process-
ing that is the focus of an experiment but might represent dif-
ficulties these subjects have with other aspects of task de-
mands. Hence, group effects in sentence processing may be
compatible with the SSIR theory under some circumstances.
In most experiments sentence materials have been con-
structed to represent two points along a complexity scale
rather than a single sentence type. This is because most re-
searchers have assumed that both low- and high-capacity
subjects have sufficient resources to assign structure and
meaning in simple sentences and that the limitations im-
posed by low working memory capacity are felt only or
mostly with complex sentences (see, e.g., King & Just 1991;
Miyake et al. 1994). Although there has been little discus-
sion of this assumption in the literature, it seems at least
plausible, given the number of sentences that most lan-
guage users appear to process without difficulty. Given this
assumption, the SR theory predicts that there will be an in-
teraction between syntactic complexity and working mem-
ory capacity: sentence complexity will affect low-capacity
subjects more than high-capacity subjects, and the differ-
ences between performance of low- and high-capacity sub-
jects with complex sentences will be greater than the dif-
ferences between the groups with simple sentences.1 Even
if the SSIR theory is compatible with a main effect of group
in such experiments for the reason outlined above, it pre-
dicts that no such interactions will be found. An interaction
between sentence complexity and working memory group
therefore favors the SR theory.2
A second approach is to investigate the pattern of mutual
interference (or noninterference) of verbally mediated
tasks. According to the SR model, verbal memory loads that
are imposed external to the comprehension task (such as a
concurrent digit span task) and sentence comprehension
draw on the same pool of resources. According to SSIR the-
ory, “interpretation-external” and “interpretation-internal”
processes draw on different resource pools. As with the re-
lationship between working memory capacity and sentence
processing, research using this approach has assumed that
a concurrent load will affect the processing of simple sen-
tences less than that of complex sentences (Baddeley &
Hitch 1974; Miyake et al. 1994). With this assumption, SR
theory predicts an interaction between external load and
sentence complexity, and SSIR theory does not. In research
using this approach, the concurrent task must utilize cen-
tral executive resources. Digit span has been the most
widely used task for this purpose.3
These two approaches can be combined. In SR theory,
comprehending more complex sentences and maintaining
a larger load in verbal memory both require more process-
ing resources from the same pool, and this pool is smaller
in some subjects. Thus, SR theory would be supported by
the finding that the expected impairment of low-capacity
subjects on more complex sentences is exacerbated by a
concurrent memory load. In contrast, SSIR theory holds
that maintaining a digit load in memory calls on a resource
pool that is standardly measured by working memory tests
and that comprehending sentences calls on another pool of
resources. This model therefore predicts that low-capacity
subjects should perform less well than high-capacity sub-
jects under conditions of increased verbal memory load,
but it does not predict that this effect will be greater for syn-
tactically complex sentences.4
We review here the evidence relevant to each of these
lines of argument. For published papers that include a large
number of analyses, we present summaries of the results.
For work in our laboratory that has not yet been published,
we present results and illustrations of representative and
critical findings.
2.1. Individual differences in speed and accuracy of syn-
tactic processing. Relating individual differences in verbal
working memory capacity to syntactic processing abilities re-
quires that we be able to measure each individual’s working
memory capacity. Daneman and Carpenter (1980) devel-
oped a “reading span” task that has become the standard
method of assessing verbal working memory. In this task, sub-
jects are required to read aloud increasingly longer sequences
of sentences and to recall the final word of all the sentences
in each sequence. A subject’s working memory capacity is de-
fined as the longest list length at which he or she is able to re-
call the sentence-final words on the majority of trials. There
are various versions of this test (Tirre & Pena 1992; Turner &
Engle 1987; Waters et al. 1987) as well as other tests with
quite different sets of operational demands, such as random
digit generation (Petrides et al. 1993) or backwards digit span
(Kemper 1988), that have been used to measure verbal work-
ing memory. Most research into the performance of groups
who differ in working memory capacity in processing sen-
tences with different structures has used the Daneman and
Carpenter task as the measure of working memory, and the
results that we will report follow this practice.
The first set of results deals with interpreting sentences
with relative clauses. There is a considerable amount of ev-
idence that assigning the structure of an object-relativized
sentence such as sentence (4) is more demanding than a
subject-relativized sentence such as sentence (5), and this
increased load occurs at the verb of the embedded clause
(push) and/or the main verb (kiss).
4. The boy that the girl pushed kissed the baby.
5. The girl that pushed the boy kissed the baby.
King and Just (1991, exp. 1) reported self-paced word-by-
word reading times for high- and low-span subjects for
these two sentence types. In this task, a sequence of words
that forms a sentence is presented visually, one word at a
time, with the subject pressing a response key to see each
successive word. Reading time increases at points of syn-
tactic complexity in this task. King and Just (1991) present
a graph, reprinted by Just and Carpenter (1992), that is said
to show that the biggest reading time differences between
high- and low-span subjects were in the syntactically criti-
cal area of the object-relative sentences. However, no sta-
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tistical analyses were reported by King and Just (1991) to
support the contention that the difference in reading times
between high- and low-span subjects is specifically local-
ized to the region of object-relative sentences where there
is the greatest processing load. Moreover, the data pre-
sented by Just and Carpenter (1992) and by King and Just
(1991) did not isolate performance on sentences in which
the subjects did not have to retain the sentence-final words
(no analyses were reported by King and Just on the sen-
tences in the zero-load condition alone).
Our laboratory has failed to find differences between
high- and low-span subjects in on-line processing of similar
types of sentences. In one study, we used the “auditory
moving windows” task, in which spoken sentences are
recorded, digitized, and segmented into constituents, and
subjects press a key to hear each successive constituent
(Ferreira et al. 1996b). As in the study by Ferreira et al.
(1996a), we found significant increases in listening times for
the embedded verb of object-relativized sentences com-
pared to subject-relativized sentences. However, in a group
of 100 subjects, this effect was no larger in low-capacity
than in high-capacity subjects. The results are displayed in
Figure 1, which shows the differences in listening time for
the same phrases in the complex object-relativized sen-
tences and the simple subject-relativized sentences. As Fig-
ure 1 shows, listening times increase at the embedded verb
and, to a lesser degree, at the main verb – both points of
syntactic processing load – and these increases do not dif-
fer among the three groups of subjects. We have also used
a continuous visual lexical decision task (Ford 1983), in
which subjects were required to judge whether each suc-
cessive word of the sentence was a real word. We replicated
Ford’s finding of a statistically significant increase in read-
ing time on the relative clause verb in object- as compared
to subject-relative clauses. In a group of 98 undergraduates
divided into high-, medium-, and low-span subjects using the
Daneman and Carpenter task, this effect was no larger in low-
span than in high-span subjects. We have obtained similar re-
sults in a replication of this study with 63 subjects in which
the sentences were presented auditorily rather than visually.
To summarize these data, we know of four studies that
compare the performance of high- and low-capacity sub-
jects on measures of word processing as a function of sen-
tence type (object- vs. subject-relativization) and region
within sentence: the self-paced reading study of King and
Just (1991) in which subjects had to recall sentence-final
words as well as process the sentences, our self-paced au-
ditory and visual lexical decision studies, and our self-paced
listening (auditory moving window) study. None of these
studies showed an interaction between span group, sen-
tence type, and region. In our studies, there were no inter-
actions of span group and sentence type in the region at
which the greatest processing load occurs.
A second type of sentence that has heavy processing
demands is a so-called “garden path” sentence. These sen-
tences are ones that are locally ambiguous, and that even-
tually are resolved in favor of the less-preferred interpreta-
tion. For instance, the sequence The experienced soldiers
warned about the dangers is ambiguous. The phrase
warned about the dangers could be a main verb with a
prepositional phrase adjunct, as in (6), or a relative clause
in which the relative pronoun has been omitted, as in the
garden path sentence (7).
6. The experienced soldiers warned about the dangers before
the midnight raid.
7. The experienced soldiers warned about the dangers con-
ducted the midnight raid.
MacDonald et al. (1992) claim to have found differences
in high- and low-capacity subjects’ self-paced reading times
and accuracy in answering questions about sentences such
as sentence (7). MacDonald et al.’s results are very complex,
and the reader is referred to Waters and Caplan (1996a) for
a review and detailed analysis. In general, for garden path
sentences such as sentence (7), group differences in read-
ing times and accuracies were not statistically significant
and differences in reading times were not found while sub-
jects were reading the ambiguous portions of the sentence.
We have examined the performance of high- and low-
capacity subjects on sentences such as sentence (7), as well
as two other types of garden path sentences (Waters & Ca-
plan 1996b). We carried out three experiments in which we
compared the ability of high- and low-span subjects to com-
prehend these three different types of garden path sen-
tences both with visual presentation of whole sentences and
with RSVP at increasingly faster rates. Although garden
path sentences were significantly more difficult to interpret
than nonambiguous control sentences, these effects were
not larger in subjects with low working memory capacity.
We also replicated the MacDonald et al. (1992) self-paced
experiment using their materials in 91 subjects and failed
to find memory span group differences in reading times
(Fig. 2), a replication of MacDonald et al.’s result, which, as
noted above, did not find significant group differences in
reading times in the ambiguous region of these sentences.
MacDonald et al. (1992) also examined self-paced read-
ing times for sentences such as sentence (6), which are lo-
cally ambiguous but are resolved in favor of the preferred
interpretation and the simpler syntactic structure. They
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Figure 1. Differences in self-paced listening times for each
phrase for object- minus subject-relative sentences (The boy that
the girl pushed kissed the baby; The boy pushed the girl that
kissed the baby) in subjects with low, medium, and high working
memory capacity. NP1, first noun phrase; V1, first verb; NP2,
noun in relative clause; V2, second verb; NP3, sentence-final
noun. High, high-capacity subjects; medium, medium-capacity
subjects; low, low-capacity subjects.
found that high-capacity subjects had longer reading times
than low-capacity subjects, and they accounted for this 
superficially paradoxical result by suggesting that high-
capacity subjects maintain both interpretations of a sen-
tence in mind until the ambiguity is resolved, whereas 
low-capacity subjects lack the resources to do so and drop
the less preferred analysis. However, their data provide 
little evidence to support the view that subjects with differ-
ent working memory capacities perform differently in pro-
cessing these sentences. MacDonald et al. did find that
reading times were longer in high-capacity than in low-
capacity subjects, but this was true only for the last word 
of sentences such as sentence (6) and not throughout 
the ambiguous region. Moreover, low-capacity subjects
made more errors in answering questions. This pattern may
simply represent different speed–accuracy trade-offs in 
the decision-making process in the different capacity
groups. Pearlmutter and MacDonald (1995) reported a
similar result, in which high- and low-capacity subjects used
different cues regarding the likelihood that the sentence
would end with a main clause or a reduced relative clause
interpretation. All of MacDonald and her colleagues’ 
results must be interpreted cautiously because she had 
subjects answer questions about the thematic role played
by the first noun after each sentence. This may have alerted
the more verbally adept high-span subjects to the pres-
ence of the ambiguity, and any differences between groups
may be due to strategic factors operating in these exp-
eriments.
We have repeated MacDonald et al.’s experiment in 91
subjects using the exact methods and materials from Mac-
Donald et al. (1992). We did not find poorer performance
in high- than in low-capacity subjects on sentences such as
sentence (6) (Fig. 3). In a follow-up experiment, we elimi-
nated the questions that were posed after the sentences.
This experiment, with 75 subjects, also failed to find differ-
ences between high- and low-capacity subjects.
A third line of research has investigated the interaction
of semantic and syntactic information in sentence interpre-
tation in subjects with different working memory capaci-
ties. Just and Carpenter (1992) studied garden path sen-
tences similar to sentence (7) but in which the animacy of
the first noun constrains the possible interpretation of the
sentence, as well as sentences that were unambiguous be-
cause of the presence of a relative pronoun. The sentence
types are shown below:
8. Syntactic garden path; semantically unconstrained: The de-
fendant examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.
9. Syntactically unambiguous; semantically unconstrained:
The defendant that was examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.
10. Syntactic garden path; semantically constrained: The evi-
dence examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.
11. Syntactically unambiguous; semantically constrained: The
evidence that was examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.
Their data show that both high- and low-capacity subjects
have longer first-pass fixation durations on the by phrase in
the sentences with reduced relative clauses (sentences 8
and 10) than in the corresponding sentences with the overt
relative clause marker (sentences 9 and 11), regardless of
the animacy of the first noun. This provides evidence for
similar degrees of modularity of syntactic processing in
both high- and low-span subjects (Ferreira 1992; Waters &
Caplan 1996a).
Just and Carpenter also found that the high-capacity sub-
jects showed longer fixation times on the by phrase in rela-
Caplan & Waters: Working memory and sentence comprehension
82 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:1
Figure 2. Differences in self-paced reading times for garden
path minus control (unambiguous) sentences in subjects with low,
medium and high working memory capacity as a function of re-
gion of the sentence. Region 1 contains the ambiguous verb and
associated prepositional phrase (warned about the dangers). Re-
gion 2 contains the disambiguating segment (conducted the mid-
night). Region 3 contains the end of the sentence (raid). High,
high-capacity subjects; medium, medium-capacity subjects; low,
low-capacity subjects.
Figure 3. Differences in self-paced reading times for preferred
(main verb) interpretation of ambiguous minus unambiguous sen-
tences in subjects with low, medium, and high working memory
capacity as a function of region of the sentence. Region 1 contains
the ambiguous verb and associated prepositional phrase (warned
about the dangers). Region 2 contains the next segment (before
the midnight). Region 3 contains the end of the sentence (raid).
High, high-capacity subjects; medium, medium-capacity subjects;
low, low-capacity subjects.
tive clause sentences with animate first nouns (sentences 8
and 9) than in the corresponding relative clause sentences
with inanimate first nouns (sentences 10 and 11), whereas
this was not true for the low-capacity subjects. This result
is difficult to interpret. It indicates that high-capacity sub-
jects were unable to use the clear, unambiguous cue to syn-
tactic structure afforded by the relative pronoun and the
auxiliary verb (that was) of the relative clause in sentence
(9), and took the defendant as the subject of the active form
of the verb examined in the phrase The defendant that was
examined, because of the animacy of the word defendant. It
is hard to understand why the more verbally adept high-
capacity subjects would not use this clear cue, and other
data show the opposite pattern. King and Just (1991, exp.
2) studied the ability of high- and low-capacity subjects to
comprehend object-relative sentences that contained verbs
that either did or did not provide strong pragmatic cues re-
garding which of the two potential actors in the sentence
was the agent of a given verb (sentences 12–15):
12. Main verb constrained; embedded verb constrained: The
robber that the fireman rescued stole the jewelry.
13. Main verb unconstrained; embedded verb constrained:
The robber that the fireman rescued watched the program.
14. Main verb constrained; embedded verb unconstrained:
The robber that the fireman detested stole the jewelry.
15. Main verb unconstrained; embedded verb unconstrained:
The robber that the fireman detested watched the program.
King and Just found that the comprehension of high-
capacity subjects did not improve in the pragmatic bias
condition, but that of low-capacity subjects did. Although
these findings reflect accuracy on end-of-sentence judg-
ments rather than eye-fixation durations during on-line
sentence processing, they are the opposite of the Just and
Carpenter (1992) results.
A fourth line of research that has been pursued involves
increasing the processing demands associated with sentence
comprehension by changing the perceptual demands of the
task. Miyake et al. (1994) reported a series of experiments
using RSVP, in which low-, medium-, and high-
capacity subjects were required to indicate the actor or an-
swer questions about sentences that required syntactic
analyses to be understood. Miyake et al. reported significant
interactions between span group and sentence type. To de-
termine whether these interactions reflected differences in
the ability of subjects with different working memory ca-
pacities to utilize syntactic structures, we reanalyzed the
data from the one experiment for which sufficient data were
available for reanalysis and found that subjects with differ-
ent working memory capacities did not perform differently
as a function of syntactic complexity (Caplan & Waters
1995). The group-by-sentence-type interaction was due to
poorer performance by low-span subjects on sentences with
two propositions compared to sentences with one proposi-
tion. The larger effect of the number of propositions in low-
capacity subjects suggests that these subjects have more dif-
ficulty than high-capacity subjects retaining in memory
information about the actor in each proposition. Thus, this
study provides evidence that increasing the perceptual de-
mands of a task does not differentially affect the abilities of
subjects with different working memory capacities to
process syntactic structure but may make certain post-in-
terpretive processes more difficult for low-capacity subjects.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the ef-
fects of age on sentence processing. Most studies have
found that working memory declines with age (Salthouse
1991), so the study of age-related changes in sentence com-
prehension provides indirect evidence about the effect of
changes in working memory capacity on this function.
The effects of aging on sentence comprehension abilities
have been examined using a variety of tasks such as object
manipulation (Feier & Gerstman 1980), question answer-
ing (Davis & Ball 1989; Emery 1985), acceptability judg-
ment (Kemper 1988; Obler et al. 1991), and sentence recall
(Norman et al. 1991). Some studies have found that elderly
subjects perform more poorly overall, but that they are not
differentially impaired on syntactically more complex sen-
tences (e.g., Feier & Gerstman 1980). Several studies have
measured sentence processing as a function of age using
on-line tasks. Baum (1991) and Waldstein and Baum (1992)
used a word-monitoring paradigm, in which subjects were
required to monitor for a word that followed an ungram-
maticality in a sentence, to investigate the sensitivity of
younger and older adults to local and long-distance un-
grammaticalities. Although processing times and error
rates of the elderly were higher overall than those of the
younger subjects, there was no evidence that elderly sub-
jects were more reliant on sentential context or that they
were less sensitive to ungrammaticalities. Kemtes and
Kemper (1996) also found that the effect of syntactic am-
biguity on word-by-word reading times did not differ in
older and younger subjects, although the older subjects
were more affected on an off-line measure of accuracy in
responding to questions. We analyzed the data from the
garden path experiment described above (Waters & Caplan
1996b) for effects of age, and found no such effects.
Other studies have shown decreased comprehension of
more complex syntactic structures among the elderly (e.g.,
Davis & Ball 1989; Obler et al. 1991). However, in terms of
the distinction we made above between interpretive and
post-interpretive processing, the tasks on which aging sub-
jects have shown such effects are ones that require elaborate
post-interpretive processing, such as retaining and reorder-
ing large amounts of material in memory (Kemper 1986;
Light 1990) or interpreting implausible sentences (Davis &
Ball 1989; Obler et al. 1991). Thus, in many of these stud-
ies, the effect of age may be attributed to difficulties subjects
might have with processes other than those involved in 
sentence interpretation. In the domain of on-line process-
ing, using a cross-modal naming paradigm, Zurif et al. 
(1995) found that older subjects were delayed in establish-
ing the connection between a gap in a relative clause and the
head of the clause (e.g., determining that it is the man who
is kissed in a sentence such as The man who the woman
kissed was embarrassed). Zurif et al.’s data are difficult to in-
terpret, however, insofar as a comparison group of younger
subjects was not tested on the same materials. We have
failed to find differences as a function of age in listening
times for phrases in high-load positions in more complex
sentences in the auditory moving window task described
above. Overall, the evidence indicates that there is little, if
any, effect of aging on syntactic processing in comprehen-
sion in aging and, therefore, indirectly supports the view that
differences in working memory capacity are not associated
with differences in the efficiency of syntactic processing in
sentence comprehension.
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In summary, several studies have examined the perfor-
mances of subjects with different verbal working memory
capacities in syntactic processing in sentence comprehen-
sion tasks. Most of these studies have not shown differences
as a function of span group, even in processing sentences
with very complex syntactic structures. A few studies have
reported group differences, but these differences might be
due to strategic effects (e.g., different speed–accuracy
trade-offs in different capacity groups) and are inconsistent
across a wider set of studies. Overall, this literature provides
evidence that the speed and accuracy of syntactic process-
ing does not differ in a systematic way in normal subjects
with different working memory capacities as measured by
performance on sentence span tasks. In contrast, there is a
suggestion in the data that low-capacity subjects are more
affected than high-capacity subjects by some sentential fea-
tures, in particular, the number of propositions in a sen-
tence. Given that subjects with different working memory
capacities do not differ in their ability to use syntactic struc-
ture to determine sentence meaning, the larger effect of the
number of propositions among low- versus high-capacity
subjects suggests that low-capacity subjects have more dif-
ficulty with retaining in memory information about the
propositional content of a sentence. We shall present data
pertaining to other post-interpretive functions below.
2.2. Effects of an external memory load on speed and ac-
curacy of syntactic processing. The second approach to
the issue of the possible specialization of working memory
for syntactic processing is to investigate the pattern of mu-
tual interference of verbally mediated tasks. According to
the SR model, verbal memory loads that are imposed ex-
ternal to the comprehension task (such as a concurrent digit
span task) and sentence interpretation draw on the same
pool of resources, and the SR model therefore predicts that
there will be interference between the two. In SSIR theory,
“interpretation-external” and “interpretation-internal” fac-
tors draw on different resource pools; hence the theory pre-
dicts main effects of each but no interference between the
two. We have undertaken several studies; all found the sec-
ond pattern.
In the first study (Waters et al. 1995), we had subjects
match sentences to pictures in a no-interference condition
and in two concurrent verbal load conditions: while retain-
ing a random sequence of digits equal to their span or equal
to one less than their span. Sentences were all semantically
reversible and varied in their syntactic complexity. The ef-
fect of syntactic complexity was examined by comparing
performance on pairs of sentences that were matched for
number of words, propositions, verbs, and thematic roles
but that differed with respect to whether a sentence con-
tained a noun phrase that had been moved, according to
Chomsky’s (1986; 1993) theory, creating a nonstandard or-
der of thematic roles. For instance, object-relativized sen-
tences (e.g., The boy that the girl pushed kissed the baby)
were syntactically complex compared to subject-relativized
sentences (e.g., The girl pushed the boy that kissed the
baby) according to this measure. There was an effect of load
on the sentence accuracy scores but no effect of syntactic
complexity and no interaction of syntactic complexity with
load in these scores or in the digit-recall data. We reexam-
ined this question by changing the task to enactment, which
may be more demanding (Waters & Caplan, submitted).
Subjects had to enact the thematic roles in sentences with
the same structures used in the picture-matching task, in a
no-interference and a digit-load condition. Again, there was
an effect of condition but no interaction of load and syn-
tactic complexity.
These studies used off-line measures of accuracy to as-
sess sentence comprehension, which may not be sensitive
to the effects of a concurrent load. We have carried out one
dual-task study in which subjects’ performances were timed
as well as scored for accuracy (Waters et al. 1987). In this
study, subjects made judgments about the plausibility of
sentences that differed in their syntactic complexity (object
vs. subject relativization) in no-interference and digit-load
conditions (recalling a random sequence of six digits).
There were effects of syntactic type and of load; the inter-
action of load and syntactic complexity was significant in the
sentence data (RTs and accuracy) in the analyses by sub-
jects but not by items.
Although the above results suggest that digit span does
not interfere with syntactic processing in sentence com-
prehension, other studies indicate that digit span does in-
terfere with several verbally mediated tasks (Baddeley &
Hitch 1974), and several researchers have interpreted their
results as showing that digit span affects subjects’ abilities
to process syntactically complex sentences. However, a re-
view of this literature indicates that the effect of a digit load
on syntactic processing occurs only under some task condi-
tions. We summarize this literature here; more complete
discussions can be found in Caplan and Waters (1996) and
Waters et al. (1995).
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) found that a concurrent ran-
dom six-digit load interfered more with subjects’ perfor-
mance on passive than on active sentences in a “reasoning
task” in which subjects had to indicate whether a statement
about a sequence of letters corresponded to the actual pre-
sentation of letters (e.g., A is not followed by B – BA). How-
ever, many factors (order of mention of the letters and the
letter pair, presentation of letters in their alphabetical or-
der in either the proposition or the pair, proactive interfer-
ence, etc.) that might have affected the results were not
considered in the analyses, and the interaction of load and
voice may have been qualified by higher order interactions
that were not considered in this early work on this topic.
Several investigators (Gick et al. 1988; Morris et al. 1988;
1990; Wright 1981) have studied younger and older
subjects on tasks that combine digit load with a sentence-
plausibility (or truth)-judgment task. Many of these studies
have found significant two-way interactions between the
size of a concurrent memory load and sentence complexity.
The sentence complexity metric in these experiments, how-
ever, was the presence of a negative element in the sen-
tence (e.g., A cat does not hunt mice), which significantly
affects the complexity of the judgment task but has little ef-
fect on the complexity of the syntactic structure of the sen-
tence. These studies have not shown interactions of syntac-
tic structure with load.
Other experiments have investigated the effect of a con-
current digit load that has been presented as the requirement
to recall the final word of each of a series of sentences. King
and Just (1991) had subjects read object- and subject-relative
sentences word by word in a self-paced task, while retaining
one, two, or three sentence-final words in memory, and an-
swer questions about the sentences. There was an interaction
between syntactic complexity and memory load in the recall
data. There was no such interaction in the accuracy data, and
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the reading time data were not analyzed for the effect of size
of memory load. A second experiment using the Daneman
and Carpenter paradigm was reported by Carpenter and Just
(1988). In this experiment, sentences were considered more
difficult if they contained less frequent and less concrete
words, and so the effect of a memory load on syntactic pro-
cessing was not investigated. Results using a variant of the
Daneman and Carpenter paradigm were reported by our
group (Waters et al. 1987; Waters & Caplan 1996b). We
found an effect of syntactic complexity (object vs. subject rel-
ativization) on the number of sentence-final words recalled
in a sentence-acceptability-judgment task. Finally, Wanner
and Maratsos (1978) interrupted sentence presentation to al-
low a set of words to be displayed and reported poorer recall
of words in object relativized than in the less complex, sub-
ject-relativized sentences.
This pattern of results suggests that whether or not a con-
current digit load interferes with syntactic processing de-
pends on the relationship of the recall and sentence pro-
cessing tasks. The published literature is consistent with the
generalization that when the stimuli in both the sentence
and the recall tasks are presented in an uninterrupted fash-
ion – as when the digit load is presented prior to each sen-
tence and must be recalled once the sentence has been un-
derstood – no interference is found, but when the
presentation of the stimuli in one task is interrupted by the
presentation of a stimulus relevant to the second – as when
the sentence is interrupted by a series of words while it is
being presented, or the presentation of the items to be re-
called is staggered across the sentence task (as in sentence-
final word recall) – a digit load of sufficient size interferes
with processing syntactically complex sentences more than
with processing syntactically simple sentences. This pattern
of results suggests that the reason for the effect of a digit
load on syntactically complex sentences is not that retain-
ing a sequence of digits and structuring a sentence syntac-
tically compete for the same resource pool but, rather, that
the attentional shifts associated with interrupting each task
interfere with subjects’ abilities to structure sentences syn-
tactically or to use that structure to assign sentence mean-
ing. We have suggested that this might be a secondary ef-
fect of disruptions of lexical access (Caplan & Waters 1996).
(An anonymous BBS referee pointed out that interruption
of a task makes it harder to retrieve information associated
with that task, which also might affect the ability to con-
struct more complex structures.)
An important point to note is that the tasks in which an
interaction between digit load and syntactic complexity has
not been found are not simply so easy that this interaction
cannot be detected. Testing for digit recall at each subject’s
predetermined span guarantees that each subject will be
below ceiling on the recall task. In fact, in the research cited
above, the percentage of trials in which all digits were pro-
duced in correct serial position in the recall task was usu-
ally about 50%. The subjects who have been tested in the
literature cited above also performed below ceiling on at
least some sentence types in which the effects of syntactic
complexity could be examined. Nonetheless, a concurrent
digit load did not lead to an effect of syntactic complexity
except when the presentation of the sentence or the digit
sequence was interrupted by the other stimulus.
In contrast to the failure of a concurrent digit load to af-
fect processing of syntactically more complex sentences
(except when either stimulus is interrupted), the same ex-
ternal verbal memory load has significant effects on sen-
tences with two propositions compared to sentences with
one. Waters et al. (1987) found that a concurrent load of six
random digits interfered more with acceptability judg-
ments about sentences with two propositions than sen-
tences with one. Waters et al. (1995) reported that this was
also the case in a sentence-picture-matching task when the
concurrent digit load was equal to each subject’s span, and
Waters and Caplan (submitted) have found similar results
using an enactment task. This suggests that, unlike the case
with syntactic processing in sentence comprehension, op-
erations on the propositional content of a sentence such as
matching it to knowledge in semantic memory or depictions
of events or using it to plan and execute actions share re-
sources with span tasks.
2.3. Effect of the combination of external memory load
and individual differences in working memory capacity
on speed and accuracy of syntactic processing. A third
approach to the question of the specialization of verbal pro-
cessing resources is the combination of the first two ap-
proaches, looking for the combined effects of individual dif-
ferences in working memory capacity and of external load
on language processing efficiency. The SR theory asserts
that comprehending more complex sentences and main-
taining a larger digit load in memory both require more pro-
cessing resources from the same pool, and that this pool is
smaller in some subjects. Thus it predicts that the expected
impairment of low-capacity subjects on more complex sen-
tences will be exacerbated by a concurrent memory load. In
contrast, the SSIR theory holds that maintaining a digit load
in memory calls on a resource pool that is standardly mea-
sured by tests such as the Daneman and Carpenter reading
span task and that comprehending sentences calls on an-
other pool of resources. Therefore, this model predicts that
low-capacity subjects should perform less well than high-
capacity subjects under conditions of increased verbal
memory load, but it does not predict that this effect should
be greater for syntactically complex sentences.
Relevant data come from several studies. King and Just
(1991) had high-, medium-, and low-capacity subjects read
object- and subject-relative sentences word by word in a
self-paced task while retaining one, two, or three sentence-
final words in memory. For the recall task, King and Just re-
ported significant interactions between group and size of
memory load and between sentence type and size of mem-
ory load but no interaction between group, syntactic com-
plexity, and memory load. In the probe question compre-
hension results, there was a statistically significant main
effect of group, and the effect of sentence type was mar-
ginally significant, but none of the interactions involving
memory load approached statistical significance. The analy-
ses reported by King and Just (1991) thus do not show the
interactions between group, sentence type, and load that
the SR theory predicts.
Carpenter and Just (1988) investigated the number of
words that high-, medium-, and low-capacity subjects re-
called in a Daneman and Carpenter-type reading span task
when the sentences were either “easy” or “difficult.” All sub-
jects performed the task at set sizes 2, 3, and 4 under condi-
tions in which the stimulus materials contained 0, 1, or all dif-
ficult sentences. High-capacity subjects were influenced by
difficult sentences only at set size 4, whereas medium-ca-
pacity subjects were affected by difficult sentences at set
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sizes 3 and 4. However, the authors did not report on the
presence or absence of a three-way interaction between span
group, set size, and sentence type, so it is unclear whether
high- and medium-capacity subjects were differentially af-
fected at either set size 3 or set size 4 by sentence complex-
ity. Contrary to the predictions of the capacity theory, the
performance of low-capacity subjects was unaffected by sen-
tence difficulty at any set size. In addition, in this experiment,
sentences were considered more difficult if they contained
less frequent and less concrete words, so the experiment
does not bear directly on syntactic processing.
We investigated the possibility that syntactic processing
would be more affected by a concurrent verbal memory
load in low-capacity than in high-capacity subjects in en-
actment (Waters & Caplan, submitted), sentence-picture-
matching, and speeded sentence-acceptability-judgment
tasks. Figure 4 shows the data from the enactment task. The
effect of syntactic complexity was greater in the low- than
in the medium-capacity group, but did not differ in the 
low- and high-capacity groups. This effect did not increase
more in the low- than in the medium- or high-capacity sub-
jects in the dual-task conditions. Similar results showing no
increase in the magnitude of a syntactic complexity effect
in low-capacity subjects compared to high-capacity subjects
as a function of the presence of a digit load were found in
the other tasks.
2.4. Some considerations regarding studies of normal
subjects. The results of the studies reviewed above are
consistent with the SSIR model. However, they are subject
to several caveats, which we will discuss here.
The first is that many of the arguments made in the pre-
ceding review are based on null results – the failure to find
differences between different capacity groups in syntactic
processing, to find effects of a concurrent verbal memory
load on syntactic processing, or to find differential effects
of load on syntactic processing in low- versus high-capacity
subjects. Issues of power and related concerns arise in in-
terpreting nonsignificant results. Concerns about the inter-
pretation of null results can be completely laid to rest only
by running a much larger number of subjects than is feasi-
ble (often hundreds or more; Krueger 1994). However,
they can be partially countered by noting there were inter-
actions between sentence type and condition and sentence
type and group in many of the experiments we have re-
ported, but that the sentence type variable entering into
these interactions was one that reflected not syntactic com-
plexity but rather the number of propositions in a sentence.
This suggests that the designs had sufficient power to gen-
erate interactions involving the sentence type factor but
that varying the syntactic form of a sentence does not dif-
ferentially affect low-capacity subjects or performance un-
der dual-task conditions.
Other considerations pertain to the dual-task experi-
ments. One issue is that most work has used the digit span
task as a concurrent verbal memory load designed to com-
pete for resources with sentence comprehension. The span
task has the advantages that load can be equated across sub-
jects by testing each subject at his or her span and that span
represents a patient’s ceiling and thus calls on all resources
that can be devoted to immediate serial recall. Nonetheless,
span may be largely based on a specialized auditory-to-
articulatory information transfer mechanism (Freidrich
1990), and additional research using concurrent tasks such
as random number generation, which Baddeley (1993) has
argued is less highly automatized than span and thus re-
quires more of the limited resources of working memory, is
needed to investigate the effect of a concurrent memory
load on comprehension of syntactically more complex sen-
tences. Preliminary results in our laboratory indicate that
this task also does not interact with syntactic complexity. A
second issue that arises regarding our interpretation of the
dual-task experiments is that we have argued that the ef-
fects of a concurrent memory span task on syntactic pro-
cessing are limited to situations in which the presentation
of the stimuli relevant to one task is interrupted by the pre-
sentation of the stimuli relevant to the second. This sug-
gests that the interference is secondary to switching atten-
tion, retrieving information when a task is interrupted, or
other control processes, rather than shared resources.
These possible explanations of the data must be tested di-
rectly.
Finally, our review of the literature on individual differ-
ences in working memory capacity and concurrent verbal
memory loads on syntactic processing in sentence compre-
hension reveals that many findings with normal subjects
have been hard to replicate. One possible reason for this
difficulty is related to the measurement of subjects’ work-
ing memory capacity. The most widely used measures of
verbal working memory are sentence span tasks, based on
the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) reading span. These
tasks have several characteristics that affect how they may
be interpreted. One is that, although these tasks are designed
to require both processing and storage of verbal material,
only the latter is usually measured. When measurements
are made of performance on the sentence-processing com-
ponent of a sentence span task, the measurement is usually
only of accuracy, not of reaction time, and this measure-
ment does not enter into the determination of which span
group a subject belongs to. Because of this, subjects’ spans
may in part reflect any number of trade-offs between allo-
cating attention and processing resources to the sentence
and recall components of the sentence span task. A second
consideration is that the verbal memory load in a sentence
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Figure 4. Performance of high-, medium-, and low-span sub-
jects on an enactment task with and without a concurrent digit
load. NI, no interference; Span, concurrent span condition.
span task is unrelated to the sentence processing that is re-
quired in these tasks. This introduces a dual-task element
into these tasks and allows them to be heavily affected by
the capacity for dividing attention. Other working memory
tasks (self-ordered number generation, in which subjects
have to produce a random series of the digits 0–9 without
repeating a digit, and externally ordered number genera-
tion, in which subjects have to recognize which digit is omit-
ted in a random series of the digits 0–9; Petrides et al. 1993)
require the memory and processing components of the task
to be related to each other, as they are in naturally occur-
ring tasks that require working memory. For all these rea-
sons, performance on a sentence span task may not be a re-
liable assessment of working memory capacity.
We have investigated the relationship between different
working memory measures and the reliability of several of
these measures (Waters & Caplan 1996c). We tested 94
subjects on the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) reading
span test, a variant of that test we developed in which RTs
and accuracies on a sentence-acceptability-judgment task
as well as sentence-final word recall were measured (Wa-
ters et al. 1987), and self-ordered and externally ordered
number- and design-generation tasks (Petrides et al. 1993).
There were significant correlations between all of these
measures of working memory capacity (r between .52 and
.58), other than the externally ordered design generation
task. This level of correlation is consistent with other re-
ports in the literature (Daneman & Merikle 1996; Engle
1995). However, test-retest reliability was not high. Forty-
four subjects were retested on a subset of these measures
at an average 1-month interval. Sentence-final word recall
scores at the two testing sessions were weakly correlated
(r 5 .41 for the Daneman & Carpenter task). Among the
44 subjects who participated in the follow-up study, 18 sub-
jects (41%) changed in terms of their classification as high-,
medium-, or low-capacity subjects at time 2, with equal
numbers of subjects improving and declining and 22% of
the subjects originally classified as high capacity being re-
classified as low capacity on retesting. These figures call
into question the stability of the most commonly used mea-
sures of working memory capacity. Difficulties in replicat-
ing effects of working memory on syntactic processing
might thus reflect the insecurity of subject classification.
One way to deal with this problem is to use measures of
working memory capacity that are more stable over time.
We found that test-retest reliability improved when we
used a composite measure of working memory capacity that
took into account performance on the sentence processing
as well as the recall portion of a sentence span test (r 5 .88;
Waters & Caplan 1996c). However, little research has been
carried out in which this type of measure is used as the ba-
sis for subject grouping. Another approach is to study pa-
tients with CNS disease as members of a low-capacity
group because their performances are characteristically
stable. There are a few studies that use this approach, to
which we turn below.
3. Studies of patients with reduced working
memory capacity
3.1. Patients with short-term memory disorders. One
group of patients whose sentence comprehension has been
studied fairly extensively are those with intact long-term
memory but specific auditory verbal short-term memory
impairments. Most of these patients have had problems
with rehearsal and/or passive storage functions (see Vallar
& Shallice, 1990, for representative cases). If working
memory capacity plays a central role in language compre-
hension, then one might expect these patients’ extreme lim-
itations in the mechanisms that support central executive
functions to have important effects on their language-
comprehension abilities. The literature clearly establishes
that this is not the case. In a review of all short-term mem-
ory patients published up to 1990, we found no evidence
linking short-term memory impairment to difficulties with
syntactic processing in sentence comprehension (Caplan &
Waters 1990). The literature since that time bears out this
pattern: although both storage and rehearsal impairments
can affect certain aspects of comprehension (Martin &
Feher 1990), these components of short-term memory
have not been related to syntactically based sentence-
comprehension difficulties. Results that are typical of the
dissociation between impaired STM and intact compre-
hension were found in a patient, B.O., whom we tested
quite extensively (Waters et al. 1991). This patient had a
memory span of only two or three items when tested both
on recall and probe-recognition tasks. When tested on the
Daneman and Carpenter task, she had a working memory
span of only one, despite the fact that she had no difficulty
understanding the sentences used in this task when they
were presented in isolation. B.O.’s performance on visual
and auditory enactment tasks and a speeded visual whole-
sentence-acceptability judgment task that tested compre-
hension of many complex syntactic forms was similar to that
of normal individuals and much better than aphasic patients
who have had a left hemisphere stroke. We have also tested
B.O.’s comprehension of garden path sentences under
timed auditory and written whole-sentence presentation
conditions. She performed as well as normal individuals on
these syntactically complex materials (Fig. 5). Parentheti-
cally, B.O. showed a reliably larger effect of the number of
propositions on comprehension than controls, in keeping
with the idea that using the propositional content of a sen-
tence to accomplish a task such as making a judgment about
the plausibility of the sentence makes use of a short-term
memory system that is not required for determining the
sentence’s syntactic form and propositional content.
However, as noted, the majority of patients with STM im-
pairments have impairments in rehearsal and/or storage
functions. The working memory system used in language
comprehension has been claimed to correspond more closely
to the central executive of a Baddeley-type model. The com-
prehension abilities of patients with limitations in the central
executive component of this system thus constitute more di-
rect and critical tests of the relationship between general-
purpose working memory and comprehension.
3.2. Patients with limitations in the central executive. Pa-
tients with dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT) have
been found to have intact functioning of the articulatory re-
hearsal and phonological storage components of working
memory but impairments on tasks that require central ex-
ecutive functions (Baddeley et al. 1991; Morris 1984; 1986;
1987; Morris & Baddeley 1988; Waters et al., in press). We
have found that, when tested on the Daneman and Car-
penter task with simple sentence structures that they have
no difficulty understanding in isolation, all the DAT pa-
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tients we have tested have had Daneman and Carpenter
spans of one or less. Thus, the working memories of these
patients are more reduced than those of normal subjects in
whom the relationship between working memory and syn-
tactic processing has been tested. Moreover, these patients’
performances on working memory tests have been stable or
have deteriorated over time (Baddeley et al. 1991). If the
SR model is correct, then DAT patients should have par-
ticular difficulty with syntactically more complex sentences,
and they should perform differentially poorly on the more
difficult syntactic structures when a concurrent memory
load is imposed. Our work has not found these results in this
population.
In our first study, we tested 22 DAT patients and age- and
education-matched controls for their ability to comprehend
nine different syntactic structures using a sentence–
picture-matching test (Rochon et al. 1994). The stimulus
materials were similar to those used in the sentence–pic-
ture-matching and object-manipulation tasks in the dual-
task experiments described above and were designed to
contrast sentences that were matched for length and other
relevant variables but that differed in syntactic complexity
along with sentences that were matched for syntactic com-
plexity but differed in terms of number of propositions. The
results showed an effect of group, with DAT patients per-
forming more poorly than controls, and a group-by-sen-
tence-type interaction. Analysis of this interaction showed
that DAT patients did not perform more poorly on the syn-
tactically more complex sentences but, rather, that their
performance was poorer than controls on sentences with
two propositions. This pattern of an absence of an effect of
syntactic complexity for DAT patients on sentence–picture
matching has been replicated in several studies (Rochon &
Saffran 1995; Waters et al. 1995; in press). We have also
found the effect in speeded acceptability-judgment tasks.
Figure 6 shows the results of one experiment from our lab-
oratory comparing performance of DAT patients and
matched controls on two-proposition simple and complex
sentences in an acceptability-judgment task. In this task,
both patients and controls showed an effect of syntactic
complexity on reaction times. However, the effect was not
greater in the patients than in the control subjects.
Patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) also have impair-
ments in executive functions (Brown & Marsden 1988;
1991; Lees & Smith 1983; Taylor et al. 1986). We tested 17
nondemented PD patients and age- and education-
matched elderly controls on a battery of tasks that tapped
components of the STM system (articulatory rehearsal and
phonological storage), verbal working memory capacity
(reading span, self-ordered and externally ordered number
generation), and various aspects of executive functions
(Stroop color–word interference, Wisconsin card sorting,
verbal fluency). Subjects were then tested for the compre-
hension of sentences differing in syntactic complexity and
number of propositions, using a sentence–picture-matching
task. Verbal working memory spans were significantly re-
duced in PD patients compared to controls, but rehearsal
and storage functions were normal in span tasks in these pa-
tients. The performance of PD patients differed from that
of controls on the sentence comprehension task, but only
on sentences that contained more propositions (Fig. 7).
Comparisons of sentences that differed in syntactic com-
plexity but that held other factors constant, such as subject-
versus object-relativized sentences, were not significant.
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Figure 5. Performance of patient B. O., with a short-term mem-
ory impairment, and matched control subjects on acceptability
judgment tasks with garden path sentences.
These data suggest that, as with DAT patients, PD patients
do not have impairments in structuring sentences syntacti-
cally.
We have also found that the ability of DAT and PD
patients to structure sentences syntactically is not affected
any more than that of normal subjects by a concurrent
memory load. In one study, DAT patients performed the
sentence–picture-matching task outlined above in a no-
interference condition and while retaining a concurrent
memory load that was equivalent to their span or one less
(Waters et al. 1995). Overall performance was poorer with
the digit load, but comparisons of length-matched sen-
tences showed that the concurrent memory load exacer-
bated the effect of number of propositions, but not the ef-
fect of syntactic complexity, in the patient group. We have
repeated this study with the PD group described above. As
with the DAT patients, the concurrent memory load did not
exacerbate the effect of syntactic complexity in the PD
group (Fig. 8).
These studies used untimed accuracy measures of sen-
tence comprehension. Although they are not subject to the
criticism that effects of syntactic structure were missed be-
cause of ceiling effects (because some comparisons of sen-
tences that differed in syntactic complexity were made on
pairs of sentences on which performance was below ceil-
ing), measures of on-line processing may be more sensitive
than an accuracy result. Using a cross-modal naming task to
study on-line processing in DAT patients, MacDonald and
her colleagues found that DAT patients were as sensitive as
age-matched controls to grammatical violations and as able
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Figure 6. Performance of patients with dementia of the Alz-
heimer type (DAT) and matched normal controls on a sentence-
acceptability judgment task. Simple, syntactically simple sen-
tences; complex, syntactically complex sentences.
Figure 7. Performance of patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD)
and matched controls on a sentence–picture-matching task. Sim-
ple, syntactically simple sentences; complex, syntactically complex
sentences; One Prop, sentences with one proposition; Two Prop,
sentences with two propositions.
Figure 8. Performance of patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD)
on a sentence–picture-matching task with and without concurrent
digit loads. Simple, syntactically simple sentences; complex, syn-
tactically complex sentences; NI, no interference; Span-1, concur-
rent one-less-than-span condition; Span, concurrent span condi-
tion.
as age-matched controls to use frequency information and
semantic and syntactic contexts to resolve syntactic ambi-
guities (Lalami et al. 1996; Stevens et al. 1996). The entire
pattern of performances suggests that DAT patients have
relatively well-preserved abilities to structure sentences
syntactically in sentence interpretation. Preliminary results
in our laboratory indicate that the same appears to be true
of PD patients: A group of 12 PD patients showed the same
pattern of performance as normal controls on the auditory
moving-windows task.
We have combined the use of timed measures with dual-
task conditions in a study of the ability of patients with DAT
to make speeded acceptability judgments to auditorily pre-
sented sentences that varied in their syntactic complexity
under no-interference and two concurrent tracking condi-
tions (Waters & Caplan 1997). In a dot-tracking condition,
subjects were required to press the switch on a mouse that
corresponded to the location of a dot that appeared on the
computer screen (left, middle, or right). In a digit-tracking
condition, a continuous random sequence of the digits “1,”
“2,” and “3” was presented in the center of the computer
screen and subjects indicated which digit had been pre-
sented by pushing one of three switches on the mouse. DAT
and control subjects’ error rates were equated on each of
the secondary tasks by varying the duration of the dot and
digit stimuli and the interval between these stimuli. Pa-
tients showed an effect of syntactic complexity in the RT
and sentence accuracy measures, which did not increase
under the tracking conditions. Patients also showed an ef-
fect of condition, which was not greater for the more syn-
tactically complex sentences. Both patients and controls
showed an effect of syntactic structure in the secondary
task-performance measures, which was not larger for the
patients. Hence this experiment found that a concurrent
task failed to affect processing of syntactically complex sen-
tences more than syntactically simple sentences under very
demanding concurrent task conditions in low-capacity sub-
jects, even when sensitive timed measures of syntactic pro-
cessing efficiency were employed. Our experiments with
DAT and PD thus indicate that patients with severely
reduced working memory capacity retain extremely good
syntactic processing capacities in sentence comprehension.
We note, however, that some authors have asserted that
sentence comprehension is impaired in patients with DAT
(Emery 1985; Kontiola et al.1990; Tomoeda et al. 1990) and
PD (Grossman et al. 1991; 1992; Lieberman et al. 1990;
Natsopoulos et al. 1991). Examination of these studies sug-
gests that DAT patients might have performed poorly be-
cause of impairments they have with aspects of post-inter-
pretive processing, such as deficiencies in their ability to
access semantic knowledge, to enact responses, and to ac-
complish other post-interpretive requirements of many of
these tasks (see Rochon et al. 1994, for discussion). For in-
stance, real-world knowledge is necessary to understand
and to respond to questions that are posed in some com-
prehension tasks (Emery 1985; 1986), and DAT patients
might have done poorly in these tasks because of impair-
ments affecting semantic memory even if they understood
the stimulus sentences. Enactment is a response require-
ment of many of the tasks used (e.g., the token test;
DeRenzi & Vignolo 1962), and it requires visuospatial, per-
ceptual, and practice abilities that are often abnormal in
DAT patients (Christensen 1974). Memory abilities are also
required in many of the tasks used in existing studies (Hart
1988). The studies that show little or no sentence-compre-
hension impairment in DAT patients have tended to use
tasks with simpler demands, such as sentence–picture
matching (Rochon et al. 1994; Schwartz et al. 1979; Sher-
man et al. 1988; Smith 1989; but see Grober & Bang 1995).
The same observations hold true regarding studies in which
sentence-comprehension impairments have been found in
PD patients (Grossman et al. 1991; 1992; Lieberman et al.
1990; Natsopoulos et al. 1991). For instance, Natsopoulos
et al. (1991) had PD patients match a sentence to one of six
pictures. Poor performance on these tasks could therefore
reflect problems in handling these task demands.
We have suggested at several points in this target article
that the effect of the number of propositions in sentence–
picture matching, enactment, and acceptability-judgment
tasks arises at the post-interpretive stage of sentence pro-
cessing. Our finding of an increased effect of the number
of propositions in DAT is consistent with the view advanced
above that these patients’ poor performance on some sen-
tence comprehension tasks is due to their having impair-
ments with such processes. Because of the importance of
the claim that the effect of number of propositions reflects
post-interpretive processing, we have examined the effect
of manipulating the nonlinguistic visual and memory de-
mands of the sentence–picture-matching task on the effect
of syntactic complexity and number of propositions in DAT
patients and controls (Waters et al., in press).
In one experiment, subjects matched a spoken sentence
to one of two pictures that appeared either before or im-
mediately following the presentation of the sentence. The
second experiment used a video-verification task in which
subjects were required to determine whether a spoken sen-
tence matched a videotaped depiction of the action in the
sentence or a syntactic foil. In this task, the spoken sentence
sometimes ended before the action was completed, requir-
ing the propositional content of the sentence to be main-
tained in memory while the action in the video unfolded. In
the third experiment, in different conditions, subjects were
required to determine whether a spoken sentence matched
a single picture or to choose the picture that matched the
sentence from an array of two or three pictures. In all tasks,
DAT patients were affected by the number of propositions
in the presented sentence, but not by the syntactic com-
plexity of the sentence. Comparison across the one-, two,
and three-picture versions of the task showed that the mag-
nitude of the effect of number of propositions increased for
both the DAT and control subjects as the number of pic-
tures in the array increased (Fig. 9). In addition, analysis of
the data from each of the tasks separately showed that the
effect of number of propositions did not occur when the foil
depicted an incorrect lexical item but only when subjects
were attempting to match the target to a foil that required
a syntactic analysis by depicting reversed thematic roles.
These results support the view that the effect of number of
propositions arises at a post-interpretive stage of processing
at which the thematic roles in the sentence are held in
memory and matched against an analysis of a picture.
Finally, in one additional study, we have found evidence
that the effect of number of propositions seen on the
sentence–picture matching task is related to the function-
ing of a general-purpose verbal working memory system.
We examined the relationship between the magnitude of
the proposition effect and DAT patients’ performance on
tasks that assessed primary memory (digits forward, Corsi
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block, auditory and visual word span), articulatory re-
hearsal/ phonological storage processes in STM (auditory
and visual phonological similarity and word length), and
measures of working memory function (digits backward,
working memory span, dual-task performance). The mag-
nitude of the effect of number of propositions was unre-
lated to all of the measures of primary memory and phono-
logical storage/articulatory rehearsal (except visual word
span) but was significantly correlated (r 5 2.62–.70) with
all three working memory measures.
To summarize the results of our studies of the number-of-
propositions effect, we have found that: (1) “intrinsic” limi-
tations in working memory capacity in normal subjects (in
whom the measurement of working memory capacity may be
inaccurate) and in patients with DAT and PD are associated
with an increase in the number-of-propositions effect in sev-
eral tasks; (2) an “extrinsic” verbal memory load imposed by
a concurrent task often increases the number-of-propositions
effect; and (3) the magnitude of the number-of-propositions
effect correlates negatively with measures of working mem-
ory in DAT patients. This set of findings provides support for
the view that the number-of-propositions effect arises at a
stage of processing that shares resources with working mem-
ory tests such as the reading span task. In addition, increases
in nonlinguistic task demands such as the presence of a larger
number of pictures in sentence-picture matching increases
the number-of-propositions effect. This suggests that these
resources are deployed at the post-interpretive stage of sen-
tence processing.
We conclude this section with a brief note on sentence
production in patients with DAT. Although not directly con-
cerned with sentence comprehension, the results of several
studies of this function are suggestively similar to those we
have reviewed in the domain of comprehension.
Fluent, syntactically well-formed speech typically char-
acterizes the conversational output of patients with DAT
and has been found in DAT patients in picture description
(Hier et al. 1985; Kemper et al. 1994) and sentence con-
struction tasks (Schwartz et al. 1979), suggesting to many
researchers that syntactic abilities are preserved in these
patients, at least in the early stages of the illness (Bayles
1982; Blanken et al. 1987; Hier et al. 1985; Illes 1989; Iri-
garay 1973; Kempler et al. 1987; Kirshner 1982; Schwartz
et al. 1979). DAT patients have also been found to correct
errors of syntax and phonology, but not semantic errors, in
anomalous sentences (Bayles 1982) and to make better use
of syntactic than semantic cues in disambiguating spoken
homophones while writing them to dictation (Kempler et
al. 1987; Schwartz et al. 1979).
Although DAT patients have been shown to produce
both oral and written language that is syntactically well
structured, the language production of these patients does
differ from that of age-matched controls in other important
respects. In one study, more than 350 DAT patients were
asked to write a single sentence and these productions were
scored for their length in words and clauses as well as for
the number of propositions produced (Kemper et al. 1993).
The sentences were also scored for six categories of gram-
matic constituents, including pronouns, main verbs, sec-
ondary verbs, negatives, conjunctions, and questions. Re-
sults showed that 89% of the variance in the clinical rating
of dementia severity could be accounted for by sentence
length in clauses and propositional content. This suggests
that the ability to produce propositions in written form is
reduced as the severity of dementia increases. Further-
more, estimates of these linguistic abilities early in life ap-
pear to be powerful predictors of cognitive function and
Alzheimer’s disease in later life. In a longitudinal study,
Snowdon et al. (1996) analyzed autobiographies written by
93 nuns when they entered a convent and evaluated the
cognitive performances of these women when they were
between 75 and 95 years of age (a span of some 58 years).
Alzheimer’s disease was assessed neuropathologically in a
sample of 25 participants who died. A stronger and more
consistent association was found between cognitive func-
tion later in life and the density of propositions in these
early narratives than between cognitive functions and the
grammatical complexity of the narratives. Strikingly, low
idea density was present in the autobiographies of 90% of
women with neuropathologically proven Alzheimer’s dis-
ease but in only 13% of those without Alzheimer’s disease.
Further studies have shown that measures of idea density
and grammatical complexity are highly stable over the life
span (r 5 .62–.74) (Kemper et al. 1996). The authors hy-
pothesize that low linguistic ability early in life may be an
early expression of Alzheimer’s disease neuropathology.
From our point of view, these results suggest a finer dis-
tinction. The greater relationship between measures of
propositional density and DAT than between measures of
grammatical well formedness and DAT is consistent with
the view that these patients are impaired in formulating
concepts but are able to use the forms of language to con-
vey the concepts that they do activate. This is a division of
function related to language production that corresponds to
that we have suggested between post-interpretive and in-
terpretive aspects of the comprehension process.
3.3. Studies of patients with reduced resources for syn-
tactic processing. We may also approach the question of
the relationship between working memory capacity and
syntactic processing in sentence comprehension from an-
Caplan & Waters: Working memory and sentence
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:1 91
Figure 9. Average combined performance of patients with
dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT) and normal subjects on
sentence–picture matching with one-, two-, and three-picture ar-
rays, as a function of syntactic complexity and number of proposi-
tions.
other angle, by examining the effect of a concurrent mem-
ory load on syntactic comprehension in patients in whom
there is evidence for a reduction in the resources available
for syntactic processing in sentence comprehension. Pa-
tients with aphasia provide such cases.
Research into the nature of the sentence comprehension
impairments seen in patients who are aphasic subsequent to
a left hemisphere stroke has shown that many such patients
have disturbances affecting their ability to use syntactic form
to determine the meaning of a sentence (Caplan et al. 1985;
1996; see Berndt et al., 1996, for review). Several aspects of
the performance of these patients suggests that one reason
for this impairment is a reduction in the processing resources
that a patient can apply to this task. One piece of evidence
that favors this view is that groups of patients have been
shown to have difficulty understanding sentences with more
complex syntactic structures (Caplan et al. 1985). Second,
factor analyses have shown that a single factor on which all
sentence types load accounts for about two-thirds of the vari-
ance in many syntactic-comprehension tasks in aphasic
groups (Caplan et al. 1985; 1996; 1997). Third, cluster analy-
sis shows that patients tend to be grouped according to their
overall level of performance in these tasks, with performance
in more impaired clusters showing greater effects of syntac-
tic complexity (Caplan et al. 1985; 1997). Finally, some pa-
tients have been able to interpret sentences when either of
two syntactic features was present, but not when both were
found in a sentence (Hildebrandt et al. 1987). These patterns
of performance are consistent with the hypothesis that the
problem in syntactic processing in sentence comprehension
seen in many aphasic patients results in part from reductions
in their ability to allocate processing resources to the syntac-
tic-comprehension task.
According to SR theory, any reduction in resources avail-
able for syntactic processing comes from a pool that is shared
with other verbal tasks and, therefore, syntactic complexity
effects will be increased in aphasic patients under a concur-
rent verbal memory load condition. In SSIR theory, these
pools are separate and there is the strong prediction that
aphasic patients will not show an increase in syntactic com-
plexity effects under a concurrent load condition.
We examined the effect of a concurrent digit load on the
sentence-comprehension performance of aphasic patients
(Caplan & Waters 1996). More than 200 aphasic patients
were screened to ensure that we tested only patients who
showed effects of syntactic complexity on a sentence–
picture-matching task, whose performance was below ceil-
ing and above chance on that task, and whose abilities to re-
peat single words permitted them to be tested on a digit-
span task. We selected ten patients who met these criteria,
and tested them on a sentence–picture-matching task in
no-interference and concurrent load conditions (span
and span minus one). Although aphasic patients showed
large effects of syntactic complexity when tested on the
sentence–picture matching test without a concurrent load,
these effects were not exacerbated by the addition of a
memory load. Their performance on the concurrent mem-
ory task was poorer with larger digit loads, but the effect of
syntactic complexity was not exacerbated. In the digit-recall
data, there was an effect of number of propositions but not
of syntactic complexity. These results provide striking evi-
dence for the separation of the resources used in syntactic
processing in sentence comprehension and those required
for span tasks.
3.4. Summary of studies with patient populations. The
studies reviewed in this section provide important evidence
against the single processing resource model. Patients with
several etiologies of CNS disease who have reduced verbal
working memory have been shown to do well on tests of
syntactic comprehension. Where effects of syntactic struc-
ture arise in these groups, the effects are comparable to
those found in normal subjects. Concurrent verbal loads do
not disproportionally affect comprehension of syntactically
more complex sentences in these patient groups. These re-
sults are based on patients’ performances on demanding
concurrent tasks and include measurements of RTs as well
as accuracy. They have documented a domain of retained
functional capacity in the midst of the many cognitive and
executive limitations found in these patients. In the apha-
sic population, for whom several arguments can be made
that there is a reduction in processing resources used for
syntactic comprehension, a concurrent verbal memory load
does not exacerbate the effect of syntactic complexity. All
these results are consistent with the view that the resources
used in syntactic processing in sentence comprehension are
not reduced in patients with reduced verbal working mem-
ory capacity and are not shared by the digit-span task. In
contrast, patients with reduced working memory capacities
have shown larger effects of the number of propositions in
a sentence than control groups, and these effects were
sometimes increased under concurrent-load conditions.
This suggests that the ability to match a proposition to a pic-
ture or to check its plausibility against information in se-
mantic memory is affected in these patients, and is affected
by a concurrent digit-span task. Although other accounts
must be considered, this pattern of results is consistent with
the view that the reduction in working memory seen in
these patients affects these post-interpretive processes and
that the resources used in these post-interpretive tasks are
shared by immediate serial-recall tasks.
4. Discussion: Fractionating verbal
working memory
The studies reviewed above provide strong evidence that
subjects whose verbal working memory capacity is reduced
on standard tests of this function can retain the ability to use
syntactic structure to determine sentence meaning. This is
true not only in normal subjects (i.e., those without neuro-
logical disease), in whom the measurement of working
memory may be unstable over time and lead to misclassifi-
cation, but also in patients with Alzheimer’s disease and
Parkinson’s disease, whose verbal working memory and ex-
ecutive control functions are significantly impaired com-
pared to those of normal subjects. In many experimental
paradigms, the processing of syntactically more complex
sentences is not disproportionately affected by a concurrent
verbal memory load, either in normal subjects or in subjects
with extremely reduced working memory capacity or in
aphasic patients. These results provide evidence that the
working memory system involved in sentence interpreta-
tion is separate from that measured by standard tests of
working memory.
If there is a specialization within verbal working memory
for the assignment of syntactic structure and its use in
sentence interpretation, this specialization may not be re-
stricted to this one aspect of the sentence interpretation
process. Syntactic processing is one of a set of related op-
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erations that transform the acoustic signal into a discourse-
coherent semantic representation in normal, everyday con-
versations. A partial list of other types of operations in this
process includes acoustic–phonetic conversion, lexical ac-
cess, recognition of intonational contours, and determina-
tion of discourse-level semantic values such as topic, focus,
coreference, causality, and temporal order of events. These
operations normally act in concert: a listener computes lex-
ical, propositional, and discourse meanings in every normal
communicative act (Marslen-Wilson 1987). Most re-
searchers consider that the integrated set of operations that
activate representations in sentence and discourse inter-
pretation has processing characteristics that are part of its
usual successful functioning. Processors are thought to be
obligatorily activated when their inputs are attended to.
They generally operate unconsciously, and they usually op-
erate quickly and remarkably accurately. The operations of
the language interpretation process are thus integrated in
two senses: they always compute items within the same re-
stricted set of representational types, and they do so in a
particular manner. Moreover, they are among the most
highly practiced of human cognitive functions. Because of
their integration and degree of overpractice, we have sug-
gested that one resource system is utilized by all these dif-
ferent types of processes that combine in the interpretation
process (Caplan & Waters 1996; Waters & Caplan 1996a).
Because of its greater inclusiveness, we will refer to 
this hypothesis as the “separate language interpretation 
resource” (SLIR) hypothesis, an extension of the “separate
sentence interpretation resource” (SSIR) hypothesis.
According to the SLIR hypothesis, the entire set of op-
erations that compute a coherent discourse meaning de-
pends on a single working memory resource. It would
therefore be supported by the finding that the efficiency of
these operations is positively correlated across normal sub-
jects and that the effects of increasing the working memory
demands of different interpretive operations are interac-
tive. Operationally, the entire system need not be tested for
this hypothesis to begin to be investigated; these predic-
tions can be applied to pairs of operations. For example, the
theory could begin to be tested by investigating the effect
of variables that affect lexical access, such as frequency, and
of variables that affect sentence interpretation, such as syn-
tactic complexity. In the model, the efficiency of post-
interpretive operations is not related to that of interpretive
operations. It therefore predicts that the efficiency of in-
terpretive and post-interpretive operations is not correlated
and that the effects of increasing the working memory de-
mands of interpretive and noninterpretive operations are
not interactive. The SLIR hypothesis predicts that working
memory capacity, as measured on a task that emphasizes
controlled, conscious manipulation of verbal information,
will not correlate with processing efficiency for any com-
ponent of the interpretation process, that a concurrent ver-
bal memory load will not interfere with more demanding
processing within any interpretive component, and that
each language-processing component involved in interpre-
tive processing will be preserved in some neurological sub-
jects with reduced working memory.
The view that we have presented for an integrated set 
of language processing operations in the interpretation
process has been challenged (Just et al. 1996a). One argu-
ment that has been made is that the comprehension process
is not always as automatic and seamless as we have repre-
sented it to be. The sentence with which we began this pa-
per, The man that the woman that the child hugged kissed
laughed, can be interpreted, but its successful interpreta-
tion is not usually obligatory, unconscious, and fast. Re-
analysis of ambiguous lexical items (We hated the cheap ho-
tel room because of all the bugs we saw in it. We realized
our conversations would not be private) and of syntactic
structures (The aggressive trial lawyer questioned in
minute detail by the judge hesitated) also often involves
conscious, slow, controlled processing. So does drawing
certain types of complex inferences (Harvey frequently in-
vested in junk bonds. He now sells pencils at the corner of
Broad and Main), or revising inferences (John returned
home from the auction $500 poorer. He swore he would
never attend a function in a rough part of town again). Lis-
teners appear to accomplish sentence interpretation in two
ways, in the usual obligatory, unconscious and fast mode, or
in a mode in which conscious, controlled processes are ap-
plied to the task. We do not conceive of the latter type of
processing as belonging to the set of operations that we sug-
gest utilize a specialized resource pool. There have been
several models of the change from one processing mode to
another, especially in the area of syntactic reanalysis (see,
e.g., Sturt & Crocker 1996). A research program could be
directed toward the question of whether the divisions made
by these models predict the nature of the working memory
system involved in processing different types of sentences.
A second issue that has been raised is that the interpre-
tation process – specifically, syntactic processing – is influ-
enced by nonlinguistic factors such as pragmatic expecta-
tions (Trueswell et al. 1994) and the frequency with which
particular lexical items co-occur in a language (MacDonald
et al. 1994; see papers in MacDonald 1997). These findings
do not undermine the analysis presented here. The fact that
the interpretation process can accept such information as
input does not entail that it cannot be distinguished from
other verbally mediated functions. One way to distinguish
it is on the basis of the combination of its input, its inter-
mediate representations, and its output compared to those
of post-interpretive tasks. We may think of interpretive pro-
cesses as a function that maps the acoustic signal onto a rep-
resentation of the preferred literal meaning of sentences in
a coherent discourse, that computes an intermediate set of
linguistic representations (phonemes, words, syntactic
structures, etc.). No other function accomplishes this map-
ping. Most post-interpretive processes are functions be-
tween the output of this process and logical entailments,
confirmations of the presence of a proposition in a memory
system, plans for action, or some other endpoint. Very few
functions other than language interpretation compute any
of the intermediate representations that are computed by
the interpretation process, and none computes all the rep-
resentations that are routinely computed by this process. In
short, encapsulation in Fodor’s (1983) terms was only one
hypothesized feature of the interpretation process. The in-
terpretation process does not have to be encapsulated to be
cognitively separable or to rely on a specialized resource
pool (Caplan 1985).
If we tentatively accept the view that there is a special-
ization in the verbal working memory for language inter-
pretation, we may try to place this specialization within a
neurobiological context. One can only speculate about the
origin of such a specialization. It may be the product of in-
nately determined neural development (Rakic 1988), prac-
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tice (Grafton et al. 1992; 1995), or both. No data are
presently available that determine this issue.
Somewhat more is known about the neural systems that
may support such a specialization, although knowledge in
this area is also very incomplete. There is strong evidence
that the dominant perisylvian association cortex is critical
for all language-interpretive functions (Caplan 1987). This
area is the best candidate for the location of the neural sys-
tem that supports the processing resources used in language
interpretation. As regards specifically syntactic processing
in sentence comprehension, lesions throughout this region
affect syntactic processing in sentence comprehension in
ways that suggest a reduction in available processing re-
sources (Caplan et al. 1985; 1996; 1997). It has been sug-
gested that one region in the left perisylvian cortex – the
pars opercularis and traingularis of the third frontal convo-
lution, Brodmann’s areas 44 and 45 (Broca’s area) – might
be particularly important in this function. Evidence sup-
porting this localization comes from the finding that on-line
processing of sentences with relative clauses is abnormal in
patients with Broca’s aphasia, who tend to have lesions that
involve this region, but not in patients with fluent aphasias,
whose lesions tend to spare this area (Swinney & Zurif 1995;
Swinney et al. 1996; Zurif et al. 1993). Studies of event-re-
lated potentials have also identified an early negative wave
in the left frontal region associated with processing object-
relative clauses (Kluender & Kutas 1993; Neville et al.
1991), and two studies have shown a localized increase in re-
gional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in the pars opercularis
when subjects made acceptability judgments about sen-
tences with object- as opposed to subject-relative clauses
(Caplan et al., in press; Stromswold et al. 1996). These re-
sults are consistent with a narrower degree of localization 
of processing resources used in at least one aspect of syn-
tactic comprehension in Broca’s area. Not all available 
data support this localization, however. Just et al. (1996b)
have reported increased rCBF in both the left frontal and
the left temporal lobes (and, to a lesser degree, in the ho-
mologous contralateral cortical regions) in a question-
answering task using sentence types that were similar to
those tested using acceptability judgment by Stromswold et
al. (1996). These differences across studies have not yet
been explained. Overall, the picture that emerges is that as-
sociation cortex in the dominant perisylvian region is sup-
ported in all likelihood by sustaining projections from thal-
amus and basal ganglia and probably also the contralateral
nondominant perisylvian association cortex, is responsible
for language interpretation, and is the best candidate for the
locus of the resources that are used in this aspect of lan-
guage processing.
In contrast, many studies show that working memory
tasks that involve conscious, controlled processing of lan-
guage representations activate dorsolateral frontal regions
of the left hemisphere rostral to the perisylvian association
cortex (for representative results, see Jonides et al., 1993,
and Petrides et al. 1993). The division of neural structures
into a perisylvian cortical region involved in language inter-
pretation and a more anterior region that supports con-
scious, controlled verbal working memory functions is con-
sistent with the division within the verbal working memory
system that we have advocated here.
It is worth noting that there are areas of the brain that
may be involved in both types of tasks. For example, the an-
terior cingulate gyrus is activated in a wide variety of tasks
– both those that involve language interpretation and those
that involve conscious, controlled verbal working memory
– and has been hypothesized to be a structure involved in
setting subjects’ level of arousal, thereby allowing them to
devote resources to a task (Posner et al. 1988). SLIR theory
does not deny the existence of such regions, but its support
comes from the existence of regions that contribute to
working memory in only one of these types of language
functions.
In summary, we have presented evidence that the use of
processing resources in assigning syntactic structure and
using that structure to determine the meaning of a sentence
is separable from a subject’s verbal working memory ca-
pacity as measured by standard working memory tasks. We
have accordingly argued that the working memory system
contains specializations for different verbal processes and
that one such specialization is used for the integrated pro-
cesses involved in the determination of the meaning of dis-
course. Our hypothesis requires additional specification
that can come only as models of both language processing
and working memory become better developed and justi-
fied, but it can be tested in the context of present-day
knowledge about both language processing and working
memory.
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NOTES
1. These predictions depend on the assumption that the slope
of the relationship between resource demands and sentence com-
plexity is monotonically increasing. This simplifying assumption
has been made throughout the literature on sentence processing
and working memory. We make it in interpreting the results pre-
sented below, recognizing that it will have to be empirically vali-
dated or that more complex models will have to be adopted and
tested.
2. This conclusion depends on the size of the resource pools in
a separate-sentence-interpretation-resource model being uncor-
related. However, although the possibility of correlated sizes of
resource pools provides an “out” for the separate-sentence-
interpretation-resource model in the case that there are interac-
tions between sentence complexity and working memory capacity
group, it is fair to say that such interactions still favor the single-
resource model, at least by making the separate-resource model
adopt more complex assumptions.
3. Span is often contrasted with concurrent articulation (re-
peating a single word such as “the” or “double”), which is thought
only to interfere with rehearsal, not to compete with another task
for central executive resources (Baddeley & Hitch 1974; Just &
Carpenter 1992).
4. These predictions also depend on assumptions about floor
and ceiling effects in experimental results. For instance, if the
combination of task and sentence-processing demands is less than
the working memory resources available to even low-span sub-
jects, ceiling effects would be expected to eliminate interactions
between load, sentence type, and span group. Much more com-
plex patterns of results can be predicted if other assumptions
about floor and ceiling effects are made (see Waters & Caplan
1996a, footnote 3).
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Abstract: We argue that if a different definition of sentence complexity is
adopted and processing capacity is assessed in a way that is consistent with
that definition, then the Caplan & Waters distinction between interpretive
versus postinterpretive processing is unnecessary insofar that it applies to
the thematic role assignment in relative-clause sentences.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) propose a distinction between interpre-
tive and postinterpretive processing. The distinction implies that
determining who did what to whom by assigning nouns to their
thematic roles imposes little or no processing load in relative
clause sentences such as sentences (1) and (2), but does impose a
load in sentences such as sentence (3) (sect. 4).
1. The duck that the monkey touched walked.
2. The artist that the waiter warned the chef about talked.
3. The clown that the teacher that the actor liked watched
laughed.
Our claim is that loads are imposed by all three sentence types
but that their magnitudes differ. We quantify processing loads 
in terms of Halford et al.’s (in press) domain general metric of 
relational complexity. “Relational complexity” refers to the arity 
of relations, that is, the number of arguments or entities that are
related. Each argument corresponds to a dimension and an 
N-ary relation is a set of points in N-dimensional space. The num-
ber of dimensions corresponds to the number of interacting 
variables that constrain responses. Unary relations have a single ar-
gument as in class membership, dog(Fido). Binary relations have
two arguments as in larger-than(elephant, mouse). Ternary rela-
tions have three arguments as in addition(2,3,5). Quaternary rela-
tions such as proportion have four interacting components as in 
2/3 5 6/9. Quinary relations entail five interacting components.
Thus a metric of relational complexity is defined, and processing
load is predicted to increase with complexity. Tasks that require
more than a quaternary relation to be processed in parallel are pre-
dicted to impose loads that exceed the capacity of the average
adult. When capacity limits are exceeded, individuals will attempt
to use segmentation and chunking strategies to reduce complexity.
We have used this metric to quantify the complexity of relative-
clause sentences. Complexity corresponds to the number of role
assignments that must be made in the same decision. Because
of the nonstandard order in which the roles occur in center-
embedded (CE), object-relative sentences and their low fre-
quency of occurrence, most people lack strategies for segmenting
the sentences so that role assignments can be made sequentially.
Consequently, the assignments are likely to be made in the same
decision. Sentences (1), (2), and (3) require, respectively, three,
four, and five role assignments and have the complexity of ternary,
quaternary, and quinary relations. Right branching (RB), subject-
relative sentences such as sentences (4), (5), and (6), which occur
more frequently and are easily segmented because the roles occur
in standard order, serve as controls for number of role assignments
and semantic content.
4. The monkey touched the duck that walked.
5. The waiter warned the chef about the artist that talked.
6. The actor liked the teacher that watched the clown that
laughed.
We used visual, self-paced presentation of sentences with probe
questions such as Who verbed? Who was verbed? What did the
noun do? to assess comprehension in normal adult participants.
Results were consistent with the complexity metric in that com-
prehension difficulty increased with number of roles, but this ef-
fect was greater for CE than for RB sentences.
We focus here on the capacity–comprehension relationship.
We included a reading span task reflecting Just and Carpenter’s
(1992) working memory approach and an n-term premise-
integration task based on Halford et al.’s (1998) relational com-
plexity approach. The n-term test requires reasoning about ordi-
nal relations between elements. The items varied in complexity as
defined above. We found a significant correlation of reading span
with four-role CE sentences, r 5 .41, p , .05, but not with three-
role CE or five-role CE sentences, r 5 .15 and r 5 .11, respec-
tively. N-Term performance was significantly correlated with
three-role CE, r 5 .24, p , .05 (one-tailed), four-role CE, r 5 .45,
p , .001, and five-role CE sentences, r 5 .48, p , .001. These
patterns are not consistent with C&W’s distinction, which would
predict significant capacity–comprehension correlations for five-
role CE sentences only, because these require post-interpretive
processing.
The n-term–comprehension correlations are consistent with
the interpretation that understanding CE sentences entails pro-
cessing of complex relational information. There was also evi-
dence of a capacity 3 complexity interaction, which C&W claim
is not generally found. The required interaction corresponds to a
significantly higher correlation between capacity and comprehen-
sion for sentences of higher complexity than for sentences of lower
complexity. Stiger’s (1980) T2 statistic showed that the correlation
of n-term with the average of four- and five-role CE sentences
(r 5 .59) was significantly higher than with three-role CE sen-
tences (r 5 .24), T2(62) 5 2.81, p , .05. The correlation of read-
ing span with four-role CE sentences was significantly higher than
with three-role CE sentences, T2(62) 5 1.98, p , .05 (one-tailed).
Note that this latter interaction does not involve five-role CE sen-
tences, which C&W claim are the ones that require verbal work-
ing memory.
These interaction effects entail the manipulation of complexity
in terms of number of role assignments made in a single decision.
In the studies reviewed by C&W, the complexity manipulations
typically involved comparing sentences with the same number of
role assignments but that differ in form (e.g., CE object-relative
vs. CE or RB subject-relative, see sects. 2.1 and 2.2). In our 
work, the capacity measures were sensitive to the form manipula-
tion only if sentences required four or five roles assignments. The
correlation of reading span with four-role CE sentences (r 5 .41)
was significantly higher than with four-role RB sentences (r 5
.14), T2(62) 5 2.08, p , .05. The correlation of n-term with five-
role CE sentences was significantly greater than with five-role RB
sentences (r 5 .15), T2(62) 5 2.08, p , .05. Observation of sig-
nificant capacity 3 complexity interactions seems to require con-
sideration of number of role assignments in addition to sentence
form. In defining complexity in terms of the number of roles as-
signed in the same decision, the relational complexity approach
achieves this in a way that incorporates all relative-clause sen-
tences.
The need to distinguish between relative clause sentences in
which role assignment requires interpretive versus post-interpre-
tive processing appears to be eliminated. However, our data do not
preclude the usefulness of the distinction in other contexts.
Commentary/Caplan & Waters: Working memory and sentence comprehension
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:1 95
Interfaces in memory
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Abstract: A distinction between interpretive processing and post-inter-
pretive processing calls for a consideration of interface relations in systems
of verbal memory. Syntactic movement of a phrase and the cognitive sys-
tem of thought/mind interact. Systems of declarative memory and proce-
dural memory interact.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) develop an interesting idea about the
modular character of verbal working memory, but their central
claim – that verbal working memory is composed of subsystems
specialized for different types of verbal tasks – suffers from prob-
lems.
Displacement of a phrase and the cognitive system of
thought/mind interact. Experimental results indicate that an
English object-relativized sentence is more demanding for inter-
pretive processing in verbal memory than a subject-relativized
sentence. According to C&W, the same is not true for post-inter-
pretive processing in verbal memory: there is no correlation be-
tween the efficiency of interpretive and post-interpretive processes
(as in sentences 8 and 11). But an object relativized sentence can
be more demanding, because it contains two displacements: a
movement of the object phrase and a movement of the subject
phrase. This “displacement property” is an important aspect of
language; phrases are interpreted as if they were in a different po-
sition in the sentence, where similar items sometimes do appear
and are interpreted in terms of natural local relations (Chomsky
1997). In generative grammar, movement rules express the dis-
placement property. Why should language have the displacement
property? According to Chomsky (1997), it is motivated by inter-
pretive requirements that are externally imposed by our systems
of thought/mind. Displacements can be described in terms of in-
terpretation: new versus old information, topic/comment, speci-
ficity, foreground versus background information, the agentive
force that we find in displaced position, and so on. “These seem
to require particular positions in temporal linear order, typically 
at the edge of some construction” (Chomsky 1997, p. 17). Object-
relativized sentences and subject-relativized sentences contain a
displaced object or subject at the edge of structure, respectively.
Differences in their structural complexity reflect differences in
their interpretive features as imposed by the system of thought/
mind. Hence the areas for a specialization in the verbal working
memory for language interpretation are far from clear. A distinc-
tion between interpretive processing and post-interpretive pro-
cessing calls for a consideration of interface relations.
Degree of modularity? C&W refer to data on processing
garden-path sentences like (8)–(10). These data indicate that
garden-path sentences are harder to process for both high- and
low-capacity subjects, regardless of the animacy of the first noun.
C&W claim that this provides evidence for similar degrees of
modularity of syntactic processing in both high- and low-capacity
subjects. We do not know why. The data referred to indicate only
that garden-path sentences are harder to process than normal
ones. These results can be expected in single resource (SR) and
separate sentence interpretation resource (SLIR) theories as 
well. The data say nothing about degrees of modularity.
Systems of memory interact. C&W claim that experiments
with patients who suffer from serious cognitive disorders such as
dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT) or Parkinson’s disease
(PD) also support the modularity of verbal working memory sys-
tem. It is not clear what kind of relations there are between ver-
bal working memory and declarative memory and procedural
memory. Ullman et al. (1997) present evidence that the lexicon is
part of declarative memory system and that grammatical rules are
processed by a procedural system. They describe Alzheimer dis-
ease (AD) subjects with severe impairments in learning new facts
and words and remembering old ones, with relative sparing of the
learning and processing of motor and cognitive skills. They found
AD patients to be relatively unimpaired in the processing of rule-
governed word forms and in processing the syntax of sentences.
According to Ullman et al. (1997), PD patients exhibit impair-
ments in the learning of motor and cognitive skills. PD patients
also have difficulty with grammar, especially with syntax. They
have trouble understanding sentences, and their spontaneous
speech is syntactically simple. Recognizing words and facts re-
mains relatively unimpaired. PD and AD groups show comple-
mentary deficits in rules and lexicon. C&W claim that AD patients
with impaired working memory retain good syntactic processing
capacities. It is surprising that C&W fail to find substantive dif-
ferences in performance in PD patients. How can PD patients
with impaired grammar (syntax) preserve good syntactic process-
ing capacities? How can both AD and PD patients be impaired in
post-interpretive processing alike? Does it mean that specializa-
tion in working memory is independent of declarative memory
and procedural memory? Surely impairments in procedural mem-
ory and/or declarative memory affect a subsystem in working
memory.
Ullman et al. (1997) report no essential differences for declar-
ative memory in storing either facts or words and no essential dif-
ferences for procedural memory in the processing of motor/per-
ceptual skills and processing the syntax of sentences. This
correlation weakens the idea of linguistic specialization in work-
ing memory. The findings of Ullmann et al. and C&W are incom-
patible.
I think linguistic projection from declarative to procedural
memory is possible and necessary. Lexical items are retrieved
from declarative memory, but they have to be combined to form
an utterance, so they must be “transferred” to procedural mem-
ory. Grammatical (agreement) features of these items in an utter-
ance must be checked, and likewise in procedural memory. For
syntactolexical integration as such, attaching the content words to
the syntactic frame, interaction between the two memory systems
is again necessary. This fits well with a view on working memory
as involving the circuitry of frontal and parietal/temporal areas.
Not so fast: Domain-general factors can
account for selective deficits in 
grammatical processing
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Abstract: Normals display selective deficits in morphology and syntax un-
der adverse processing conditions. Digit loads do not impair processing of
passives and object relatives but do impair processing of grammatical mor-
phemes. Perceptual degradation and temporal compression selectively
impair several aspects of grammar, including passives and object relatives.
Hence we replicate Caplan & Waters’s specific findings but reach oppo-
site conclusions, based on wider evidence.
Passives and object relatives are more difficult for agrammatic
aphasics to process and interpret than actives and object relatives.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) ascribe this well-known fact to deficits
in a domain-specific grammatical processor, with a syntax-specific
pool of working memory resources. They base this conclusion on
evidence involving comprehension of a small subset of English
syntactic structures, in patients with agrammatic aphasia, patients
without receptive agrammatism despite working memory deficits,
and young adults stratified by memory span and/or tested under
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a digit load to simulate deficits in domain-general working mem-
ory. Against Miyake et al. (1994), who simulated receptive agram-
matism in normal subjects with speeded visual stimuli, C&W do
not find specific effects on “hard” sentence types as a function of
digit load or memory span. We have replicated C&W’s results, but
we have also replicated those of Miyake et al., and we believe that
C&W have moved too fast in reaching their broad conclusions
about the autonomy of grammatical processing. Using a broader
range of structures, languages, and patient groups, with controls
tested under a broader range of adverse processing conditions, 
we conclude that specific deficits in grammar can be explained
without recourse to a domain-specific resource or processing de-
vice. Our interpretation differs from that of Miyake et al., but it is
similar in spirit.
First, the same hierarchy of difficulty (actives, subject relatives
. passives, object relatives) has been observed in several languages
and in many different populations, including Broca’s aphasics,
Wernicke’s aphasics, anomics without expressive agrammatism,
and individuals in the early stages of first- or second-language ac-
quisition. The pattern is not unique to any form of aphasia or to
any lesion site (Dick et al. 1998; Naucler et al. 1998).
Second, other facets of receptive agrammatism (deficits in the
use of function words and grammatical inflections) have been ob-
served in a broad range of patient populations as well as in nor-
mals subjected to a broad range of stressors. Published and un-
published studies from our laboratory have simulated selective
deficits in morphology (with relative sparing of word order) in col-
lege students processing under a digit load, a partial noise mask,
low-pass filtering, and/or auditory compression. These results
hold true, in varying degrees (depending on the strength of each
information type under normal conditions), in English, Italian,
and German (Bates et al. 1994; Blackwell & Bates 1995; Kilborn
1991).
Third (and most relevant to C&W’s claim), selective deficits in
the processing of passives and object clefts have been demon-
strated in English college students, but under conditions different
from those adopted by C&W. Because they failed to demonstrate
effects of digit load or working-memory capacity on the above sen-
tence hierarchy, C&W conclude that syntactic processing is af-
fected only by deficits within a syntax-specific pool of processing
resources and not by reductions in working memory outside this
domain (as claimed by Miyake et al., based on results with speeded
presentation). We have shown that C&W and Miyake et al. are
both right: college students tested under a digit load (a task that
disrupts computation of subject–verb agreement and other in-
flectional phenomena in our laboratory) are unimpaired in their
ability to process passives and object clefts (replicating C&W), but
students tested under perceptual degradation and/or temporal
compression are selectively impaired on precisely those sentence
types (replicating Miyake et al. in the auditory modality). Fur-
thermore, students tested with both compression and perceptual
filtering produced superadditive results, greater than those we
would expect from adding separate effects of compression and
degradation alone, and identical to results for aphasic patients in
the same paradigm (similar error rates and similar patterns of in-
dividual variation in a cluster analysis) (Dick et al. 1998).
We conclude that the specific challenges posed by passive and
object relatives are not unique to a single aphasia type and can be
explained without recourse to syntax-specific mechanisms or to
damage involving specific lesion sites. We propose a domain-
general account of the specific difficulties posed by low-frequency
syntactic structures that differs from the working-memory pro-
posal of Miyake et al., reflecting the effects of structural frequency
on encoding (activation of stimuli) rather than memory (mainte-
nance of stimuli in working memory). Grammatical morphemes
are vulnerable to stressors of either type (including digits); low-
frequency word orders are vulnerable at encoding but form solid
memory traces that are mnemonically robust if they make it over
the encoding threshold. This would explain why patients with
working memory deficits do not show the predicted pattern, but
it does not permit C&W to leap to a much stronger conclusion,
namely, that syntactic deficits reflect damage to an autonomous
processor, independent from the processing resources used by
other cognitive systems. Our account makes differential predic-
tions for the fate of complex sentence types under stress in cross-
linguistic comparisons, results that are supported by preliminary
findings for German and Italian.
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Abstract: We agree with Caplan & Waters that there are problems with
the single-resource theory of sentence comprehension. However, we chal-
lenge their dual-resource alternative on theoretical and empirical grounds
and point to a more coherent solution that abandons the notion of work-
ing memory resources.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) argue for the inadequacy of the single-
resource theory of verbal working memory in sentence compre-
hension. We are sympathetic to this position and see two ap-
proaches to developing an improved account. One is the approach
that C&W adopt: dividing the single working memory resource
into two independent resources, each dedicated to a particular
processing module. The other is to reject the construct of a lim-
ited processing resource; Navon (1984) clearly articulated this po-
sition and likened the notion of processing resources to a theoret-
ical “soup stone,” contributing no explanatory power to theories of
cognition. We have elsewhere advocated this position for theories
of language comprehension and have argued that the abandon-
ment of the notion of verbal working memory provides a superior
account of the individual differences in sentence-comprehension
abilities that C&W review (MacDonald & Christiansen 1998). We
see C&W’s dual-resource account as nothing more than cracking
the superfluous soup stone into pebbles. Instead, we suggest that
individual differences emerge from interactions between varia-
tions in linguistic experience (e.g., some people read more than
others) and processing architecture (e.g., some people have more
accurate phonological representations than others). Thus, indi-
vidual differences in working memory tasks correlate with lan-
guage comprehension not because there is a separate resource
constraining these tasks but rather because the same architectural
and experiential constraints that shape the accuracy of language
comprehension also affect skill in performing verbal working
memory tasks.
C&W have noted that understanding a sentence and following
instructions are not the same thing, a point that no one would wish
to dispute. They have reified this observation into a claim about
separate working memories, however, and this move is an unfor-
tunate one for a theory of cognitive processes. The motivation for
the fractionated working memory is that performance in the two
arenas is not particularly well correlated. By this logic, any two
poorly correlated tasks should be constrained by separate working
memories; the proliferation of working memories would be enor-
mous. Indeed, it is not at all clear why C&W propose only two
working memories for language; segmenting the speech stream,
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activating lexical semantics, parsing, and pronominal reference in-
terpretation are very different processes, and probably abilities in
these areas are not perfectly correlated, yet C&W assume that
these processes are all part of one “interpretive” working memory.
Thus, the decision to have one vs. two vs. twenty working memo-
ries is unprincipled.
A serious concern with all resource theories is that they are
nearly impossible to falsify, because there is no theory of how re-
ductions in resource availability will affect the myriad processes
that purportedly draw on the same resource. By dividing this re-
source into two pools each constraining many processes, C&W
have not made this concern go away; they have compounded it.
C&W suggest that current data do not yield the complex interac-
tions predicted by the single-resource theory, but in fact they re-
view almost every conceivable pattern of data (including those
with the putatively crucial interactions) and conclude that no re-
sult is inconsistent with their account. It is always possible to in-
vent a scenario in which comprehenders allocate resources to
tasks in a way that accounts for the data, especially if the sizes of
the two “independent” resource pools are positively correlated, as
C&W imply.
Whereas C&W go to great lengths to explain away conflicting
data from studies with young normal adults, they may appear to
be on firmer ground with data from patient populations. We sus-
pect that this situation is merely an artifact of the paucity of on-
line studies of language comprehension and working memory in
these populations. Contrary to C&W’s claims, our work with pa-
tients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) has shown that these pa-
tients’ on-line sentence processing is impaired compared to that
of controls (Almor et al. 1998). Patients appear equivalent to nor-
mal individuals in cross-modal naming only when the stimuli are
constructed in such a way that subjects can ignore all but a few
words in the sentence (typically the last few) and still perform the
task accurately. Moreover, Almor et al. (1998) found that AD and
normal subjects’ accuracy producing and interpreting pronouns
correlated well with performance on putatively “post-interpre-
tive” working memory measures. Thus C&W’s claim that patients
with impaired “central executive functioning” have normal syn-
tactic processing is not supported by studies that carefully manip-
ulate the on-line processing demands of the stimuli. Instead, the
ability to develop a discourse representation, a key part of “inter-
pretive processing” in C&W’s account, is related to performance
on “post-interpretive” working memory tasks.
Much of the confusion in C&W’s account stems from a narrow
view of sentence processing and a failure to appreciate that no-
tions of working memory are inseparable from views of process-
ing architecture. C&W make several mistakes in their discussion
of sentence-processing theories, including (1) an inconsistent
blending of constraint-based and reanalysis approaches to ambi-
guity resolution and (2) questioning the lack of reading effects in
ambiguous sentence regions for ambiguities in which no theory
predicts any effects in this region. At the architectural level,
C&W’s account (as well as the single-resource theory) incorpo-
rates the assumption that sentence comprehension consists of
building syntactic representations word by word as the basis for
semantic interpretation. Working memory resources are needed
for storage of partial processing results. The constraint-based ac-
count that we advocate holds that sentence comprehension in-
volves the parallel application of multiple probabilistic constraints
from sentential and discourse context. In connectionist instantia-
tions of this view, there is no distinction between storage of lin-
guistic knowledge, comprehension processes, and working mem-
ory resources. An individual’s “capacity” to process language is
realized as the efficiency of passing activation through a network
and is constrained by the interaction of network architecture and
experience. Including the notion of working memory resources
adds nothing to this account.
Distinguishing interpretive and 
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Abstract: A separation between interpretive and post-interpretive pro-
cesses is central to Caplan & Waters’s theory of language comprehension.
This commentary raises some issues that are intended to help sharpen the
distinction.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) present an excellent overview of their
research. Their work demonstrates that differences in working
memory capacity do not affect sentence-interpretation processes
themselves but may influence operations performed on the out-
put of those processes. I find the general approach the authors
take convincing, but a number of questions can be raised con-
cerning the distinction between interpretive and post-interpretive
events during sentence comprehension. Let me begin by ac-
knowledging that C&W do go some way toward providing clarifi-
cation on this point in their section 4, entitled “Discussion: Frac-
tionating verbal working memory.” There they suggest that
interpretive processes include accessing words, computing
prosody, assigning thematic roles to syntactic constituents, estab-
lishing coreference (although presumably not coreference rela-
tions that rely extensively on real-world plausibility), and deter-
mining a sentence’s focus-presupposition structure.
What strikes me as requiring more justification are the authors’
assumptions about what constitutes post-interpretive processes.
Likely everyone would agree that it is not really language that tells
us that if Harvey used to sell junk bonds and now he sells pencils
on a street corner he likely lost money, but some of the other pro-
cesses labeled as post-interpretive seem more controversial. For
instance, C&W seem to assume that events involved in sentence
reanalysis are post-interpretive. The examples they give include
We hated the cheap hotel room because of all the bugs we saw in
it; We realized our conversations would not be private; and The
aggressive trial lawyer questioned in minute detail by the judge
hesitated. The first presumably involves lexical reanalysis and the
second syntactic reanalysis. The problem here is that certainly not
all cases of either require post-interpretive processing. For exam-
ple, the sentence The team defeated in the Super Bowl vowed re-
venge next season might require repair once vowed is encoun-
tered, but re-analysis does not seem to require more than the basic
interpretive processes of the sentence-comprehension system. In-
deed, recently Fodor and Inoue (in press) proposed a theory of
syntactic revision that is deliberately designed to keep reanalysis
internal to the sentence-interpretation mechanism. In their the-
ory, when a word cannot be incorporated into the current syntac-
tic phrase marker (vowed in the Super Bowl example above), it is
“attached anyway,” and then the parser faces the syntactic conse-
quences of that attachment by moving right to left through the
tree, making necessary adjustments. Therefore, it seems that
C&W should say much more about what sorts of repair processes
might be post-interpretive and what sorts are not.
Another question concerns C&W’s assumption that sentences
with more than one proposition invoke post-interpretive process-
ing. First, I do not understand how the sentences they give as ex-
amples contrast in number of propositions; second, I do not see
why number of propositions by itself should matter. The authors
devote several paragraphs in the article to their argument that the
processing of multi-propositional sentences interacts with re-
source limitations because such sentences require post-interpre-
tive processing, but they do not really spell out how this is sup-
posed to work. Let us take an example from the beginning of the
paper that is meant to illustrate the contrast:
1. The boy hugged the girl and the baby.
2. The boy hugged the girl and kissed the baby.
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According to C&W, sentence (1) is made up of just one proposi-
tion, but sentence (2) is made up of two. The idea seems to be that
in sentence (1) the boy is simultaneously hugging the girl and the
baby (the three are squeezed into one bear hug), but in sentence
(2) the boy hugs a girl and also kisses a baby (but notice he could
do both at the same time; he could be hugging both, but kissing
only the baby). The claim that there is only one proposition in sen-
tence (1) assumes that comprehenders create a particular mental
model for the sentence, one in which a boy hugs both a girl and a
baby at the same time. The meaning of the sentence is also com-
patible, though, with a situation in which the boy hugs the girl and
then he hugs the baby, in which case clearly the sentence contains
two propositions. It could even be argued that the sentence con-
tains two propositions even in the simultaneous case, because the
representation indicating the meaning of the sentence has to in-
dicate somewhere what agent acted on the baby. The point here
is not that the analysis assumed by C&W is wrong but rather that
their position requires a set of assumptions that are vulnerable to
challenge and so must be explained in more detail.
I will end by repeating that I generally like the approach the au-
thors take in this work. Recently we have begun examining how
unimpaired undergraduates interpret unambiguous sentences
such as The lawyer was sued by the doctor and The dentist was
pulled by the tooth. We are finding striking evidence that sen-
tences that are implausible by virtue of world knowledge – in the
authors’ terminology, by post-interpretive processing – are
processed quite differently from sentences whose sensibility can
be ruled out based on feature mismatch (a tooth cannot be an
agent because agency requires animacy). Even more intriguing is
our finding that, if the two participants in an implausible event
(e.g., The lawyers were sued by the doctor) differ on some gram-
matical feature (plurality in this case), confusion occurs much less
often than when the noun phrases cannot be distinguished with a
grammatical feature. We believe the distinguishing features allow
the two noun phrases to be unambiguously bound to their appro-
priate thematic roles, and as a result misinterpretations are much
less likely to occur (the two noun phrases cannot swap positions).
Data of this sort provide independent and compelling evidence
for the original and creative theoretical perspective C&W present
in their target article, because they require an explanation that as-
sumes a separation between processes that compute interpreta-
tions and so are internal to the language system, and processes 
that evaluate and modify those interpretations and are therefore
external to the system.
Modularity, segregation, and interactions
Karl J. Friston
The Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, Institute of Neurology,
London WC1N 3BG, England. k.friston@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract: This commentary considers how far one can go in making in-
ferences about functional modularity or segregation, based on the sorts of
analyses used by Caplan & Waters in relation to the underlying neuronal
infrastructure. Specifically, an attempt is made to relate the “functionalist”
approach adopted in the target article to “neuroreductionist” perspectives
on the same issue.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) provide compelling arguments in sup-
port of the notion that there is a separate working memory system
for assigning the syntactic structure of a sentence by noting that
there is no interaction between structural complexity and other
processes that require working memory. This is a nice example 
of a general approach to inferring something about the cognitive
architecture of a system given only its outputs (responses) to in-
puts or stimuli that can be manipulated over a number of dimen-
sions. The approach is related to Sternberg’s revision of Donder’s
subtractive method (Sternberg 1969) in which the interactions
among various processes are used to infer something about their
functional organization. Both depend critically on interactions,
and it is this theme that will be pursued in the context of neuro-
biologically motivated analyses of functional anatomy. The key
question, addressed by C&W, is whether the mnemonic aspects 
of interpretive sentence processing are modular or functionally
dissociable from other (e.g., post-interpretive) aspects. This ques-
tion is purely functionalist but implies the existence of distinct
neuronal systems that mediate this processing. An explicit version
of the same question is “Is there functional segregation, in terms
of neuronal systems, for the structural complexity of sentences?”
Much is invested in the term “functional segregation” here, and 
it is worthwhile considering what it means.
The brain appears to adhere to two principles of organization,
functional segregation (Phillips et al. 1984) and the functional in-
tegration of segregated systems, such as cortical areas, subareas,
neuronal populations or individual cells. “Functional segregation”
refers to the selective neuronal responses to specific sensorimotor
attributes. Consider the cortical area V5, a motion-sensitive area
(Zeki et al. 1991) that can be characterized in terms of population
responses (as measured with fMRI or local field potentials with
electrode recordings) to visual stimuli. To demonstrate functional
specialization for motion, one would have to show a high degree
of mutual information between V5 responses and visual motion.
For this area to be functionally segregated, there is a further re-
quirement that there are no responses to other attributes, such as
changes in colour. This constraint has important consequences for
the context sensitivity of speed-dependent responses: imagine
that we characterised the receptive field f(s,l) of a V5 cell as a
function of stimulus speed (s) and wavelength (l). Under segre-
gation, the responses (x) over different speeds should be the same
for any two wavelengths:
x 5 f(s,l1) 5 f(s,l2) 5 f(s).
In short, the speed-dependent responses would be insensitive to the
colour of the stimulus. In other words, functional segregation for a
specific attribute implies that the same responses will be elicited by
changes in that attribute irrespective of the other stimulus attrib-
utes (or more generally the context). Imagine that we measured the
response of V5 to a changes in speed using long-wavelength (red)
stimuli and short-wavelength (blue) stimuli. If we found a response
difference (i.e., a context-sensitive, speed-dependent response),
then functional segregation for motion per se has to be rejected and
we would infer that this area preferred red (or blue) motion (see
Fig. 1 for a schematic illustration of the receptive fields implied by
these situations). This context sensitivity is simply revealed by the
interaction between speed and wavelength in predicting the re-
sponse. Precisely the same construct is used by C&W. In their for-
mulation the response is in terms of speed and accuracy of sentence
processing and the stimulus attribute of interest is structural com-
plexity. They have examined the complexity-dependent responses
(low vs. high) in two contexts to see if there was an interaction. Fail-
ing to find an interaction allows them to assert that functional seg-
regation is a sufficient model for the observed findings. The two
contexts were low and high concurrent working memory load or
subjects with low and high capacity.
The above argument suggests that functional segregation
should involve a series of simple subtractions in different contexts
in order to demonstrate the context-invariant nature of selective
responses. In functional neuroimaging this is the tenet of “con-
junction analyses” (Price & Friston 1997). A conjunction is de-
fined as the presence of a main effect (e.g., of structural complex-
ity) in the absence of interactions (e.g., with memory load). It
would be interesting to revisit this issue with functional neu-
roimaging using a factorial design wherein structural complexity
(high and low) was crossed with memory load (sub- and supra-
span). It is possible that some brain regions would show functional
segregation for complexity (as identified with a conjunction analy-
sis). However, it is likely that some regions would show regionally
specific interactions, speaking to the integration between inter-
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pretive sentence processing and the mnemonic processes engaged
by digit recall. Finding such effects would not detract from infer-
ences about segregation in other brain areas but would speak to
the integration, or coordination, of segregated processing systems
(Friston et al. 1996). Although, to my knowledge this experiment
has never been carried out, it seems extremely well justified by the
psychological background provided in Caplan & Waters.
Interpretative and post-interpretative
processes in sentence comprehension
Edward Gibsona and Rose Robertsb
aDepartment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences and Department of Linguistics
and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
02139 and; bDepartment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. gibson@psyche.mit.edu
rose@psyche.mit.edu
Abstract: We discuss several issues raised by Caplan & Waters’s distinc-
tion between interpretative and post-interpretative processes in sentence
comprehension, including the nature and properties of the two systems,
problems with measuring their respective capacities, and the relationship
between the hypothesized separate-language-interpretation-resource
(SLIR) and the general verbal working memory system that supports post-
interpretive processing.
Caplan & Waters’s (C&W’s) proposed distinction between inter-
pretative and post-interpretative processing leads to several inter-
esting questions.
First, what is the nature of the interpretive system and the re-
sources available to it? For example, what is it about the interpre-
tive system that makes an object-extracted relative clause, as in
sentence (1), harder to comprehend than a subject-extracted rel-
ative clause, as in sentence (2)?
1. The woman whom the waiter insulted left the room.
2. The woman who insulted the waiter left the room.
The range of constructions that have been tested thus far with
respect to C&W’s claims about the working memory resources re-
quired for interpretative processing is quite narrow. If the ob-
served performance differences between aphasics and control
groups on these constructions is due to differences in available in-
terpretative resources in the participant groups, then the same dif-
ference should be present with respect to other sets of linguistic
constructions that differ in the quantity of interpretative resources
that they require in their comprehension. To test these kinds of
predictions of C&W’s claims, it is necessary to have a theory of the
resources required in sentence interpretation. One recent theory
of the computational resources used in sentence processing is pro-
vided by Gibson (1998). According to this theory, the complexity
of a sentence is heavily affected by the distance between words
and their dependent constituents in the sentence. Distance is
measured in terms of the number of previously unmentioned dis-
course referents separating a word and its dependent constituent,
where a discourse referent is an object or an event. Thus the com-
plexity difference between sentence (1) and sentence (2) is caused
by the fact that in sentence (2) the relative pronoun “that” is im-
mediately adjacent to the verb on which it depends (“insulted”),
whereas in sentence (2) the new discourse referent “the waiter”
intervenes between “that” and “insulted.” Given a theory of inter-
pretative resources, other sentence structures can be compared
with respect to their on-line processing complexity. Having an ex-
plicit interpretative complexity theory allows one to make and test
predictions about complexity differences across constructions
within a language and across constructions in other languages.
Second, what are the properties of the working memory system
that is used for post-interpretive processing, and what is the best
way to measure this system’s capacity? As C&W point out, re-
searchers studying human cognition use several different tasks to
assess working memory capacity. The implicit assumption is that
these tasks are all relatively interchangeable measures of the same
underlying function and, thus, that results from experiments us-
ing different tasks can be compared directly. C&W report the 
results of an experiment showing that some common working
memory measures are neither highly intercorrelated nor highly
reliable. In a recent experiment, Roberts and Corkin (1998) have
extended this result: they found that commonly used measures of
working memory, including reading span, backward digit span,
and N-back, are not significantly intercorrelated and are sensitive
to different predictor variables.
C&W suggest that the reading span measure used by psy-
cholinguists to assess working memory capacity measures the
post-interpretive system used for operating on parsed input,
rather than the interpretive system, and that individual differ-
ences observed in this measure are due to differences in the ca-
pacity or efficiency of the post-interpretive system, not to individ-
ual differences in interpretive processing. They state that the
limitation demonstrated by low-capacity subjects is one of “re-
taining in memory information about the propositional content of
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Figure 1 (Friston). Schematic to illustrate the relationship be-
tween interactions and context-sensitive responses. The upper
panel shows the response of a neuronal system to changes in some
attribute to which it is sensitive. In this instance the responses are
insensitive to the context (i.e., there are no interactions between
attribute and context. Conversely the responses in the lower panel
evidence strong interactions and context-sensitivity. These re-
sponse profiles can be thought of as “receptive fields.”
a sentence.” We have observed just such an effect in an experi-
ment measuring response accuracy to probe questions about sen-
tences containing two to five propositions (Roberts et al. 1997).
When subjects are divided into a high-capacity group and a low-
capacity group using the reading span measure, both groups are
near ceiling with two-clause sentences (99% vs. 92%) and are
equally inaccurate with four-clause sentences (34% vs. 31%).
However, high-span subjects are significantly more accurate in re-
calling the propositional content of three-clause sentences (73%
vs. 54%). These data provide evidence that the reading span mea-
sure divides subjects according to their ability to retain informa-
tion about the propositional content of sentences, a post-
interpretive process. There is currently no measure of the capac-
ity of the interpretive processing system that does not tap post-
interpretive processes; designing such a measure remains a goal
for further research.
Third, what is the relation between the systems used for in-
terpretive processing and the general verbal working memory sys-
tem used for post-interpretive processing? C&W claim that the
separate language interpretation resource (SLIR) is a separate
module within working memory, but what is evidence for this
claim? Given that deficit–lesion correlation studies and imaging
studies point to different neurological substrates for the two sys-
tems, and that C&W have experimentally demonstrated that they
do not interact, it seems more plausible to hypothesize that the
SLIR and general working memory are entirely distinct. In any
event, the fact that the two systems appear to be neurally distinct
provides strong evidence against Just, Carpenter and colleagues’
view (see, e.g., Just & Carpenter 1992) that the same units are
used for interpretative processing and storage within working
memory.
What do working-memory tests 
really measure?
Michael J. Kane,a Andrew R. A. Conway,b
and Randall W. Englec
aDepartment of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303-
3083; bDepartment of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago,
IL 30332-0170; and cSchool of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, GA 30332-0170. mkane@gsu.edu aconway@uic.edu
re23@prism.gatech.edu
Abstract: Individuals may differ in the general-attention executive com-
ponent or in the subordinate domain-specific “slave” components of work-
ing memory. Tasks requiring sustained memory representations across at-
tention shifts are reliable, valid indices of executive abilities. Measures
emphasizing specific processing skills may increase reliability within re-
stricted samples but will not reflect the attention component responsible
for the broad predictive validity of span tasks.
We thank Caplan & Waters (C&W) for pointing out the weak-
nesses in the view that language interpretation and parsing are
limited by general, domain-free working memory resources (see,
e.g., Just & Carpenter 1992). Based largely on their earlier work
(Caplan & Waters 1990), Engle and Conway (1998) concluded
that there is little evidence to support the claim that the phono-
logical loop or the central executive plays an important role in the
early stages of language processing. We have argued that the work-
ing memory system is theoretically equivalent to a view of human
intelligence proposed by Cattell (1963) and Horn (1980), which
distinguishes between a domain-free general fluid intelligence
and domain-specific elements of crystallized intelligence, which
are peculiar to knowledge, skill, and talent.
Our view, derivative of Baddeley and Hitch (1974), sees work-
ing memory as a system of (1) activated traces, which are the out-
put of domain-specific processors, and (2) domain-free controlled
attention (Engle et al., in press b; Kane & Engle 1998). Individu-
als may vary in the quality and skill of their domain-specific proces-
sors. They may also vary in their general fluid ability to bring con-
trolled attention to bear on managing information in the tempo-
rary storage buffers and on resolving conflict at output (cf. Shallice
& Burgess 1993). Thus, variability on working memory tasks can
reflect individual differences in the domain-specific processors,
the domain-free controlled attention, or both.
We argue that the general capability to sustain an active mem-
ory representation in the face of attention shifts or distraction is
what drives the relationship between working memory span mea-
sures and diverse higher order capabilities. C&W complain that
the processing component of working memory span tasks “intro-
duces a dual-task element into these tasks and allows them to be
heavily affected by the capacity for divided attention.” We argue,
however, that the divided-attention component is the strength of
working memory span tasks. The divided-attention component is
critical to the broad predictive validity of span tasks (and, there-
fore, of fluid intelligence tests) across task and stimulus domains.
All studies that use individual or group differences to make in-
ferences about working memory involve the measurement of con-
structs and the partitioning of variance in those constructs. If the
range of general ability in a sample of subjects is sufficiently broad,
then measures of working memory capacity, such as the reading
span task (Daneman & Carpenter 1980) and the operation span
task (Turner & Engle 1989), will be reliable. Furthermore, they
will reflect the ability of both the domain-free central executive
and the domain-specific processors necessary to perform the tasks
because no working memory task is a pure test of either the cen-
tral executive or the slave systems (Engle et al., in press a). If, how-
ever, a sample’s range of general ability is narrow, as it often is at
prestigious universities, there will be little variability in the gen-
eral fluid ability construct. Therefore, the variability in perfor-
mance for the restricted sample will reflect primarily differences
in the skill of the domain-specific processors necessary to perform
the task.
To the extent that the “processing” component is entered into
the working memory span score as C&W suggest, reliability may
increase. However, the construct measured by that score is more
likely to reflect the domain-specific processors required for that
task and not the general controlled attention–central executive
construct. In fact, our own work (e.g., Conway & Engle 1996;
Conway et al. 1998) suggests that processing skills within span
tasks can actually suppress the relationship between working
memory scores and higher order cognition. Thus, the “innovation”
proposed by C&W may increase reliability in a restricted sample,
but it will be a good test only if the goal is to measure specific pro-
cessing skills. It will not be a good test if the goal is to measure
general domain-free controlled attention capacity. If the goal is to
measure the domain-free executive component of working mem-
ory, then we recommend administering a battery of different
working memory tasks that share the dual-task quality mentioned
above but differ in the domain-specific processes required to per-
form the task.
C&W questioned the reliability of the reading span task, but, as
we pointed out above, low reliability can result from sampling a
restricted range of individuals. Kitty Klein and William Fiss of
North Carolina State University recently conducted an extensive
analysis of the operation span task (Turner & Engle 1989). They
tested 33 subjects at three different times, the second time 3
weeks after the first and the third time 6–7 weeks after the sec-
ond. The corrected reliability was .88 and the stability scores
ranged from .76 to .92.
As for the “fractionation” of working memory, we would argue
that C&W’s measures reflect quite specific skills at parsing and
processing syntactically complex sentences. These processes oc-
cur at a pre-interpretative level and thus do not generally make
demands on the central executive. The two different components
they propose reflect the outputs from specific processors that do
their work with little need for limited-capacity, controlled atten-
tion. For example, adding a secondary working memory load to a
Commentary/Caplan & Waters: Working memory and sentence comprehension
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:1 101
syntactic processing task has no detrimental effect. Because syn-
tactic processing may proceed unhindered by a load, it may be
performed relatively automatically, without much controlled at-
tention. However, secondary load tasks do interfere with syntactic
processing when the load-task stimuli are interleaved with the syn-
tax task, demonstrating that, when syntactic information must be
sustained across an attention shift, it suffers significantly.
Rather than assign syntactic processing to a specialized compo-
nent of working memory, then, we suggest that it operates inde-
pendently of the central executive. That is, working memory ca-
pacity is needed only under attention-demanding circumstances,
and, insofar as syntactic processing appears to be immune to
divided-attention conditions, it likely occurs relatively automati-
cally. Caplan and Waters (1990) argued that the phonological loop
may be required in some syntactic parsing circumstances, such as
when subjects are “garden-pathed” or when many words must be
maintained in active memory. Why not use that interpretation for
the present work?
The age invariance of working memory
measures and noninvariance 
of producing complex syntax
Susan Kemper and Karen A. Kemtes
Department of Psychology and Gerontology Center, University of Kansas,
Lawrence, KS 66045. skemper@ukans.edu
www.lsi.ukans.edu/clang/sklab.htm kkemtes@ukans.edu
Abstract: In challenging current conceptions of the role of working mem-
ory in sentence processing, Caplan & Waters consider studies comparing
young and older adults on sentence processing. This commentary raises
two challenges to Caplan & Waters’s conclusions: first, working memory
tasks appear to be age invariant. Second, the production of complex syn-
tactic constructions appears not to be age invariant.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) raise a number of questions about the
role of working memory during sentence processing. They con-
sider evidence from studies comparing young and older adults on
sentence processing tasks relevant to this issue because older
adults are typically found to exhibit working memory deficits on a
variety of tasks. This commentary raises two challenges to C&W’s
conclusions. First, working memory measures appear to be age-
invariant. Second, the production of complex syntactic construc-
tions appears not to be age-invariant.
Age invariance. C&W question whether the tasks commonly
used to measure individual differences in working memory are re-
liable and stable. An additional concern, not considered by C&W,
is whether the tasks are age invariant. As Stine (1995) notes, even
when younger and older adults are matched based on working
memory scores, investigators might inevitably find that older
adults have processing difficulties that are seemingly unexplained
by their performance on the working memory tasks.
Horn and McArdle (1992) explain that the latent variable ap-
proach to constructing measurement permits the test of two com-
mon concepts that receive little attention in intergenerational re-
search: construct validity and construct invariance, across samples
such as age groups. Horn and McArdle define measurement in-
variance as factorial invariance: the characteristic that measure-
ments are composed of linear composites, that is, item scores
summed to form a total score, is stable across measurement occa-
sions of same or different samples. the authors present four crite-
ria that are sufficient to determine factor invariance: (1) Factor
patterns are equivalent across groups, a necessary condition for
factor invariance to hold. (2) Factor variances are equivalent
across groups. (3) Factor covariances are equivalent across groups.
(4) Factor averages of composite scores are equivalent across
groups. A fifth criterion they impose is whether cross-products are
equivalent across groups. If the answer is “yes,” then the answer
to questions (1–4) is necessarily “yes”; if the answer is “no,” in-
variance is not necessarily falsified.
To date, few studies have used a latent variable approach to as-
sess the age invariance of working memory measures. As an ex-
ample of this approach, Kemtes and Kemper (1998) assessed
working memory performance for 248 adults (young and old) in
four separate studies using a variety of verbal working memory
tasks. With the latent variable approach, they tested whether a
simple within-studies factor analytic structure with a single latent
variable of working memory was reliable across age groups. For
three of the studies, this single-latent-factor working memory
model was validated across age groups, suggesting that a common
construct was measured. Kemtes and Kemper’s finding of factor
invariance across these different samples strongly supports the
conclusions that working memory, as measured by the digit spans,
reading span, and listening span, is age invariant.
Age noninvariance. C&W also review the existing literature 
on the effects of aging on sentence processing and conclude 
that there are few age differences in on-line sentence processing
although post-interpretative processes of question answering 
and text recall may be affected by aging. However, they overlook
an additional body of research on age differences in produc-
tion. Older adults show a reduction in their production of com-
plex syntactic constructions such as those involving subordi-
nate and embedded clauses (Kemper 1987; 1988; Kemper et al.
1989; 1992; Kynette & Kemper 1986). The age-related decline 
in syntactic production is somewhat greater for left-branching
constructions (e.g., The gal who runs a nursery school for our
church is awfully young) than for coordinate or right-branching
constructions (e.g., She’s awfully young to be running a nursery
school for our children). This asymmetry in the production of
right-branching constructions versus left-branching constructions
provides strong evidence for the effects of working memory limi-
tations. Left-branching constructions, including center-embed-
ded object relative clauses such as The dog that the man that the
cat bit chased escaped, are typically considered more complex
than right-branching constructions such as The cat bit the man
that chased the dog that escaped (Gibson et al. 1996; Lewis
1996b).
Cheung and Kemper (1992) investigated the relationship be-
tween age, working memory, and production using a number of
different ways of measuring linguistic complexity including: mean
length of utterance (MLU; Chapman & Miller 1984), develop-
mental sentence scoring (DSS; Lee 1974), developmental level
(DLEVEL; Rosenberg & Abbeduto 1987), two alternative ways of
measuring Yngve depth (Yngve 1960), and two variants of Fra-
zier’s (1985) node count. In addition, propositional density
(PDENSITY), based on Kintsch and Keenan’s (1973) analyses of
text difficulty, was computed in order to assess whether semantic
content covaries with grammatical complexity. Cheung and Kem-
per (1993) applied structural equation modeling to these linguis-
tic complexity metrics using language samples from younger and
older adults. The best-fitting model fit the data by specifying two
correlated factors, verbal ability and working memory. Age was
negatively associated with working memory, leading to a decline
in digit span with advancing age, and was somewhat positively as-
sociated with verbal ability, reflecting a slight improvement in vo-
cabulary with advancing age. Working memory was related to
three syntactic factors: length, measured by MLU; the amount of
embedding, measured by MCU; and the type of embedding,
measured by DSS and DLEVEL as well as by both Yngve depth
metrics and both Frazier counts. Finally, verbal ability predicted
another linguistic factor, semantic content, measured by PDEN-
SITY, which was not correlated with the syntactic factors.
Working memory limitations associated with aging affect older
adults’ production of complex syntactic structures. A key deter-
minant of syntactic complexity, affecting the DSS, DLEVEL,
Yngve, and Frazier metrics, is whether embeddings occur in the
main-clause subject of left-branching constructions such as “Go-
ing to the St. Louis World Fair was a major undertaking” or in the
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main clause predicate of right-branching constructions such as “I
enjoyed going to the St. Louis World Fair.” The ability to produce
left-branching constructions appears to be especially vulnerable
to aging owing to working memory limitations.
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Aphasia, prefrontal dysfunction, and the use
of word-order strategies
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Abstract: Caplan & Waters’s neuropsychological evidence for two types 
of verbal working memory rests entirely on a very restricted definition 
of “syntactic complexity,” one in terms of word order. This opens the pos-
sibility that the dissociation they observe relates to the differential use 
of word-order strategies rather than to the structure of verbal working 
memory.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) present a substantial amount of neu-
ropsychological data obtained in sentence comprehension tasks.
These data appear to demonstrate the existence of a dissociation.
On the one hand, there are aphasic patients who show a negative
effect of “syntactic complexity.” On the other hand, we have the
patients who are assumed to suffer from prefrontal dysfunction –
Parkinson and Alzheimer patients – for which there is an effect of
the “number of propositions” but not of “syntactic complexity.”
C&W take this dissociation to indicate the existence of two types
of verbal working memory. It is this interpretation that we wish to
challenge.
1. The argumentation crucially hinges on the effect of word or-
der. Two effects are discussed. First is the effect of number of
propositions. In this respect, the two groups do not differ: both
show a negative effect. Second is the effect of “syntactic complex-
ity.” “Syntactic complexity” is defined primarily in terms of word
order. Word order can be canonical or noncanonical. With apha-
sics, sentences with canonical word order lead to better perfor-
mance than sentences with noncanonical word order. For
Alzheimer and Parkinson patients, there is no difference.
2. Word-order strategies make performance on canonical sen-
tences better than on noncanonical sentences. It has been widely
assumed that aphasic patients use such strategies. If patients, as a
consequence of a verbal working memory deficit, lose track of the
syntactic representation, they could compensate for this state of
affairs by choosing thematic roles directly on the basis of word or-
der. In particular, they could associate the agent role with the first
noun phrase (NP) of the sentence (cf. Caplan 1983; Caplan & Fut-
ter 1986; Caplan & Hildebrandt 1988; Grodzinsky 1990). It is not
necessary to assume that patients use such a strategy invariably. It
is also conceivable that processing failure occurs intermittently
and that the strategy is invoked only in case of processing failure
(cf. Kolk & Weijts 1996). If so, every time a patient would use it,
the response would be correct with canonical and incorrect with
noncanonical sentences.
3. There is no direct evidence that noncanonicity leads to a
higher processing load in aphasic patients. The idea that non-
canonicity represents an independent load factor is attractive, in
particular because it relates to argument movement in linguistic
theory. Nevertheless, an experiment showing the idea to be valid,
in which the strategic factor is controlled for, is still missing. There
is ample room for doubt. In a production task, in which Dutch-
speaking agrammatics had to order constituents written on cards,
we have compared subject-verb-object (SVO), subject-object-
verb (SOV), and verb-subject-object (VSO) orders. Generative
linguists consider Dutch to be an SOV language (Koster 1975).
When word order was varied within a single clause, there was lit-
tle difference between the three orders. When word order was
varied within an embedded clause, all three word orders became
significantly more difficult, with some advantage for the SVO or-
der (Kolk & van Grunsven 1985). This result indicates that, at least
in production, it is the phrase structure complexity rather than the
canonicity that determines computational load.
4. The strategy hypothesis can account for the canonicity effect
that C&W observed in aphasics just as well as the syntactic-
complexity hypothesis, perhaps even better. In view of the above,
it is rather surprising that the strategic factor is not at all consid-
ered by C&W. It is obvious that the complexity hypothesis makes
almost the same predictions as the strategy hypothesis. The strat-
egy in this case would be to take the first NP of the sentence as
the agent of the relevant verb (the verb for which the roles are re-
versed on the distractor picture). There is one sentence type for
which the predictions are different: the so-called object-subject
sentences (e.g., “The horse kicked the elephant that touched the
dog”; the distractor picture presents a horse kicking an elephant,
as well as touching a dog). For this sentence type, the complexity
hypothesis predicts relatively good performance, because word
order is canonical. The strategy hypothesis predicts bad perfor-
mance because the horse, the first NP, is taken as the agent of
“touch.” The strategy hypothesis turns out to make the right pre-
diction. The object-subject sentences are about as hard as their
noncanonical controls (“subject-object”) and substantially harder
than another canonical sentence type (“conjoined”). Unfortu-
nately, no statistical test of the latter comparison is reported (see
Fig. 1 in Caplan & Waters 1996).
5. The absence of word-order strategies in Alzheimer and
Parkinson patients could be related to a deficit in strategy gener-
ation and/or realization. In our view, both aphasic and Parkin-
son/Alzheimer patients would suffer from a deficit in the general
type of verbal working memory described by Just and Carpenter
(1992), although the aphasics’ deficit would be more severe. This
assumption accounts for the presence of a proposition effect in all
three groups. The absence of word-order strategies in Parkin-
son/Alzheimer patients would be related to another aspect of their
prefrontal dysfunction and would lie in the domain of supervisory
processes. In a recent paper on the supervisory attentional system,
Shallice and Burgess (1996) identify “strategy generation” as an
important component of this system. It could be this component
itself or the realization of strategies – requiring the intactness of
various other components – that is defective in Alzheimer and
Parkinson patients.
Is it timing after all?
Sonja A. Kotz and D. Yves von Cramon
Max-Planck-Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany.
kotz@cns.mpg.de
Abstract: Even though there is ample evidence from the sentence-
comprehension literature for specialized working memory systems in nor-
mal and patient populations, some open questions remain. One of them is
an explanation for a missing “post-interpretive” processing deficit in a va-
riety of accuracy-judgment tasks in an aphasic patient with a severe verbal
working memory problem.
The target article by Caplan & Waters (C&W) provides an excel-
lent overview of the specific effects of working memory capacities
on different levels of sentence comprehension in normal and pa-
tient population studies. However, their conclusions about non-
aphasic patients (dementia of the Alzheimer type [DAT] and
Parkinson disease [PD] patients) with severe verbal working
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memory problems should at least be extended or discussed in a
different context. In particular, the question arises of whether sen-
tence comprehension deficits in aphasic or central nervous system
(CNS) dysfunction patients are solely a consequence of a specific
working memory resource deficit and/or a computational deficit.
In other words, can there be an independent resource deficit with-
out some interference from a computational deficit at the “post-
interpretive” processing level? We will present data from an apha-
sic patient with verbal working memory deficits to broaden this
discussion.
Patient H. G., a 45-year-old male, suffered an ischemic stroke
in 1996. T2-weighted images in the axial plane taken about half a
year after the stroke revealed an extended lesion in the left tem-
poroparietal region and a small lesion in the left posterior frontal
area. The temporoparietal lesion encloses (1) the left Heschl
gyrus, (2) the posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus, (3) the
supramarginal gyrus, and (4) the occipital gyri. The frontal lesion
involves the middle portion of the praecentral gyrus and the pos-
terior part of the frontal gyrus (F2p). The inferior frontal gyrus
(F3) is spared. The functional deficit due to the frontal lesion
could be twofold: (1) an articulatory deficit due to the lesion in the
praecentral gyrus or (2) a verbal working memory deficit due to
the lesion in the posterior F2 area. The lesioned supramarginal
gyrus in the temporoparietal region should crucially affect the
phonological short-term memory (STM; see Warrington 1975),
with intact rehearsal processes (see unaffected F3 region). In
terms of the functional–neuroanatomical correlates, H. G. should
show the classical picture of an aphasic patient with an STM
deficit and potentially a syntactic processing deficit during sen-
tence comprehension.
In a first step, we tested H. G. for deficits in the articulatory re-
hearsal and phonological storage system. Results indicate no STM
deficit in H. G. Tests for verbal working memory capacities such
as verbal word span (span: 2–3) and an adapted aphasic reading
span task (span: 1) as well as digit spans (forward and backward),
however, indicate a severe verbal working memory deficit in H. G.
Next, H. G. was tested with several sentence-comprehension par-
adigms engaging syntactic complexities (word category violations,
subject–object relative clauses, subordinate clause violations).
Furthermore, a combination of syntactic complexity with increas-
ing propositional content was applied. We used both sentence
picture-matching tasks and auditory and visual comprehension
tasks in the two test batteries. Results indicate that H. G. did not
show a significant deficit in sentence comprehension at the “in-
terpretive” or “post-interpretive” level of processing. Thus, if
working memory impairments exclusively influence “post-inter-
pretive” processing, as proposed by C&W (sects. 3.3 and 3.4), H.
G.’s data provide evidence against this hypothesis. Most strikingly,
he did not show any effect of increasing propositional content.
One example of this effect is that he scored 100% on a German
version of the Token Test (DeRenzi & Vignolo 1962; Martin & Fe-
her 1992) and in a judgment task with increasing propositional
content.
To ensure that the “untimed” accuracy measures of sentence
comprehension were not due to a ceiling effect, we proceeded to
test H. G. in a combined syntactic and semantic judgment para-
digm utilizing event-related potentials (ERPs). We assumed that
if the verbal working memory deficit of H. G. has any effect on
sentence comprehension it should be visible in the on-line mea-
surements of ERP components specific to syntactic and semantic
processes (see also Friederici et al., in press). Even though this
judgment paradigm did not use the most complex syntactic struc-
tures nor a dual-task manipulation with additional load, H. G. dis-
played an interesting picture. Whereas the performance data were
in the normal range, H. G. showed that on-line computation of
syntactic structure and semantic integration was influenced by the
input parameters. The evaluation of syntactic violations (word cat-
egory errors) and semantic violations (selectional restriction er-
rors) and correct sentences in connected speech did not elicit any
of the expected ERP components in H. G. A similar picture
emerged in the visual modality with a fast presentation rate (SOA:
500 msec). In a long SOA (1100 msec) visual manipulation, the
N400 (onset: 350 msec) was elicited to semantic violations and a
delayed P600 (onset: 1,000 msec) was elicited to syntactic viola-
tions. These results, although by no means exhaustive in the dis-
cussion of resource-capacity models, give evidence that reduced
verbal working memory capacities might go hand in hand with a
temporal deficit.
In-line measures of syntactic processing
using event-related brain potentials
Marta Kutas and Jonathan W. King
Department of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego, La
Jolla, CA 92093-0515. kutas@cogsci.ucsd.edu king@cogsci.ucsd.edu
Abstract: Scalp-recorded event-related potential (ERP) measures of
reading and listening have been proved more sensitive to the time course
of syntactic processing than the chronometric and behavioral data de-
scribed by Caplan & Waters. ERP studies using sentences containing rel-
ative clauses indicate that there are individual differences in syntactic pro-
cessing that appear at the earliest theoretically relevant time points and
are attributable to working memory operations.
Leaving aside a discussion of Caplan & Water’s (C&W’s) specific
proposal that there are two distinct verbal working memory sys-
tems, we note that C&W base much of their argument on
chronometric and behavioral data from the processing of sen-
tences containing subject-relative (SR) and object-relative (OR)
clauses. The focus on the contrast between SR and OR clauses is
clear; arguments concerning limitations in working memory ca-
pacity permeate the experimental literature on this topic. The de-
cision to focus on reaction time measures, however, is less clear to
us. Although a host of measures show consistent chronometric dif-
ferences between the two sentences, these effects are generally
observed substantially after the point in the sentence where they
would be expected owing to a difference in working memory stor-
age demands per se. In the following examples,
OR: The reporter who the senator harshly attacked admitted the error.
SR: The reporter who harshly attacked the senator admitted the error.
the noun phrase “the senator” in the OR sentence marks the be-
ginning of the differential working memory load between the two
sentence types. However, RT differences are not seen until the
end of the relative clause or even later, on the main clause verb.
Thus, one might question the sensitivity of the chronometric mea-
sures on which C&W base their arguments, at least if monotonic
increases in memory load lead to monotonic increases in process-
ing time, as many assume.
There is, however, one measure of brain processing that shows
differential activity for OR versus SR sentences starting precisely
where one would expect from the usual working memory argu-
ments, namely, event-related potentials (ERPs). While C&W
miscite who found out what and when, they do note that the pro-
cessing of OR sentences is associated with a greater negativity
than the processing of SR sentences. This electrophysiological
pattern has been observed repeatedly during word-by-word read-
ing in English (King & Kutas 1995) and German (Mecklinger et
al. 1995; Münte et al. 1997) as well as in connected speech (Müller
et al. 1997). This ERP difference between subject and object rel-
atives is large and is more pronounced over anterior electrode
sites; with visual materials, it is also left-lateralized. (Indeed, it is
this topographic characteristic of the data that C&W highlighted
when referring to ERP results in their section on the anatomical
locus of verbal working memory processes.) But, to emphasize the
point, the electrophysiological data show a much earlier point of
divergence. Moreover, King and Kutas (1995) found that the
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ERPs to the main-clause verb in both SR and OR sentences
showed a greater left anterior negativity than the second verb in
sentences that did not contain relative clauses. Although tempted,
we will refrain from arguing from this pattern of effects that the
insensitivity of the behavioral reaction time data suggests they are
more likely to reflect “post-integrative” effects.
C&W also claim that there is no (behavioral) evidence of an in-
teraction between sentence complexity and working memory ca-
pacity (WMC), and, because there is no evidence that sentence
complexity has larger effects on low-WMC subjects, C&W con-
clude that RT data from the SR–OR contrast support their pro-
posal for a verbal working memory subsystem specialized for syn-
tactic analysis. Setting aside their interpretation of the behavioral
data, we would like to point out that the ERP studies cited above
also include notable demonstrations of individual differences in
syntactic processing. In both written and spoken English, good
comprehenders show large ERP differences between SR and OR
sentence types, whereas poorer comprehenders show almost none
(see, e.g., King & Kutas 1995; Müller et al. 1997). In good com-
prehenders, subject relatives elicit a frontal positivity, whereas ob-
ject relatives show more negative deflections from this pattern. In
poor comprehenders, the responses elicited by both the SR and
the OR sentences are almost identical to each other and also iden-
tical to the response elicited by OR sentences in good compre-
henders. It is likely that these good comprehenders would score
higher on many (possibly language specific) WMC measures than
would poor comprehenders. More sensitive measures thus do
show the kind of individual differences C&W failed to find. Addi-
tionally, however, we find that good and poor comprehenders
show ERP differences even on simple transitive sentences (Kutas
& King 1996), data that are not predicted by any of the existing ca-
pacity theories, because these sentence types require far less ca-
pacity to process.
Whatever the ultimate subdivisions of verbal working memory
turn out to be, we doubt that psycholinguists can afford to ignore
the temporal information and processing perspective provided by
sentence-level ERP measures. At present, although interesting
and provocative, the C&W proposal awaits an exact empirical test.
Accounting for the fine structure of syntactic
working memory: Similarity-based
interference as a unifying principle
Richard L. Lewis
Department of Computer and Information Science and Center for Cognitive
Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210. 
rick@cis.ohio-state.edu www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~rick
Abstract: A promising approach to more refined models consistent with
the Caplan & Waters hypothesis is based on similarity-based interference,
a general principle that applies across working memory domains. This may
explain both the fine details of syntactic working memory phenomena and
the gross fractionation for which Caplan & Waters have found evidence.
Detailed models of syntactic processing that embody similarity-based in-
terference fare well cross-linguistically.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) present a compelling case for specializa-
tion within verbal working memory. They conclude their target ar-
ticle by looking ahead to additional specification of the hypothesis
based on better developed models of working memory. In this
commentary I describe some work that takes up the challenge to
develop more refined working memory models. I will first discuss
briefly some of the phenomena that must be accounted for by a
more detailed theory. I will then argue two theoretical points: 
first, even though working memory may be quite specialized, there
are general principles that apply across all kinds of working mem-
ory. Second, one of those general principles, similarity-based in-
terference, may explain both the fine details of syntactic working
memory phenomena and the gross fractionation and specialization
for which C&W have found evidence (Lewis 1993; 1996b; 1998).
C&W start their discussion of memory demands in sentence
comprehension with the notoriously difficult English double 
center-embedded relative clause (their sentence [1]) and go on to
cite a few of the computational models and linguistic metrics that
have been developed to account for the problem with such em-
beddings. What they did not mention is how surprisingly difficult
it has been to produce models and metrics that are empirically ad-
equate. Though it is true that there is a “remarkable degree of sim-
ilarity in the measurements” that some of the models produce
(sect. 1), the vast majority of these measurements do not fare well
when considered against a broad range of embeddings cross-lin-
guistically. Furthermore, there has been little independent psy-
chological motivation for the proposed memory structures (e.g.,
stacks, lookahead buffers) and their associated limitations (see
Lewis 1996 for a review).
As an example of the kind of empirical hurdle faced by any the-
ory of syntactic working memory, consider a fact established by
Cowper (1976) and Gibson (1991) in their seminal work: a metric
based on the amount of center-embedding does not account for
many difficulty contrasts in English and other languages. Consider
sentences (1a) and (1b):
1a. That the food that John ordered tasted good pleased him (Cowper
1976; Gibson 1991).
1b. Der Bauer, der die Kuh, die schlechte Milch gab schlachtete ist
krank.
the farmer who the cow which bad milk gave killed is sick.
“The farmer who killed the cow which gave bad milk is sick” (Hawkins
1994).
Though both constructions involve double center-embedding of
sentential structures (and sentence [1b] even involves center-
embedding of relative clauses), neither causes the comprehension
difficulty associated with the classic example cited in the target ar-
ticle.
Although increasing center-embedding certainly increases dif-
ficulty, another important observation is that increasing the simi-
larity of the embedded constituents increases difficulty, and mak-
ing constituents more distinct or dissimilar in some way helps
processing. This generalization is an old one; it goes back to Miller
and Chomsky’s (1963) original self-embedding metric and has
been noted several times since (e.g., Bever 1970; Kuno 1974).
Why is this observation significant? Similarity-based inter-
ference is a principle that holds true of working memory in gen-
eral. Starting with the early work of Baddeley (1966) and Conrad
(1963), which identified a special system relying on phonological
codes and covert rehearsal, evidence has accumulated for a wide
range of distinct working memory types subject to selective, type-
specific interference. The verbal versus visual-spatial distinction is
the best known (Baddeley & Hitch 1974; Logie et al. 1990), but
there is also evidence for distinct codes for kinesthetic memory
(Williams et al. 1969), odor (Walker & John 1984), and sign lan-
guage (Poizner et al. 1981), to name a few. The robust result across
domains is that, when to-be-remembered items are followed by
stimuli that are similar along some dimensions, the original items
are more quickly forgotten (Shulman 1970; Waugh & Norman
1965).
Crucially, similarity-based interference operates within major
categories as well. The most familiar within-category effect is the
phonological similarity effect. Ordered recall of phonologically
similar lists of words, consonants, or nonsense trigrams is worse
than with dissimilar lists (Baddeley 1966; Conrad 1963; Wickel-
gren 1965). Related effects show up in immediate memory for
American Sign Language (Poizner et al. 1981) and visual orienta-
tion (Magnussen et al. 1991).
Building on these results, and the work cited earlier by Gibson
(1991), Cowper (1976), and others, I have hypothesized that 
similarity-based interference as a general principle applies to syn-
tactic working memory as well. Lewis (1993; 1996b) described a
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computational model that embodies retroactive, type-specific syn-
tactic interference and accounts for a range of cross-linguistic data
concerning difficult center embeddings. The model posited a sim-
ple buffer that could maintain no more than two constituents of a
particular syntactic type.
The type specificity of the limitation is crucial to the empirical
success of the model. To see why, consider again the difficult cen-
ter embedding discussed in the target article, repeated here as
sentence (2a):
2a. The man that the woman that the child hugged kissed laughed.
2b. The man that the woman kissed laughed.
Three noun phrases (NPs) of the same syntactic type (subjects)
must be momentarily buffered in order correctly to parse the very
difficult sentence (2a), whereas only two such NPs must be
buffered to parse the acceptable sentence (2b). But consider now
the comprehensible Japanese construction in sentence (3) below:
3. John-wa Bill-ni Mary-ga Sue-ni Bob-o syookai sita to it-ta.
John-TOP Bill-DAT Mary-NOM Sue-DAT Bob-ACC introduced say.
“John said to Bill that Mary introduced Bob to Sue” (Lewis 1993).
Such sentences do not cause the difficulty associated with sen-
tence (2a), despite stacking up five NPs. The crucial difference, of
course, is that sentence (3) requires buffering no more than two
NPs of any particular syntactic function: at most two subjects, two
indirect objects, and a direct object.
What this theory amounts to is adding “syntactic” to the list of
immediate memory types that exhibit type-specific interference
and decreased performance with increased similarity. Just as there
is the well-known phonological similarity effect, there is also a
“syntactic similarity effect,” and one way this effect manifests it-
self is difficulty with center embedding. Lewis (1998) extends this
theory to combine both retroactive and proactive interference
into a measure of working memory load. The new model increases
the empirical coverage considerably, and directly yields detailed,
moment-by-moment predictions of processing load.
The similarity-based interference hypothesis can be seen as a
further specification of the C&W specialization hypothesis. The
good news may be that the same principle that yields fractionation
at a gross level also seems to work well as a basis for quite detailed
models of syntactic processing across languages. Furthermore, it
should be clear that we can embrace fractionation and specializa-
tion without abandoning more general cognitive principles.
Further fractionations of verbal working
memory
Randi C. Martin
Psychology Department, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251.
rmartin@rice.edu www.ruf.rice.edu/~psyc/faculty/martin.html
Abstract: Although the working memory capacity involved in syntactic
processing may be separate from the capacity involved in word list recall,
other aspects of initial sentence interpretation appear to depend on some
of the same capacities tapped by span tasks. Specifically, there appears to
a capacity for lexical–semantic retention involved in both sentence com-
prehension and span measures.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) have presented a convincing case con-
cerning the independence of the working memory resources in-
volved in syntactic processing and those that are tapped by vari-
ous span measures such as reading span or digit span. They have
amassed a large body of data showing that across different mate-
rials, experimental procedures and subject populations critical in-
teractions are not obtained between the effects of syntactic com-
plexity and extraneous memory load and between syntactic
complexity and individuals’ working memory capacity.
A less well justified claim put forward by C&W is that sen-
tence comprehension can be divided into interpretive and post-
interpretive processes and that all interpretive processes depend
on capacities separate from those tapped by standard span mea-
sures. In order to make this claim they have to argue that an ef-
fect on comprehension of number of propositions (which does in-
teract with extraneous load) occurs because the number of
propositions effect is due to post-interpretive processes. However,
their definition of interpretive processes includes “assigning the-
matic roles, focus, and other aspects of propositional and dis-
course-level semantics.” According to this definition, it is not clear
why greater post-interpretive capacity rather than greater inter-
pretive capacity is involved in deciding the sensibility of sentences
with two propositions (e.g., “The famous author wrote the play
that watched the audience”) versus one proposition (“It was the
play that watched the audience”). If the capacities involved could
be said to fall under interpretive processes, then C&W would be
forced to conclude that, even within what might be termed inter-
pretive processes, there are separable capacities devoted to the
maintenance of different types of information, for example, syn-
tactic structure versus propositions.
In several publications, we have argued that there are separa-
ble components involved in the maintenance of phonological, 
lexical–semantic, and syntactic information during sentence pro-
cessing, and at least the phonological and lexical–semantic com-
ponents play a role in short-term memory for word lists (Martin &
Romani 1994; Martin et al. 1994; Martin 1995). Brain-damaged
patients who have a disruption of the semantic component, but
not those who have a disruption of the phonological component,
have difficulty understanding sentences in which the integration
of meanings of words is delayed because the meanings of a num-
ber of words must be held in an unintegrated fashion until some key
word is processed (Martin & Romani 1994). For example, for sen-
tences in which there are a number of adjectives preceding a noun
(“the rusty old red pail”), the meaning of the adjectives cannot be
precisely determined nor can their meaning be integrated with
the noun until the noun is processed. Similarly, when a number 
of nouns precede a verb (“flowers, trees, and shrubs grew . . .”),
the thematic role that the nouns play with respect to the verb can-
not be determined until the verb is processed. These patients’ dif-
ficulty in understanding such sentences is not an effect of the
number of propositions, insofar as these patients could under-
stand sentences with the same number of propositions when im-
mediate integration was possible, such as when the adjectives fol-
lowed the noun (“the pail was old, red, and rusty”) or the nouns
followed the verb (“the gardener grew flowers, trees, and shrubs”).
It would be difficult to claim that comprehension of the sentences
involving the maintenance of several unintegrated word meanings
depends on “post-interpretive” processes. The ability to hold in-
dividual word meanings until they can be integrated with other
words’ meanings to form propositions would seem to be a funda-
mental ability involved in initial sentence interpretation. It should
be noted that the same patients who had difficulty with the de-
layed integration sentences did not have difficulty making gram-
maticality judgments for sentences in which several words inter-
vened between the two words signaling a grammatical error. Thus,
the capacity affected was specific to maintaining lexical–semantic
information and not syntactic information.
In discussing the separation between the working memory in-
volved in post-interpretive processes and that involved in inter-
pretive processes, C&W point to lesion localization and functional
neuroimaging data. As they indicate, there is much evidence im-
plicating the dominant perisylvian cortex in fundamental aspects
of language processing. They further claim that neuroimaging
studies of working memory have not implicated these areas. How-
ever, contrary to this claim, several neuroimaging studies of work-
ing memory have found activation in Broca’s area and in the infe-
rior parietal region (Brodmann’s area 40; see Fiez et al. 1996 for
an overview). Activation in these areas has generally been attrib-
uted to phonological retention and rehearsal. If these working
memory studies used more meaningful word materials rather than
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letters or digits, as is typically the case, it is possible that other lan-
guage areas involving lexical–semantic retention would be impli-
cated as well (see Buckner & Petersen 1996). Thus, the lesion and
neuroimaging data do not provide a clear separation between ar-
eas involved in sentence processing and those involved in standard
working memory tasks. Although we agree with Caplan & Waters
concerning the separation between the capacities for syntactic
processing and those involved in word list recall, other aspects of
sentence interpretation may in fact depend on the same brain re-
gions implicated in working memory tasks.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by National Institutes of
Health grant DC-00218 to Rice University.
Backtracking? Rehearsing and replaying
some old arguments about short-term
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Abstract: We discuss the role of short-term auditory verbal storage within
a working memory system. Data from single case studies of patients with
left parietal lesions and selective impairment of memory span are dis-
cussed in order to address the question of the functions of short-term
memory in language processing. The backup resource of auditory verbal
short-term memory is required for those tasks that necessitate backtrack-
ing in order to integrate a verbal message within a developing central cog-
nitive representation.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) present arguments for a differentiated
and multifunctional verbal working memory system based on an-
terior and perisylvian regions of the left hemisphere. Although we
are largely sympathetic to their analysis, we consider that they
have given insufficient theoretical and empirical weight to the
contribution of the parietal lobe and, more importantly, to the well
established division of working memory into storage and executive
components (see, e.g., Baddeley 1986).
C&W state that “there is strong evidence that the dominant
perisylvian association cortex is critical for all language interpre-
tative functions” (sect. 4, para. 7). This zone may constitute a core
neuroanatomical substrate for “working memory” in those tasks
that have high loading on executive problem-solving abilities (e.g.,
when disentangling complex syntax). However, C&W ignore the
neuroanatomical evidence from patients with selective deficits in
auditory verbal short-term storage. Damage to the inferior sectors
of the left parietal lobe/angular gyrus has consistently been
demonstrated in such cases (see, e.g., Della Sala & Logie 1993;
McCarthy & Warrington 1990a; Warrington et al. 1971).
Do these patients have normal language processing? Yes and no
(see, e.g., Shallice & Warrington 1970). Patients with dramati-
cally reduced digit span and rapid forgetting (on the Brown-
Petersen task) may have superficially well preserved language
skills: their comprehension of sentences can appear to be normal.
Even the earliest reports of short-term memory deficits noted that
such patients were able to name objects on the basis of long spo-
ken descriptions (e.g., “What is the name of the thin grey dust that
remains after something has burned such as a cigarette?”). How-
ever, it was also apparent that their processing of nonredundant
spoken information was impaired. In particular, their perfor-
mance on Token Test instructions was well outside normal limits
(e.g., “Put the green square on top of the red circle”; see, e.g., 
Warrington et al. 1971). This contrast would seem to hold the key
to understanding the contribution made by auditory verbal short-
term storage to the (multiply determined) task of language com-
prehension. Simple interpretations in terms of sheer length of
message or impaired syntactic processing have been eliminated
(see, e.g., McCarthy & Warrington 1990a).
Is this a language deficit, or something else? Some years ago we
attacked the problem of accounting for the preserved/impaired
characteristics of the short-term memory syndrome (McCarthy &
Warrington 1987a; 1987b) Our cases RAN and NHB were re-
markably intact on most tests of sentence comprehension (again
with the exception of the Token Test), despite having reliable digit
and word spans of only one item. For example, on a stringent 
order-dependent sentence–picture matching test, they scored
close to a control level (e.g., “The clown applauded the dancer” vs.
“The dancer was applauded by the clown”; Schwartz et al. 1980).
This evidence, combined with the patients’ remarkably well pre-
served ability to repeat sentences, led us to conclude that differ-
ent resources were required by the span task and by many aspects
of sentence processing. We considered that their on-line language
system was preserved, enabling them to perform a range of lin-
guistic operations, including syntactic analysis. However, the
problem remained: What were the conditions under which their
sentence comprehension failed?
Our patients were impaired when they were required to utilise
information with a high propositional load (e.g., in judging com-
paratives such as “Which is green: a poppy or a lettuce?”). How-
ever, their problem did not appear to be exclusively linguistic. We
suggested that the processes involved in understanding a sen-
tence (rather than merely analysing its verbal content) reflected
an interaction between linguistic and nonlinguistic levels of rep-
resentation. When the number of propositions in a sentence was
held constant but the pragmatic context was varied, the results
were striking and were consistent with our hypothesis. For ex-
ample, violating conventional “order of mention” rules resulted
in a marked impairment (e.g., “She watered the garden after she
went to the shops”). Pragmatic expectancies about the subject of
a sentence and the object of an action also markedly influenced
their performance. In a critical experiment, the patients were
asked to manipulate one fixed and one movable doll in accor-
dance with a spoken sentence. We found that instructions to
place one doll behind (or in front of ) the other could be under-
stood only if the movable stimulus was in the subject position of
the sentence.
We considered that these deficits indicated a specific role for
verbal short-term memory in language understanding. Although
much language comprehension can be mediated on-line, some
conditions require the auditory verbal message to be reanalysed
so that it can be assimilated within a developing central cognitive
representation. Auditory–verbal short-term storage provides the
backup facility that is used in order to backtrack and reanalyse the
spoken message. Our patients were impaired under those cir-
cumstances in which sentence understanding required the use of
a backup verbatim record. We considered that our evidence indi-
cated that the following three conditions were likely to require
backup and backtracking (McCarthy & Warrington 1990b):
1. When the rate of information presentation is too great for
the development of a sufficiently unambiguous central cognitive
representation.
2. When extralinguistic presuppositions bias the interpretation
of the spoken message.
3. When the achievement of an adequate central cognitive rep-
resentation requires supplementary cognitive operations to be
performed on the spoken input.
These three conditions are unlikely to be mutually independent
(and are certainly not an exhaustive listing). They simply exemplify
those circumstances under which backtracking is required so that
an utterance can be understood in terms of a central (supralin-
guistic) cognitive framework. We would speculate that the dy-
namic interplay between on-line language analysis, short-term
storage, and a developing cognitive framework is partly under the
control of executive and problem-solving systems of the frontal
Commentary/Caplan & Waters: Working memory and sentence comprehension
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:1 107
lobes, but it also depends on the contributions from widely dis-
tributed processors in both hemispheres of the brain.
C&W emphasise the complexities of “working memory” organ-
isation without articulating the architecture or characterising the
contributions made by different subcomponents of the system.
Consequently, the account they give of the various short-term
memory systems and their relationship to problem solving and
language comprehension remains opaque. To replace one prob-
lem with another is not a solution: it is two problems! As demon-
strated by C&W’s overview, large-scale surveys have a propensity
to generate data in which elegant dissociations and statistical arte-
facts are difficult to disentangle. In our view, theoretically moti-
vated studies of single cases should be given substantially more
weight; they provide a very direct route to understanding the com-
ponents of working memory and other cognitive skills.
Good interactions are hard to find
Akira Miyake, Michael J. Emerson, and Naomi P. Friedman




Abstract: Caplan & Waters’s arguments for separate working memory
subsystems for “interpretive” and “post-interpretive” comprehension
processes do not have a solid empirical basis. The likely involvement of a
separate phonological loop makes their memory-load data irrelevant to
theory evaluation, and the lack of statistical power from nonoptimal
experimental designs and analyses unfairly reduces the chances of
detecting the relevant interactions.
Caplan and Waters (C&W) propose a new distinction between
working memory subsystems used for “interpretive” and “post-
interpretive” comprehension processes. C&W’s main evidence for
this separate-sentence-interpretation-resource (SSIR) hypothesis
comes from the lack of significant interactions between variables
tapping “interpretive” aspects of sentence processing (e.g., syn-
tactic complexity) and those reflecting verbal working memory ca-
pacities (e.g., external memory loads, reading span scores). Al-
though they discuss an impressive array of empirical results
documenting the failure to detect these interactions, we find such
evidence tenuous at best. Specifically, we argue that (1) interac-
tions concerning the effects of external memory load are irrele-
vant to the comparison of the SSIR and the single-resource (SR)
hypotheses and (2) lack of statistical power resulting from nonop-
tical experimental designs and analyses unfairly reduces the
chances of finding the interactions of interest.
According to C&W, the finding that external memory load usu-
ally does not impair comprehension of complex sentences more
than simple sentences supports the SSIR hypothesis and poses a
challenge to the SR hypothesis. C&W’s logic is flawed, however.
Although memory load experiments were used to support a work-
ing memory theory that does not make the “interpretive” versus
“post-interpretive” distinction (Just & Carpenter 1992), external
memory load places demands on a separate phonological loop
component of working memory, particularly when participants
start repeating the to-be-maintained digit sequence before the
presentation of the target sentences (see, e.g., Waters et al. 1995).
Many researchers, including C&W (Caplan & Waters 1990), have
argued that the phonological loop is separable from other aspects
of working memory that are implicated in the processing and
maintenance of linguistic information during comprehension
(Gathercole & Baddeley 1993; Just & Carpenter 1992). Therefore,
the lack of significant interactions is expected because the mem-
ory load manipulation does not tap the same aspect of working
memory as the language complexity and/or span group variables.
As C&W suggest, external memory load also likely taxes an ex-
ecutive control mechanism for dual tasking. This control mecha-
nism, however, may be separable from the working memory used
for language processing because frontal-lobe patients exhibiting
disorders of executive processes can demonstrate unimpaired lan-
guage performance (Eslinger & Damasio 1985), and, more im-
portantly, the correlation between reading span and various so-
called executive or prefrontal tasks is usually low (Carpenter et al.
1990; Lehto 1996). To the extent that this distinction between ver-
bal working memory and executive mechanisms is valid, the lack
of significant interactions involving memory load and language
complexity variables can be accommodated easily without postu-
lating the “interpretive” versus “post-interpretive” distinction for
verbal working memory.
Another line of C&W’s evidence concerns studies failing to find
significant interactions between span groups and language com-
plexity variables. Although this evidence is more theoretically rel-
evant, the lack of such interactions does not mean that the SSIR
hypothesis is correct. Without enough power, interactions are gen-
erally difficult to detect, particularly when the interactions of in-
terest are fan-shaped, rather than crossover (McClelland & Judd
1993), as is the case with C&W’s analyses. Thus, statistical power
should be an important consideration when the acceptance of the
null hypothesis is involved (Frick 1995).
C&W acknowledge the importance of power, but claim that
their experiments had enough power because they consistently
found significant interactions involving the number of proposi-
tions, a language complexity variable that they link to the “post-
interpretive” aspects of working memory. However, this argument
is invalid because statistical power depends on the effect size of
each statistical test (Cohen 1988), and, thus, the significance of
one interaction has no bearing on the statistical power of another
interaction (McClelland & Judd 1993). In fact, contrary to C&W’s
claim, we suspect that, in many cases (if not all), their failure to
detect theoretically relevant interactions was due to insufficient
power.
Prevalent yet nonoptimal designs and analyses, namely, the use
of highly discrete measures of individual differences (i.e., reading
span scores such as 2.5 and 4.0) and the creation of arbitrary span
groups (i.e., high-span and low-span groups), are the major causes
of low statistical power in experiments cited by C&W. When com-
pared to more continuous ways of scoring working memory span
tasks (e.g., total number of words recalled), discrete span measures
have lower power because they reduce the variance by not captur-
ing subtle differences that may exist among individuals with the
same span score. More problematic is the creation of arbitrary span
groups. Although such ANOVA-based group analyses may be
meaningful and acceptable as long as they achieve statistical signif-
icance (Maxwell & Delaney 1993), these analyses treat all members
within a group as identical despite variation within the actual span
scores, thus reducing power (Cohen 1978; Humphreys & Fleish-
man 1974; Maxwell et al. 1984; Maxwell & Delaney 1993; McClel-
land 1997). In fact, dichotomizing a continuous variable can reduce
the variance of that variable by 20–67%, with a corresponding loss
of power equivalent to throwing out one- to two-thirds of the sam-
ple (Cohen 1983). This issue is particularly relevant when investi-
gating interactions, because measurement errors in one variable re-
sulting from arbitrary grouping are exacerbated when that variable
is part of an interaction (McClelland & Judd 1993).
Many of the experiments published by C&W (see, e.g., Waters
& Caplan 1996b) and discussed in the target article actually
showed a suggestive trend for the interactions predicted by the SR
hypothesis. C&W dismissed such trends by arguing that they did
not reach the .05 level, but we suspect that these nonsignificant
trends likely will reach statistical significance if they are tested in
multiple regression analyses, using a continuous measure of work-
ing memory spans. This point is particularly relevant when the tar-
get interactions were tested with multiple degrees-of-freedom
omnibus tests, because focused single-degree-of-freedom con-
trasts for specific interaction patterns are much more sensitive
than the omnibus tests (Abelson & Prentice 1997; McClelland
1997; Rosenthal & Rosnow 1985).
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Given the prevalent use of the group ANOVA design, it is un-
derstandable why C&W used it to support the SSIR hypothesis (in
fact, one of us is also guilty in this regard; see, e.g., Miyake et al.
1994). Ironically, however, this choice of designs and analyses re-
duces statistical power so much that obtaining nonsignificant in-
teractions is not much of a hurdle for the SSIR hypothesis and,
hence, does not provide much support for it. Thus, until C&W
provide more direct evidence, we see no compelling reason to pos-
tulate separate verbal working memory subsystems for “interpre-
tive” and “post-interpretive” aspects of language processing.
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Abstract: Caplan & Waters propose a dedicated linguistic working mem-
ory to handle “interpretive” language comprehension, but there are data
suggesting that more general working memory capacity can predict syn-
tactic comprehension difficulty, and their claims depend on the existence
of a principled distinction between “interpretive” and “post-interpretive”
processes, which seems unlikely. Other conceptions of the source of indi-
vidual differences also deserve consideration, as more flexible explana-
tions of the phenomena.
Caplan & Waters’s (C&W) proposal for a dedicated linguistic
working memory system raises important issues for sentence com-
prehension, for language comprehension more broadly, and of
course for their interaction with other cognitive systems. How-
ever, there are both data and a wider range of possible theories to
consider with respect to their proposal.
C&W point out (sect. 2) how a wide range of sentence process-
ing data claimed to support a nonspecific working memory system
is in fact equivocal at best. However Pearlmutter and MacDonald
(1995) provided stronger data than C&W suggest (sect. 2.1): with
word-by-word self-paced reading, high-capacity readers were sig-
nificantly slower at “in” and at “but was” in temporarily ambigu-
ous sentences such as sentence (1), relative to unambiguous con-
trols such as sentence (2) in the following.
1. The soup cooked in the pot but was not ready to eat.
2. The soup bubbled in the pot but was not ready to eat.
Low-capacity readers showed no differences between the two ver-
sions, resulting in a significant Span 3 Ambiguity interaction. The
comprehension questions in this study did not ask about the am-
biguity (and the thematic role applied to the first noun in these
sentences is the same regardless of how the ambiguity is resolved).
Furthermore, although high-capacity readers showed marginally
better comprehension, neither group had substantial compre-
hension difficulty (98% vs. 94%), and their overall reading rates 
were nearly identical (321 msec/word vs. 320 msec/word), so a
speed–accuracy tradeoff explanation is unlikely. These results are
problematic for the C&W proposal.
Pearlmutter and MacDonald also showed that high-capacity
readers’ difficulty could be traced to their consideration of the rel-
ative plausibility of various alternatives for the ambiguity. Low-ca-
pacity readers showed sensitivity to the plausibility of the unam-
biguous control, but they were apparently unable to consider
plausibility when faced with multiple alternatives. This might pro-
vide an alternative explanation of our results for C&W: perhaps
plausibility is processed post-interpretively. In fact, though, this
raises a more serious theoretical concern, which is the nature of
the distinction between interpretive and post-interpretive pro-
cesses. C&W provide some clear examples of each, including the
creation of a constituent structure, assigning thematic roles, and
various earlier processes for the former and storing information in
LTM and using verbal information for other tasks for the latter.
However, this distinction runs into problems in dealing with plau-
sibility. As soon as any semantic information is allowed into inter-
pretive processes (and this will be necessary for successful the-
matic role assignment), it becomes impossible to exclude a range
of additional information. For example, one might try to draw the
line at semantic features, as C&W appear to do, permitting ani-
macy and sentience to be considered, but not other knowledge
about referent and event properties. Unfortunately, in ambiguity
resolution, the influence of nonfeatural semantic information ap-
pears identical to that of featural information (cf. Trueswell et al.
1994 with Pearlmutter & MacDonald 1992 and Tabossi et al.
1994): computation of the plausibility of a particular set of the-
matic role assignments on the basis of general knowledge of the
events and entities involved is contiguous with computation on the
basis of semantic features. There is no reason to think that the sit-
uation is different in the processing of unambiguous structures.
C&W also connect (introduction, para. 6) their interpretive–post-
interpretive distinction to the module–central process distinction
(Fodor 1983), but the same problem arises in that debate, as dis-
cussed by Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1987; see also Boland &
Cutler 1996 and MacDonald et al. 1994 for related discussion). It
is thus difficult to see where to draw the line between interpretive
and post-interpretive processes, and of course this also muddies
the water with respect to why they ought to rely on independent
resource pools.
Two further theoretical issues deserve attention. First, the
question of how much to fractionate working memory must be
considered in more detail. C&W select one division within a con-
tinuum of possibilities. Although the evidence may suggest a divi-
sion at roughly the point in processing that they suggest, it is not
clear whether that is the only division, and all interpretive pro-
cesses draw on the same pool, or whether, instead, various inde-
pendent subcomponents (e.g., thematic role assignment, con-
stituent structure generation, lexical access) each have their own.
Second, C&W seem to ignore the possibility that the explana-
tion for all of their effects is not a matter of working memory ca-
pacity at all but is instead a matter of efficiency of processes. To
some extent these approaches are interchangeable: if all processes
relevant to “interpretation” are allowed to be (or become) more
efficient together, then effects equivalent to those resulting from
variations in working memory capacity ought to result. However,
an efficiency approach offers the important additional possibility
that individual processes can vary independently. On this ap-
proach, a process might be as specific as access to a particular lex-
ical item, for example, or as broad as the complete computation of
a constituent structure representation for an input string (thereby
incorporating the fractionation issue as well). Such an approach
remains to be worked out in detail, but Pearlmutter and Mac-
Donald (1995) discuss how relevant differences in efficiency
might arise as a consequence of differences in experience with lan-
guage (see also MacDonald & Christiansen 1998), so that effects
ascribed to differences in working memory capacity by C&W
might instead be the result of variations across individuals in the
quality of encoding of different types of information.
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Abstract: The target article differentiates a new, syntactic component in
verbal working memory. We suggest that several more components could
be differentiated to make a model of working memory complete. Next,
syntax is not always separable from the subject’s verbal memory capacity
as measured by standard working memory tasks. Finally, interference be-
tween different processes cannot be taken as evidence for the processes
sharing the same resources. Interference might be a result of active mu-
tual inhibition.
Caplan and Waters (C&W) present several pieces of convincing
evidence that demonstrate specialization within working memory.
Although we completely agree with the authors’ general intention
to doubt the existence of a universal, all-purpose working mem-
ory, we think that they are still not radical enough in pursuit of
their general objective.
Working memory is usually defined by its main function, the ca-
pacity to store and manipulate information in the service of ac-
complishing a task. Any processing that takes time and is not
completely promiscuous must preserve previously computed 
results and order data to carry out required computations. Thus,
the needs of general processing dictate that every information-
processing task and even every stage of it, should have its own
memory (Allik & Bachmann 1983). Although the idea of a single
central processor and store where “it all comes together” on the
stage of such a Cartesian theater (Dennett 1991, p. 107) is not
completely unthinkable, it is more natural to begin with an as-
sumption that mental activity is accomplished in the brain by
many separate agents, with their own specific functions and pur-
poses, which interact with one another.
How many components are in working memory? C&W are
departing from the human working memory model, according to
which it consists of three main components, the central execu-
tive, the articulatory loop, and the visual–spatial sketch or scratch
pad (Baddeley 1990b; 1995). Now they are proposing that there
is an additional component of working memory for assigning the
syntactic structure of a sentence and using that structure for de-
termining sentence meaning. Unfortunately, the authors of this
amendment to the working model do not inform their readers,
explicitly at least, whether the list of working memory compo-
nents is now exhausted or if it is meaningful to expect some other
specializations within working memory. However, from the gen-
eral undertone of the article, it is obvious that the list of working
model components is not complete, both empirically and logi-
cally. We have an impression that consequences of the possible
multiplication of working memory components and uncertainty
about their number are not fully realized by the authors. The in-
creasing number of specialized components is changing the ba-
sic conceptualization of working memory (Schneider 1993). It is
more natural to characterize working memory architecturally not
as one unitary system consisting of a certain number of compo-
nents but primarily as a system of relations between different rel-
atively independent cognitive subsystems. Words, as inherently
multifaceted entities, must be analyzed and processed at differ-
ent levels: phonologic, morphologic, figurative, and semantic.
Luria (1974), observing forms of memory disturbances after lo-
cal brain damages, distinguished four basic types of relationships
in working memory corresponding to phonologic, morphologic,
figurative, and semantic aspects of verbal material. In addition,
he presented evidence for separate systems to determine mean-
ing relations coded in phrases and meaning relations coded in
stories.
Thus, it can be proposed that all different kinds of relation-
ships into which a word enters are processed by separate systems.
It is noteworthy that two of these basic relations – phonologic
and relations of words in phrases – correspond more or less
closely to the phonological loop in Baddeley’s model of working
memory and that syntactic subsystem of working memory differ-
entiated in the target article, respectively. However, this also
suggests that several other specialized short-duration and lim-
ited-capacity relationships within working memory could be dis-
covered.
Is there a specialization for morphological processing? C&W
propose that there is a specialized system for language interpreta-
tion, identifying it mainly with syntactic processing. However, the
syntax is not primary in the logical sense, for it presupposes the
definition of the fundamental elements that are combined (Allik
& Help 1985). It is possible that many aspects of language ma-
nipulation, like syntax within a word or sentence, are governed by
an extralinguistic part of mental competence, for example, by a
general capacity for mental serialization (cf. Restle 1970). There-
fore, the distinction made by C&W between properly linguistic
“interpretive processing” and extralinguistic “post-interpretative
processing” is not totally convincing. In analytic languages, such
as English, the “interpretive process” operates mainly within the
sentence. In agglutinative languages, such as Estonian, where sen-
tences are composed from strings of units, none of which has any
independent, word-like status, the “interpretative process” has to
operate within a word as well.
For example, in our laboratory we found that the memory span
for the same noun in different cases (there are 14 cases in Eston-
ian) is considerably lower than the memory span for various nouns
in nominative case (Nõmm 1996). The “word stem similarity” ef-
fect is analogous to the phonological similarity effect, the reduced
immediate serial recall of phonologically similar words (Baddeley
1990b; 1995). Thus, processing an Estonian sentence Kõndisime
toast tuppa, tubadest tubadesse (“We walked from a room to a
room, from rooms to rooms” or “. . .room.ELATIVE room.ILLA-
TIVE, room.PLURAL.ELATIVE room.PLURAL.ILLATIVE”)
cannot be entirely independent from a subject’s verbal working
memory capacity measured by standard working memory tasks as
is suggested in the target article.
Is the logic of separating working memory components infal-
lible? In studies of working memory it is assumed that when two
processes interfere with one another they share processing re-
sources. It is possible, however, that such an interference emerges
not because the processes have to share common limited re-
sources but because they are inhibiting each other. Recent stud-
ies on humans as well on animals have shown the importance of
inhibitory processes in cognitive functions (Kapur 1996; Irle 1987;
1990). Luria (1974) proposed several years ago that when a sub-
ject is asked to memorize verbal material, phonological relations
between words are usually actively inhibited by semantic ones,
which generally dominate over the other relations. According to
this view, storage and recall are always a choice between several
alternatives, the preference of one type of relationship and the in-
hibition of other relationships between words. For example,
phonological and other similarity effects can be the result of this
kind of active inhibition but not the result of difficulties with dis-
criminating between stimuli. Analogously, findings that demon-
strate interference between two processes are not sufficient for
claiming that the processes share processing resources. Interfer-
ence might be a result of mutual inhibition.
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Abstract: Working memory span forms an important cornerstone of cur-
rent accounts of cognition, and cognitive development. We describe data
that challenge the conventional interpretation of span as a measure of
working memory capacity. We argue that the implications of these data un-
dermine the analysis provided by Caplan & Waters concerning the role of
working memory in sentence comprehension.
The framework of working memory advocated by Baddeley and
Hitch (1974; see also Hitch & Baddeley 1976) sought to embed
the processes and systems responsible for short-term memory
within the context of cognitive activity generally. Rather than
viewing memory as an independent system – an appendage on
cognition – the authors advocated a more functional approach,
whereby working memory supports many aspects of cognitive ac-
tivity. In these terms, the target article of Caplan & Waters (C&W)
stands as a monument to the success of the working memory
framework, given their view that the post-interpretational phase
of sentence comprehension (though not syntactic processing it-
self ) reflects memory processes.
C&W also offer an important challenge to the interpretation of
working memory span tasks within a single-resource (SR) theory.
C&W’s treatment of data often cited in support of SR theory 
is laudable, and in the main they provide an excellent critique.
Leaving aside concerns about their focus on reading span – a task
requiring sentence comprehension – as the vehicle to explain
sentence-comprehension processes, where does the analysis lead?
Having argued that the Single Resource King is dead, in fact very
little changes, for resource sharing lives on in the post-interpreta-
tive account of comprehension and enaction. Thus, C&W perpet-
uate the current orthodoxy (established by the pioneering analysis
of Daneman & Carpenter 1980) that working memory span mea-
sures a working memory capacity shared between processing and
storage functions. This is, after all, the logic driving the compar-
isons between groups of “high” and “low” span, pervading both SR
and “separate-sentence-interpretation-resource” (SSIR) theories.
Within the area of cognitive development too, the notion of re-
source sharing is widespread and offers a powerful account of age-
related change. For example, changes in counting span (Case et
al. 1982), a task analogous to reading span, form a central plank of
Case’s (1985) theory of cognitive development. Nonetheless, we
believe that resource sharing can be supplanted in large part by
the view that working memory span is affected by time-based for-
getting. Experimental manipulations of task difficulty – tradition-
ally thought of as affecting span by altering the balance of shared
resources – may be merely manipulations of the retention inter-
val for memory items. This conclusion is based on evidence that
children’s counting span is equivalent when task difficulty varies
while retention time is held constant (Towse & Hitch 1995). Con-
versely, spans are reduced when retention time is increased but
task difficulty is held constant (Towse et al. 1988). This occurs
across a range of ages and tasks, including counting span, opera-
tion span, and reading span (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, we found
no systematic decline in processing efficiency as memory load in-
creased, contrary to what one would expect if processing and stor-
age competed for the same pool of resources. What seems to be
important for working memory is retention interval (the extent to
which tasks provide the opportunity for children to forget stimu-
lus items), not the consumption of “processing resources.”
We believe that our data on the nature of working memory span
have implications for the comparison of adults with low and high
span scores; there may be several differences between span
groups that have nothing to do with resource-sharing capacity.
Among various possibilities are the following.
1. Low- and high-span groups differ in the rate at which rep-
resentations degrade; high-span adults can endure longer reten-
tion intervals.
2. High-span adults process events more quickly, reducing the
amount of forgetting that takes place (indeed, we found reliable
correlations between children’s working memory speed and span
even after partialing out age; Towse et al. 1998).
3. Speed effects may be more subtle because faster processing
allows an individual to produce more computations, or engage in
more complex computations, in a given time period. Thus, even
when span groups do not differ in processing time, one cannot be
certain that they perform the same cognitive operations. The ad-
ditional cognitive possibilities enjoyed by a quick processor may
be the very key that gains these lucky souls entry into the “high-
span club.”
These considerations suggest that C&W miss the radicalism of
their own analysis, in the real extent to which resource sharing may
be a chimera, and in the need to reconsider the largely untested
and potentially sterile orthodoxy that any differences between
span groups are due solely to their resource-sharing capacities.
Meanwhile, the fallback position, that alternative paradigms such
as random generation may be the saviour of working memory as-
sessment, remains unconvincing. Random generation is an im-
portant task, but there is increasing evidence that, as with work-
ing memory span, it is a product of complex and heterogeneous
skills, difficult to render into a meaningful, singular construct
(Towse 1998).
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Figure 1 (Towse et al.). Reading span scores (and standard er-
rors) adapted from Towse et al. (1998). Children read sentences
and produced the missing sentence-terminal word, which they
later attempted to recall. The reading time on the first and last
sentences in the set was manipulated to alter the required reten-
tion interval (because memory requirements begin only when the
processing product is derived) while keeping the overall work on
a trial comparable. The effects of retention interval differences on
span are significant for each age group.
Sources of variability in correlating syntactic
complexity and working memory
Matthew Walenskia and David Swinneyb
aDepartment of Linguistics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA
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Abstract: Caplan & Waters’s model differentiating levels of processing
and the role of working memory is important and likely right. However,
their claim rests on a lack of correlation between working memory and
structural complexity. We examine sources of variability in these mea-
sures that remain unaccounted for (by anyone), variability that muddies
a straightforward claim that the lack of correlation is cleanly estab-
lished.
Caplan & Waters (C&W) have provided a review and theoretical
interpretation of data that are important and in their larger pic-
ture, we believe, essentially correct. The target article provides a
detailed empirical basis for a position which has had progenitor
observations as early as work from the 1970s (e.g., Fodor et al.
1974), namely, that what is standardly examined in psychology as
short-term memory (or working memory, or verbal working mem-
ory) may not be the same process that is involved in normal sen-
tence comprehension (but it may be involved in task-related be-
havior tied to experimental paradigms in the study of language).
There are important issues, however, that we believe require fur-
ther clarification and delineation; some of them will inevitably
blur the clear-cut distinctions C&W have attempted to draw.
Specifically, previously unexamined sources of variability may
contribute to the lack of a strong correlation reported between
verbal working memory (VWM) and syntactic complexity, thus
weakening claims based on lack of correlation.
First, we believe the distinction that C&W draw with regard to
interpretive versus post-interpretive processing is correct. How-
ever, to the degree that one believes structural processing to be a
coherent, individuated aspect of interpretation, VWM cannot be
a sufficient mechanism for capturing the memory representations
of sentence interpretation (even a VWM assigned proprietarily to
language processing). It is not obvious, for example, how struc-
tural relationships could ever be captured in a representation of
phonological memory. This issue somewhat recapitulates argu-
ments underlying the move away from structuralism in linguistics;
part of Chomsky’s revolution was the recognition of the role of syn-
tax in how surface form maps onto meaning. Such a mapping can-
not be derived from word (phonological/morphological) forms
alone (nor can it be derived solely from propositional accounts of
structure). This in itself may be sufficient to account for some of
the lack of covariance between memory span and syntactic com-
plexity effects that C&W find (given that syntax is not phonologi-
cal in nature and that measures of VWM do not typically attempt
to take into account any unit larger than the word). VWM is es-
sentially a claim about phonological representations. Some con-
sideration of the nature of the processing resources that structure-
building uses in interpretive level processing, as well as their
relation to other types of resources (e.g., VWM), is necessary to
measure accurately effects of these resources.
In addition, whereas we agree that standard VWM tests are typ-
ically indicative of post-interpretive processing, the claim of a lack
of correlation of VWM with interpretive processes (structure
building) has not been as clearly examined as might be desired.
The evidence for a lack of correlation between VWM and syntac-
tic complexity comes nearly entirely from tasks that present ma-
terials visually (with the exception of one auditory moving window
study, to which we will return). Moreover, the reading span task
itself is typically presented visually. In these cases, visual encoding
and (probably) visual-to-phonological processes are involved at
each stage. To dismiss VWM’s role in interpretive-level processing
may require a higher standard of explicitness in testing, namely,
the use of verbal-only stimuli. Thus, again, some of the noise (lack
of strength) in the correlations may be attributable to interference
from nonverbal processes.
Despite the fact that Daneman and Carpenter (1980) find a
good correlation between visual and auditory presentation of sen-
tence memory span materials, we have found (Walenski et al.
1997) that modality of presentation does significantly affect the as-
sessment of span. We find that sentence memory span scores are
significantly higher when the test materials are presented audito-
rily compared to visually. Scores are probably higher for auditory-
only stimuli because of the greater automaticity of auditory pro-
cesses, compared to reading. Therefore, one needs to ask the
following: With any reading-based task, to what extent does the
mediation by material from the visual modality force the task to
involve more post-interpretive (i.e., less automatic) processing
than one that is purely auditory (and uses only phonological work-
ing memory)? Furthermore, rate of auditory presentation has
been demonstrated to affect the structural processing (Swinney &
Love 1998). Even normal but slightly slowed presentations engage
structural processing (involving some degree of conscious, post-
perceptual processing) different from that used for normal to fast
rates of speech. This brings us back to the auditory moving win-
dow task, which uses relatively slow presentation; hence it too is
likely to involve some degree of task-induced post-perceptual pro-
cessing and may not reflect the more automatic comprehension
processes found in normal-rate fluent auditory comprehension.
Clearer tests using only materials presented in the auditory do-
main at normal rates are needed.
Finally, it is self-evident that to ensure as “clean” a test of these
hypotheses as possible, the materials used in the assessment of
span must be controlled as carefully as possible (cf. Walenski et al.
1997). The reading span materials typically used (Daneman &
Carpenter 1980; Just & Carpenter 1992) have not been controlled
either for syntactic complexity or for number of propositions. The
fact that C&W do find better correlations for number of proposi-
tions than for structural complexity might be simply an accident
related to the lack of control in the reading span materials (per-
haps those materials differ less in propositional content than in
structural complexity). In an uncontrolled test, more and less com-
plex sentences will essentially be randomly distributed through-
out the materials. This will affect task demands nonuniformly
throughout the task and may result in low- to middle-span subjects
being assigned a lower-than-true score if they encounter more
complex sentences early in the task, increasing task demands for
them at that point. Similarly, it may result in middle- to high-span
subjects being assigned a higher-than-true score if less complex
sentences are encountered late in the test, reducing task demands
for them at that point. Nonstructural-complexity-equated reading
span tests may accordingly provide a highly variable measure of
the level of syntactic complexity that a subject can handle (con-
currently with memory demands).
Again, we believe that the distinction between interpretive and
post-interpretive processes that C&W draw is an important one,
and that “standard” VWM is involved in post-interpretive pro-
cessing. However, further work must be done to resolve variabil-
ity issues resulting from the interaction of materials, tasks, and
mental processes before a clean case for a lack of correlation be-
tween syntactic complexity and standard VWM can be definitely
established.
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A separate language-interpretation resource:
Premature fractionation?
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Abstract: The target article argues for the modularity of language inter-
pretive processes without the usual criterion that a module be informa-
tionally encapsulated. It is the encapsulation criterion, however, that gives
modularity most of its testability. Without the criterion of encapsulation,
testing whether relatively automatic comprehension processes use their
own unique resource is a very tricky matter.
At the core of Caplan & Waters’s (C&W’s) argument is a question
that runs as a theme through current research in psycholinguis-
tics: What are the boundaries between the language system and
the more general cognitive system? Typically, this question is
framed in terms of whether the language system is composed of
distinct modules or interactive subprocessors (cf. Farah 1994). In-
stead, C&W propose a language–cognition boundary that is based
on distinctions between pools of attentional resources. As the au-
thors point out, much of the support for the fractionation of re-
sources comes from failures to find interactions between working
memory limitations and variables related to the difficulty of sen-
tence processing, such as syntactic complexity. C&W acknowl-
edge that this raises an issue of the power needed to detect the in-
teraction. We believe, however, that the authors have failed to
appreciate fully the relevance of power considerations for their ar-
gument, especially if we consider power more broadly. Power, in
the context used here, is not simply a matter of having enough 
participants but is instead a matter of whether the research meth-
ods are implemented with sufficient precision to provide a fair test
of the hypothesis.
Our concerns about power stem from a key point on which 
single-resource and multiple-resource theorists agree. Specifi-
cally, language-interpretive processes are highly practiced and, in
most contexts, relatively automatic. Fodor (1983) justified his the-
sis that language functions are served by modules that are func-
tionally and neurologically separable from more general cognitive
processes in part based on the relative automaticity of language
processing. Similarly, C&W justify their thesis in part by the claim
that the fast, overlearned nature of interpretive processes makes
it reasonable to view these processes as an integrated set served
by a separate resource.
It is important to note the difference that framing the issue in
terms of processors or resources makes here. In the case of a mod-
ular subsystem that is fast and automatic, and that is information-
ally encapsulated, the automaticity of the system does not inter-
fere with testing for the isolability of the module. In fact, tests of
modularity have centered on the criterion of information encap-
sulation (e.g., Tanenhaus et al. 1995). However, if we have a sep-
arate resource used by a part of the system that operates in a rel-
atively automatic fashion, then the automaticity of the processes
compromises our ability to test the resource hypothesis. By defi-
nition, it will be difficult to detect interactions of working mem-
ory limitations with language-interpretive processes if these in-
terpretive processes are relatively low in resource demands. Thus,
it is possible that different syntactic structures take somewhat dif-
ferent amounts of time to compute but that the whole scale of the
resource demands of syntactic parsing is low enough that tests of
the single-resource view yield weak and inconsistent interactions.
In fact, the patterns of results shown in Figure 4 of the target ar-
ticle are qualitatively similar to several similar findings reviewed
by Just and Carpenter (1992). The load effects appear larger for
low-span readers but, in this case, not significantly so. The power
problem is exacerbated in designs such as this by treating span as
a grouping variable with three levels. This approach results in a
substantial loss of power compared to using only high or low spans
in the design or taking a multiple regression approach with span
as a continuous variable (cf. Cronbach & Snow 1977).
The problem of teasing apart different kinds of resources is fur-
ther complicated by people’s ability to manage working memory
overloads by trading off one kind of processing for another. Of
course, concerns about processing tradeoffs are at the heart of
C&W’s misgivings about the reading span test used by Carpenter,
Just, and their colleagues. Although we agree with C&W that mea-
sures of reading span should take both word recall and sentence
processing into account in computing a person’s score (see also
Engle et al. 1992) it is also important to realize that processing
tradeoffs can take place within language tasks themselves. Data
from our laboratory (see, e.g., Budd et al. 1995) have shown that
low- and high-span readers sometimes tailor their processing
strategies to fit their level of working memory capacity. The result
is that processing by low spans may not be just quantitatively dif-
ferent from that of high spans but also qualitatively different. 
Such qualitative differences in task performance have important
implications for testing predictions about interactions among
reading span, load manipulations, and language-processing tasks.
For example, King and Just (1991) obtained evidence that low-
span readers may increase use of pragmatic information to aid sen-
tence parsing rather than rely on syntactic information alone. With
such tradeoffs occurring, a comparison of sentence reading times
across conditions may be misleading if it is based on the assump-
tion that two groups of readers are processing in a similar manner.
Further, it may be that readers’ performance of a given task will
differ qualitatively when processing load is manipulated, as in the
studies that provide digit load conditions. Unless we examine mul-
tiple aspects of the comprehension task, we might miss where par-
ticipants are sacrificing text processing to maintain digits in work-
ing memory.
Perhaps a way to provide a more powerful test of the hypothe-
sis proffered by C&W is to examine comprehension in richer con-
texts. Their multiple resource hypothesis predicts that tradeoffs
between interpretive and post-interpretive processes should not
be obtained because these processes are served by different re-
sources. It may be possible to test this hypothesis by manipu-
lating text processing load in a way that affects post-interpretive
processing and looking for tradeoffs at more local, sentence-
interpretation levels. This requires that investigators look beyond
the sentence level to the level of discourse, where the ability to
manipulate processing loads is less constrained than at the sen-
tence level. In these richer contexts the SLIR hypotheses may yet
prove testable, despite the relative automaticity of many sentence-
interpretation processes. At present, however, we regard strong
conclusions about separate language resources as premature.
Working memory and sentence
comprehension: Whose burden of proof?
Arthur Wingfield
Department of Psychology and Volen National Center for Complex Systems,
Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254-9110.
wingfield@volen.brandeis.edu www.ccs.brandeis.edu:80/~kopp/
Abstract: Caplan & Waters argue that the processing resources used for
sentence comprehension are not drawn from an undifferentiated verbal
working memory resource. This commentary cites data from normal ag-
ing to support this position. Still lacking in theory development is a speci-
fication of the transient memory representations necessary for interpre-
tive and post-interpretive operations.
Single-resource (SR) models have appeared with striking regular-
ity in cognitive theory, from Titchener’s (1908) postulate of the
need to divide limited “psychic energy” among multiple percep-
tual inputs to Kahneman’s (1973) influential model of attentional
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resources and their allocation. The popularity of SR models has
rested partly, one presumes, on an appeal to parsimony: Why ar-
gue for separate resource systems if one will do? There also seems
to be a remarkably seductive appeal to seeing cognitive resources
as a sort of metaphorical fluid reservoir in a hydraulic system in
which, as effort is expended on one mental operation, less effort
is available for others. Within the domain of language compre-
hension, this SR view is echoed in the widely held position that
verbal working memory represents a limited-capacity memory
and resource system that carries, and hence constrains, language
comprehension (Carpenter et al. 1994).
Caplan & Waters (C&W) make the case that sentence compre-
hension must be carried by a separate sentence-interpretation re-
source that is not measured by standard verbal working memory
span tests. It is interesting to ask why such a multiple-resource
claim represents a minority position that has to be argued, rather
than placing the heavier burden of proof on the original SR theo-
ries. We can see this in the hurdles that C&W face with their ar-
guments for a separate language-interpretation resource. Among
these is C&W’s unenviable position of having to prove the nega-
tive, in which they mut show that concurrent activities do not in-
teract with syntactic complexity in dual-task settings, and they
must show an absence of consistent correlations between working
memory capacity as measured by traditional span tests and tests
of sentence comprehension. Such correlations have been re-
ported (Carpenter et al. 1994; Daneman & Merikle 1996). C&W
argue, however, that such correlations are typically modest ones
and that when they do appear they reflect post-interpretive pro-
cesses rather than constraints on sentence comprehension itself.
The strongest arguments against SR models come from reports
by C&W and others of neurological patients who show reduced
capacities of short-term verbal memory or executive function yet
show good sentence comprehension, even for sentences with
quite complex syntactic constructions. Strong evidence can also be
found in studies of normal aging. Although there are wide indi-
vidual differences in rate and extent, age-related declines in work-
ing memory are a virtual hallmark of the aging process. Indeed,
given the neural changes in the aging brain (Raz et al. 1998) it
would be surprising if it were otherwise. The value of studies of
language comprehension in healthy aging is that losses in pro-
cessing speed and efficiency are not accompanied by a significant
loss in linguistic knowledge (Light 1990). Thus, whatever differ-
ences one sees in language comprehension would be more likely
attributable to working memory or other processing constraints
than to a disruption in the richness of the linguistic knowledge
base.
C&W recognize that elderly adults can show performance
decrements with especially complex sentences, but their claim is
that these deficits lie not in immediate sentence comprehension
but in what they refer to as post-interpretive operations. Our own
review of the literature has also revealed many published cases in
which age differences in speech comprehension or recall were not
increased by the need to perform a concurrent activity even when
drawn from the verbal domain (Tun & Wingfield 1993).
C&W’s alternative to SR theory is not yet fully formed. An im-
portant area not addressed in the target article is the question of
the nature of temporary memory representations that must be in-
volved in sentence comprehension. One example relates to
acoustic–phonetic conversion leading to lexical access, a function
C&W include in the integrated process that they believe is gov-
erned by their sentence-interpretation resource. The fact that
speech perception is inherently context dependent demands the
necessity of a syllable-sized perceptual buffer to allow for syllable
identification (Mattys 1997). At a higher level has been an argu-
ment for a conceptual short-term memory (Potter 1993) that
stores what might arguably be the product of C&W’s interpretive
operations: a transient memory representation that may supply a
needed base for post-interpretive operations. C&W’s call for de-
velopment of their model might well be targeted to the nature of
these representations and whether they are constrained by, or in-
dependent of, the postulated sentence-interpretation resource.
Although the position staked out by C&W is an incomplete one at
this stage, I believe it is an important step in the right direction.
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Abstract: Commentaries on our target article raise further ques-
tions about the validity of an undifferentiated central executive
that supplies resources to all verbal tasks. Working memory tasks
are more likely to measure divided attention capacities and the ef-
ficiency of performing tasks within specific domains than a shared
resource pool. In our response to the commentaries, we review
and further expand upon empirical findings that relate perfor-
mance on working memory tasks to sentence processing, con-
cluding that our view that the two are not strongly related remains
viable in light of the material presented in the commentaries. We
suggest that a productive research enterprise would be to develop
the concept of working memory as a pool of resources in relation
to specific tasks.
We greatly appreciate the time and effort the commenta-
tors on our target article have spent on their contributions.
We have benefited enormously from these comments on
our work; we hope that the airing of issues concerning this
topic is of use to others as well. We also wish to apologize
to any commentators who, after reading our Response, be-
lieve we have misunderstood their work. We have done our
best to understand and respond to our colleagues’ thoughts
about our target article.
The commentaries address a wide range of topics. We
recognize that we cannot respond to every comment; we
have tried to deal with what we take to be major issues that
the commentaries raise. We have structured this Response
along the same lines as our target article. We deal first with
the concept of working memory, then with the distinction
we wish to draw between interpretive and post-interpretive
processing, with the relationship between interpretive and
post-interpretive processes and working memory, and fi-
nally with neural issues.
R1. The concept of working memory
In our target article, we used the term “working memory”
to refer to a putative component of short-duration memory
that performs computations on relatively small amounts of
information to accomplish a task. This involves the hypoth-
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esis that the informational storage and computational de-
mands of many cognitive tasks draw on “resources” in such
a working memory system and that limitations in these re-
sources in part affect the throughput of such tasks. We be-
lieve that this is the sense of the concept “working memory”
articulated by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). In further elab-
oration of this concept by Baddeley and colleagues, a “cen-
tral executive” was hypothesized to be responsible for both
computational and storage capacities and “slave systems”
for additional storage of verbal and nonverbal representa-
tions. Some of the commentaries on our target article chal-
lenge this concept.
Kane et al. consider working memory “a system of 
(1) activated traces, which are the output of domain-specific
processors, and (2) domain-free controlled attention.” The
domain-specific processors may be subject to resource limi-
tations (this depends on how automatic they are), but the at-
tentional system does not appear to participate in computa-
tions; rather, it schedules domain-specific processors. With
respect to tests of working memory, Kane et al. say that “the
divided-attention component is the strength of the working
memory span tasks. . . . [It] is critical to [their] broad predic-
tive validity.” Towse et al. present a similar view. They ar-
gue that variation in working memory span is better ex-
plained by variation in retention interval than by variation in
the degree to which a limited resource must be shared across
two tasks (Towse & Hitch 1995). They therefore suggest that
there is no justification from performance on such tasks for
postulating a short-duration memory system in which the
processing and storage demands of a task compete for a 
limited resource. Towse and Hitch (1995) indicated that 
the children in their experiments “switched” rather than
“shared” attention across the counting and recall compo-
nents of the counting span task. These commentators appear
to think of working memory as consisting of an executive
component that schedules domain-specific processing and
the domain-specific processors themselves.
We are sympathetic to this perspective. In previous
work, we have examined the relationship between the stor-
age and processing components of the sentence span task
(Waters & Caplan 1996c). If there is a single working mem-
ory resource, performance on the recall and sentence mea-
sures should be positively correlated at list lengths below
span, because subjects with greater capacities will accom-
plish both the sentence and the span tasks better than sub-
jects with lesser capacities. At list lengths above subjects’
spans, performance on the sentence and recall compo-
nents should be negatively correlated, because subjects’
capacity limitations will force them to trade off between
the two tasks. Neither of these predictions was borne out
by our data, suggesting that the availability and limitation
of a single working memory resource is not a major deter-
minant of the relationship between performance on the
processing and recall portions of this task. More generally,
we note the analysis of resources provided by Navon
(1984), cited by Christiansen & MacDonald, which
makes clear the difficulty of providing strong evidence that
dual task decrements should be attributed to shared re-
sources. If the “more radical” view (Towse et al.) that
there is no central resource is correct, our separate lan-
guage interpretation resource (SLIR) hypothesis is triv-
ially true, as long as language comprehension (1) is a sep-
arate domain of cognitive functioning and (2) requires
processing resources.
We want to distinguish between the claims that different
tasks share a single resource and that performance on indi-
vidual tasks is limited by resource availability. Chris-
tiansen & MacDonald dispute the latter claim. For them,
the concept of resources is a “theoretical soup stone”
(Navon 1984) sold to an ignorant Russian peasant (us
psychologists) to be put in boiling water to make soup; how-
ever, the soup’s flavor depends entirely upon its other in-
gredients. Focusing on language, Christiansen & MacDon-
ald argue that language processing consists of “passing
activation” through a connectionist network in which there
is “no distinction between storage of linguistic knowledge,
comprehension processes, and working memory re-
sources.” We do not accept this view. Navon (1984) did not
deal with models of performance on single tasks; in fact, his
arguments assume resource consumption by individual
tasks. Nor do connectionist models of individual tasks elim-
inate the notion of processing resources. Connectionist
models have features that determine the efficiency of their
operation that are independent of the specific representa-
tions or the elementary operations in a model, such as the
number of hidden units in a net (Seidenberg & McCelland
1989), the number of feedback loops in the system (Tabor
et al. 1997), or a built-in decay of weight strengths (Plaut et
al. 1996). These features have limiting effects on computa-
tions, and, at a sufficiently abstract level, are analogous to
limitations on computations imposed by other mechanisms
in procedure-based models. Connectionist models also
have features that serve as metrics of the complexity of an
operation, such as the number of iterations through a net
before a response is selected. Thus they also provide a
means of measuring processing load. We believe that the
concept of processing resource or working memory is not
eliminated in connectionist models so much as transformed
because of the nature of the models. Although the existence
of a shared central resource has been questioned, the facts
of complexity and floor effects in individual tasks suggest
that resource utilization and resource limitations are deter-
minants of performance in individual tasks.
R2. Interpretive and post-interpretive processing
We distinguish between processes that assign the meaning
of a sentence in a discourse and those that operate on this
meaning to perform other tasks. Although the distinction
between interpretive and post-interpretive processing is in-
tuitively clear in selected examples, as many commentators
acknowledged, the boundary between the two types of pro-
cessing and the exact characterization of each raise a vari-
ety of issues.
In our target article, we considered the interpretive stage
of language processing to consist of the computation of a set
of linguistic representations (lexical items, syntactic struc-
tures, intonational contours, thematic roles, focus, topic,
etc.). Pearlmutter argues that general knowledge of
events enters into the computation of thematic roles and
that the distinction between linguistic and nonlinguistic
processing therefore cannot be maintained. Our response
to this comment is twofold: first, the evidence for the lack
of informational encapsulation in language-comprehension
processes is not definitive (see Frazier & Clifton, 1996, for
discussion). Second, even if we grant that language pro-
cessing is not as narrowly informationally encapsulated as
Fodor (1983) envisaged, broadening the input into the
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computational processes does not render the notion of in-
terpretive processing incoherent. If judgments of event
probability and lexical statistical facts are integrated into
on-line comprehension, they nonetheless enter into com-
putations that yield the representational types we associate
with language interpretation. Consider the equivalent
process in vision. Many different basic visual processes can
be affected by context, as visual illusions document. This
does not imply that the visual system does not yield struc-
tural descriptions of objects, or face identity, or other end-
point representations that can then be utilized by other sys-
tems.
Bánréti points out that object relativization in English
serves purposes such as expression of new information, top-
icalization, emphasis, and so on. He therefore suggests that
difficulties subjects have with sentences with this construc-
tion may reflect the interface between language and the
mind. We agree that object relativization in English, and
many other syntactic structures that increase complexity at
the syntactic level, are used to convey features of discourse
structure, and we also agree that the boundary between
“linguistic” and “cognitive” processes as applied to both the
structure and the processing of discourse is hard to draw.
We think that features such as those Bánréti mentioned –
novelty of information, topic, focus, agency – are always
computed as part of discourse processing and are part of the
interpretive process. On the other hand, we doubt that it is
the fact that object relativization expresses an unusual fo-
cus or topic that leads to difficulty with this construction in
the experiments that have been performed in many labora-
tories. This is a testable hypothesis: if inappropriateness at
the discourse level is the reason for subjects’ difficulty with
these constructions, the difficulty should disappear in the
appropriate context.
Ferreira asks which repair processes are part of the in-
terpretive system and which are post-interpretive, pointing
out that there are models in which reanalysis is accom-
plished entirely intralinguistically. We did not mean that all
reanalysis is post-interpretive; we believe that some re-
analysis is part of the interpretation process. Reanalysis that
shifts into a controlled, conscious mode is certainly post-
interpretive by our criteria. The criteria for identifying this
shift are admittedly subjective, but the shift is used to gen-
erate data by some researchers who attempt to distinguish
between different reanalysis mechanisms (Sturt & Crocker,
1996, and references cited therein). We note that the prob-
lem raised by Ferreira is not confined by reanalysis of am-
biguous structures. At some point, the processing of unam-
biguous, multiply center-embedded relative clauses ceases
to be accomplished by unconscious dedicated routines and
begins to be accomplished by problem-solving mecha-
nisms. Metrics of structural complexity (see below) provide
clues as to what might determine this point, but the ques-
tion of when this happens remains unanswered.
Ferreira also asks for clarification of the distinction be-
tween one- and two-proposition sentences that figure
prominently in our target article (see also Martin). In our
work, a proposition expresses a set of thematic roles. (We
are not stipulating that this is how to define the term, only
indicating that this is what it refers to in our research to
date.) We agree with Ferreira that whether a sentence such
as The boy hugged the girl and the baby expresses one ac-
tion or two depends on the mental model that the listener
constructs. This is determined by the pictures in sentence–
picture matching and is internally generated in object ma-
nipulation, plausibility judgment, and answering questions.
Because the number-of-propositions effect arises at the
conceptual or perceptual, not the linguistic, level, our pre-
diction is that, if listeners are induced to form a mental
model that involves two actions for a sentence such as The
boy hugged the girl and the baby, by, say, adding then after
and, then the sentence will pattern with two-proposition
sentences.
We recognize that there is no full theory of the set of pro-
cesses that constitute interpretive and post-interpretive
processing and of their boundary. The distinction is admit-
tedly vague enough to allow researchers to use it to escape
from unwelcome results, but we think that it is also poten-
tially rich and precise enough to serve a useful function in
thinking about results. The same is true of the concept of
working memory, as the discussion above demonstrates,
and many other broad concepts.
R3. The relationship between working memory and
interpretive and post-interpretive processes
We note that several commentators considered it plausible
on theoretical grounds that there be more than one pro-
cessing resource system utilized by verbal tasks (see Wing-
field and Toomela & Allik; see also Christiansen & Mc-
Donald). We agree with this perspective, but will focus
here on empirical issues.
R3.1. Sentence comprehension and working memory ca-
pacity in normal subjects. Many of the commentaries
raised issues concerning the interpretation of the studies
with normal subjects. The majority of these commentaries
dealt with methodological and statistical issues that can af-
fect the power of particular studies.
One question raised by several commentators concerned
whether many of the studies cited have sufficient power to
detect the predicted interactions. Whitney & Budd point
out that it is difficult to test for interactions if interpretive
processes are low in resource demands. In addition, they
claim that designs that treat span as a grouping variable with
three levels result in a substantial loss of power compared
to those using only high or low spans or those treating span
as a continuous variable. Miyake et al. make similar claims
and argue that a major cause of low statistical power is the
use of highly discrete measures of individual differences
and the creation of arbitrary span groups. They point out
that “discrete span measures have lower power because
they reduce the variance by not capturing subtle differ-
ences that may exist among individuals with the same span
score.” They speculate that “in many cases (if not all), [our]
failure to detect theoretically relevant interactions was due
to insufficient power.” In addition, they argue that “these
nonsignificant trends likely will reach statistic significance
if they are tested in multiple regression analyses, using a
continuous measure of working memory span.”
As we pointed out in the target article, we agree that re-
searchers must be extremely careful when interpreting
nonsignificant results (the “unenviable position” that Wing-
field describes). However, several aspects of the data give
us confidence in our interpretation. In the vast majority of
cases we cite, the relevant interactions do not just fail to
reach significance but in fact are far from significant. Fur-
thermore, in our own studies (particularly of normal indi-
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viduals) we often replicate the pattern of results over sev-
eral studies using large samples (n 5 100) and a new set of
stimulus materials in each study. It is true that, if the same
total number of subjects were tested but divided into two
rather than three groups, the number of subjects per group
would be larger, thus increasing power. However, the use of
just two groups to make inferences about a continuous vari-
able such as span can be highly problematic from a design
standpoint. If only two groups are tested (high and low
span) and there is a systematic relationship between span
and some measure of language processing, the assumption
is that this relationship is monotonic and that subjects who
fall between high- and low-span groups in terms of working
memory capacity would also fall between in terms of 
language-processing ability. However, we have found that
in many instances subjects who fall between high- and low-
span subjects in terms of working memory capacity perform
either more poorly than low-span subjects or better than
high-span subjects in terms of language-processing effi-
ciency (see Figs. 1–3 in the target article). This finding dra-
matically alters the conclusion that would have been drawn
if only two groups had been tested, and it justifies the in-
clusion of at least three groups.
Miyake et al. argue for the use of continuous measures
of working memory span rather than the creation of arbi-
trary span groups. Although this approach is rarely taken by
researchers in the field, we agree with it fully and have in
fact used it in some of our own work. In our experience, the
use of such measures does not increase the ability of tradi-
tional measures of working memory capacity to predict 
language-processing efficiency. In one study (Waters & Ca-
plan 1996c), we tested 94 college students on a sentence
span task four times, once with each of four different sen-
tence types. All subjects were tested at all span sizes from
2 to 6 (i.e., 25 trials or 100 items). We investigated the re-
lationship between measures of reading comprehension
and various measures of span (total number of items cor-
rect, total number of trials correct, traditional working
memory span). There was more variability in the item and
trial measures, with the range of scores being 1–6 for the
traditional span measure, but 1–100 for the item measure,
and 1–25 for the trial measure. Standard deviations were
approximately one-fourth of the mean for the trial and item
measures. However, all three measures were highly corre-
lated, and the greater range of scores did not result in sig-
nificantly better correlations with the test of reading com-
prehension. Correlations between reading comprehension
and the four traditional span measures ranged from .21 to
.33; with the trial measure they ranged from .22 to .34 and
with the item measure from .25 to .37. We have also taken
this approach to the analysis of the on-line data from the au-
ditory moving windows task presented in Figure 1 in the
target article. In this analysis, rather than divide the sub-
jects into discrete groups on the basis of working memory
span, we examined the correlation between the number of
items correctly recalled to span on the working memory
task and the increase in processing time on object- com-
pared to subject-relative sentences for each of the five
phrases shown in Figure 1. All the correlations between this
fine-grained measure of working memory capacity and this
on-line measure of sentence-processing difficulty were
nonsignificant (all correlations less than .10). An identical
pattern of results was found in an additional study of 100 
elderly subjects. Thus, whereas in principle the lack of re-
lationship between traditional measures of working mem-
ory span and language processing could be due to the use
of discrete groups based on sentence-final word recall, in
practice the use of finer-grained measures of sentence-final
word recall does not result in better predictive ability.
On the other hand, we have found that the ability of sen-
tence span measures to predict language-processing effi-
ciency does increase if not only sentence-final word recall
but also efficiency (as indexed by reaction times (RTs) and
errors) on the sentence-processing component of the sen-
tence span task is taken into account when subjects are al-
located to working memory groups. We have labeled this
measure a composite Z score (Comp Z; Waters & Caplan
1996c). For example, in the study of college students out-
lined above, the correlation between the four different sen-
tence span tasks and reading comprehension increased to
.72 when sentence-processing efficiency was included in
the calculation of working memory span. In a similar vein,
differences between the high-, medium-, and low-span sub-
jects shown in Figure 1 did emerge when the groups were
divided on the basis of Comp Z.
A critical issue becomes how to interpret the better
predictive power of a working memory measure that takes
sentence-processing efficiency into account. Kane et al.
argue that our “innovation” of including the sentence-pro-
cessing component in the measure of working memory ca-
pacity pushes the measure toward being one of specific pro-
cessing skills, as opposed to a measure of domain-free
controlled attentional capacity. We think this is correct. Our
data (Waters & Caplan 1996c) and those of Tirre and Pena
(1992) suggest that most of the shared variance between
sentence span tasks and reading comprehension tasks is ac-
counted for by the processing component of the sentence
span task. Daneman and Tardiff (1987) suggested that the
entire relationship between the sentence span task and
measures of language-processing efficiency can be ac-
counted for by the overlap of operations in the two tasks
(but see Waters & Caplan, 1996c, for some reservations
about the basis for their conclusion). Our data (Waters &
Caplan, 1996c) show that there also is a small but signifi-
cant contribution of the recall measure to these correla-
tions. For the reasons cited above, it is likely that the recall
component of a working memory test is not a measure of a
central verbal working memory capacity. The independent
contribution of the recall measure in complex span tasks to
predicting comprehension probably reflects a functional
ability that overlaps between recall and certain types of
memory requirements of text and discourse processing,
such as those that are involved in finding the referents of
pronouns and other anaphoric elements. We suggest that
the major determinant of the relationship between sen-
tence span working memory measures and text and dis-
course comprehension is the fact that the two involve struc-
turing sentences and assigning their meanings, and we
suggest that an additional contribution to the correlation is
the fact that the two tasks share the need to refer to items
held explicitly in a short-term memory system.
Kane et al. argue that the best way to measure the
domain-free executive component of working memory is to
administer a battery of different working memory tasks that
share the dual-task quality but differ in domain-specific
processes. They claim that domain-free working memory
capacity is needed only under attention-demanding cir-
cumstances and that, because syntactic processing appears
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to be immune to divided attention, it likely occurs relatively
automatically. Kemper & Kemtes have also taken the ap-
proach of using the data from several working memory tasks
as a measure of working memory capacity. They claim that
the data from such tasks suggest a single latent variable
across age groups, but unlike Kane et al., they have found
that such measures are related to interpretive processing,
at least on the output side.
We have taken the approach suggested by Kane et al. in
several studies. In one we tested 112 healthy elderly sub-
jects (50–85 years old) on seven operation span measures
(alphabet span, backward digit span, missing digit span,
subtract 2, running item span, and two versions of sentence
span). Correlations among all the measures (other than
missing digit span) were moderate, even when the effects
of age were partialled out. Correlations between the Nel-
son Denny reading comprehension subtest and the opera-
tion span scores ranged from 2.04 to .30, the highest cor-
relation being with the sentence span measure. However,
there were no significant correlations between any of these
measures and an index of processing difficulty on an on-line
measure of auditory sentence processing (self-paced listen-
ing). These data support the notion that domain-free work-
ing memory plays very little role in on-line interpretive pro-
cessing and provide further support for our claim, outlined
above, that the relationship between sentence span mea-
sures and text and discourse comprehension likely has to do
with the memory requirements of these tasks.
Walenski & Swinney raise a different set of method-
ological issues regarding the reading or sentence span task
itself. They suggest that previously unexamined sources of
variability may contribute to the lack of strong correlation
between verbal working memory capacity and syntactic
complexity. In particular, they argue that the materials used
in the assessment of span should be controlled for their syn-
tactic complexity and number of propositions. Further-
more, the commentators argue that the finding of better
correlations for propositions than for complexity may be
due to the fact that the span materials differ less in propo-
sitional content than in structural complexity. Although it is
true that, in general, other researchers do not control the
linguistic properties of the materials used in the sentence
span task, these variables were either manipulated or con-
trolled for in all of our studies with patients and normal in-
dividuals cited in the target article. In all these studies, sub-
jects were divided into groups using a variant of the
Daneman and Carpenter task that we devised in 1987 (Wa-
ters et al. 1987), in which the trials are blocked by sentence
type and the sentences are systematically varied in terms of
syntactic complexity and number of propositions. Thus,
contrary to Walenski & Swinney’s claim, these sources of
variability were not unexamined and cannot account for the
lack of strong correlation.
In addition to questions about the sensitivity of the work-
ing memory measures, some commentators questioned
whether the chronometric and behavioral methods in the
studies we cite are sensitive enough to detect the expected
effects. Kutas & King claim that they are not. In particu-
lar, they claim that reaction time effects seen in the behav-
ioral data occur after the point at which they would be ex-
pected (Christiansen & MacDonald seem to disagree).
Kutas & King claim that event-related potential (ERP) data
are more sensitive and in fact show the predicted complex-
ity by group interactions. However, in the Kutas & King
studies cited, the subject groups were based not on mea-
sures of working memory capacity but rather on compre-
hension scores. They claim that it is likely that good com-
prehenders would score better on working memory
measures. However, the correlations found between com-
prehension and working memory measures are often at best
only moderate (see data referred to above) and do not jus-
tify using comprehension scores in lieu of working memory
scores if the question of interest is the relationship between
working memory capacity and language processing.
Gibson & Roberts point out that, to date, the range of
syntactic structures tested has been quite narrow. They ar-
gue that a metric, such as that developed in Gibson’s model,
can be used to make predictions about the relative difficulty
of various syntactic structures. We agree and are in the
process of extending our work to other structures. Gibson
& Roberts also point out that they have found additional
support for our hypothesis that working memory measures
predict post-interpretive processing through an experiment
in which subjects answered questions about sentences with
varying numbers of propositions. Lewis develops a differ-
ent model of the determinants of syntactic complexity; our
impression is that the revision of Gibson’s model found in
his recent work accommodates the discrepant data Lewis
pointed to in Gibson’s earlier work. Lewis suggests that sim-
ilarity of to-be-remembered items affects performance in
all tasks that have a memory component. Perhaps this is
true, but different types of similarity affect different mem-
ory performances differently (e.g., semantic similarity has
little effect on immediate recall, and phonological similar-
ity has a major effect; at longer delays, the effects are re-
versed), and these different effects of similarity considered
along different dimensions are part of the basis for postu-
lating different memory systems.
Walenski & Swinney point out that the evidence for a
lack of correlation of verbal working memory with inter-
pretive processes has come mainly from tasks that present
materials visually and point out that the reading span task
is also typically presented visually. They have found that
sentence span scores are significantly higher when the test
materials are presented auditorily and attribute this effect
to the greater automaticity of the auditory modality. How-
ever, differences in sentence span scores in the auditory
versus the visual modality are typically very small, and there
is no evidence that subjects process the material any more
automatically when the materials are presented auditorily.
Walenski & Swinney also suggest that visually based lan-
guage tasks may involve more post-interpretive processing.
They make a plea for using only materials presented in the
auditory modality at normal rates, suggesting that the audi-
tory moving windows task may involve some task-induced
post-perceptual processing, because the rate of presenta-
tion is slower than normal speech and so may not reflect 
automatic comprehension processes. However, the behav-
ioral data do not suggest that the task picks up post-
perceptual processing. Furthermore, the implication is that
other auditory tasks might be a better reflection of automatic
comprehension processes. However, all tasks other than sim-
ply listening to normal speech probably change the nature 
of the comprehension process. For example, in the cross-
modal naming and lexical decision/priming tasks, the stimu-
lus sentences are presented at a normal rate, but the pre-
sentation is interrupted by the presentation of a visual cue 
to which the subject must respond. This divided-attention
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task likely changes the manner in which subjects process
the stimulus sentences.
Several commentaries claim that additional data not
cited in the target article point to a relationship between
working memory capacity and syntactic comprehension
ability. Pearlmutter points out that Pearlmutter and Mac-
Donald (1995) showed a span-by-ambiguity interaction in
a self-paced reading task. High-span subjects were sensi-
tive to plausibility in both unambiguous and ambiguous
sentences, low-span subjects only in unambiguous sen-
tences. Strategic factors induced by questions were not
likely to have been present because, unlike the case in the
study by MacDonald, Just and Carpenter (1992), the com-
prehension questions did not ask about the ambiguity. This
study raises very interesting issues. We do not deny that
there are differences in the verbal talents of high- and low-
span subjects. Pearlmutter and MacDonald (1995) suggest
that one such difference lies in their use of plausibility in-
formation in on-line sentence processing. Another possi-
bility is that the difference lies in their judgments of prob-
abilities of thematic roles, knowledge of lexical co-ocur-
rence statistics, and so on. It is possible that all subjects use
information of this type on line; the difference between
subjects might reside not in their spans but in their knowl-
edge. To explore this, probability ratings would have to be
obtained from the same subjects who are tested for on-line
comprehension and the factors of individual probability
ratings and working memory span examined for their in-
dependent relative contributions to the on-line sentence-
processing measure.
Andrews & Halford claim to have found a complexity-
by-capacity interaction when complexity is measured in a
different way – one that takes the number of role assign-
ments into account. Their account rests on the unsupported
and counterintuitive view that subjects process all thematic
roles in subject-object and doubly center-embedded object-
relativized sentences at once but treat subject-relativized
sentences with the same number of thematic roles on a
clause-by-clause basis. In addition, the results described by
Andrews & Halford are complex, with effects of working
memory span appearing for different sentence types in in-
consistent ways. Our reaction to these data is that they are
hard to interpret and, although not supportive of our hy-
pothesis, do not constitute results strongly contradictory to
the data we reviewed in our target article.
Bates et al. cite Kilborn (1991), who found that subjects
did not use morphological markings normally under condi-
tions of noise. In our opinion, the experiment suffered sig-
nificantly from the inclusion of ungrammatical sequences
that the subjects had to interpret (e.g., hits the wristwatch
the television), which predisposes subjects towards the
adoption of problem-solving strategies, and from an inade-
quate number of examples of each type, which precludes
the analysis of the data by items. These problems aside, the
finding that morphological endings are not used normally
when materials are presented in noise only suggests that
they are not perceived in these conditions, which is hardly
surprising given their lack of stress. Bates et al. also men-
tion a paper by Blackwell and Bates (1995) as evidence that
a concurrent digit load selectively disrupts recognition of
subject–verb-agreement errors compared to omissions or
transpositions of elements in a sentence. However, none of
the interactions of error type and digit load was significant
in the analyses.
Finally, Miyake et al. claim that the logic of the dual-
task studies we cite is flawed because the digit span task in-
terferes with the phonological loop component of working
memory rather than imposing an external load on the cen-
tral executive (CE). This is not the interpretation that other
researchers, beginning with Baddeley and Hitch (1974),
have made of the effect of a concurrent digit load task. One
possible problem with the external load paradigm, which
we acknowledge in the target article, is that it may not be
demanding enough. We suggest that perhaps more de-
manding secondary tasks, such as random number genera-
tion, would prove more useful. However, Towse et al.
point out that random number generation “is a product of
complex and heterogeneous skills, difficult to render into a
meaningful, singular construct.” Given the dissociation
over both normal and brain-damaged subjects of perfor-
mance on tasks that are thought to measure CE functions
(as Gibson & Roberts noted), we will have to rely on the
slow accumulation of data using different interference par-
adigms, none of which is an ideal concurrent task to occupy
the CE of a working memory system.
R3.2. Neuropsychological evidence. Most commentators
felt that the data showing that patients with low working
memory capacity had good syntactically based compre-
hension were among the strongest points in favor of our
separate-sentence-interpretation-resource (SSIR) hypoth-
esis. However, a few commentators disagreed, and several
raised issues about other aspects of patients’ performances.
Bates et al. point out that deficits in syntactic process-
ing in patients with aphasia extend beyond difficulties with
passives and object relatives to include processing morpho-
logical forms and that these difficulties are not restricted to
patients with agrammatic speech. We agree with both these
observations but believe they are not relevant to our thesis.
Christiansen & MacDonald argue that the data from
patients with low working memory spans are mostly off-line
accuracy measurements. They refer to results of theirs that
indicate that patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) are
normal in cross-modal naming only when all but a few
words in a sentence can be ignored and that their abilities
to produce and interpret pronouns correlate well with
working memory measures. Not having seen these data, we
cannot discuss them in detail. We can say, however, that we
have found normal effects of syntactic structure on self-
paced listening in Parkinsonian patients with reduced
working memory (studies with AD patients are underway).
Kolk & Hartsuiker discuss the possible use of “strate-
gies” on the part of patients. They argue that a strategy that
takes the first noun of a sentence as the agent of all the verbs
in a sentence would account for the performance of apha-
sic subjects, particularly in object–subject-relative clauses
(The horse kicked the elephant that touched the dog). We
have long argued that aphasic performance is determined
by a combination of a patient’s deficit and the strategies that
he or she uses (Caplan & Futter 1986; Caplan et al. 1985;
Caplan & Hildebrandt 1987; 1988). In English, there are
two well-documented strategies that aphasic patients use to
assign thematic roles when syntactic analysis fails. Aphasic
patients may either take the first noun in the sentence as
the agent of every verb (the strategy Kolk & Hartsuiker
mention) or take the noun immediately before each verb as
the agent of that verb. The first strategy leads to errors in
object–subject-relative sentences and good performance
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on conjoined sentences; the second leads to the opposite
pattern. Both strategies are commonly used, and we have
not been able to find a predilection for one or the other
across large groups of aphasic patients. Individual patients
tend to use one or the other, not both. Contrary to Kolk &
Hartsuiker’s claim about data of ours (Caplan & Waters
1996), accuracy on object–subject and conjoined sentences
does not differ systematically in aphasic patients overall.
Kolk & Hartsuiker also discuss patients with AD and
Parkinson’s disease (PD). They claim that problems these
patients have with sentences containing more than one
proposition are related to a general verbal working memory
limitation – our point in the target article exactly. They also
say that these patients do not use word-order strategies and
that this deficit is related to a “prefrontal dysfunction . . . in
the domain of supervisory processes.” To our knowledge,
there is very little that can be said with confidence about
whether AD and PD patients use the same types of strate-
gies as aphasic patients. The most convincing data on strate-
gies used by aphasics come from enactment tasks in which
the patients can make whatever responses they choose;
patients with AD and PD have been tested mostly on
sentence–picture-matching tasks in which the foils are pre-
selected and spontaneously generated strategies may not
have a chance to emerge. However, given the ubiquity of
the strategies used by aphasics (they are used by children
as well), there is every reason to think that AD and PD pa-
tients use them also. We expect that Kolk & Hartsuiker’s
speculations in this regard will prove incorrect.
McCarthy & Warrington review their work on the
sentence-comprehension deficits of patients with short-
term memory (STM) impairments, arguing that these pa-
tients were able to understand sentences on-line but had
difficulties when utterances had to be reanalyzed. We agree
with McCarthy & Warrington’s point that STM cases have
not shown syntactic comprehension deficits that can be re-
lated to their STM limitations (see Waters et al., 1991, and
Caplan & Waters, 1980). We are puzzled by their statement
that we have not disentangled the various components of
the working memory system. We distinguished between
impairments in the rehearsal and phonological storage 
capacities that are found in the STM patients Warrington 
& McCarthy and other researchers described and disorders
of the CE component of working memory (to use Badde-
ley’s terminology). We did so because, as we noted in our
target article, some researchers (e.g., Just & Carpenter
1992) have argued that patients with disorders of rehearsal
and phonological storage are not adequate tests of the claim
that there is a single working memory resource, whereas pa-
tients with limited “central executive” working memory
functions are. It is for this reason that we deemphasized this
literature in our target article in favor of discussion of pa-
tient groups with CE limitations. We appreciate McCarthy
& Warrington’s drawing attention to this literature.
McCarthy & Warrington promote single case studies
over “large-scale surveys” in which they say “elegant disso-
ciations and statistical artifacts are difficult to disentangle.”
We think one takes data wherever they come from. Statis-
tical analyses of large data sets, such as those referred to by
Kemper & Kemtes, tell us things that experimental ex-
ploration of single cases cannot. Single case studies may re-
flect exceptions to widely found patterns of performance
and therefore may be misleading regarding the general
properties of a cognitive system. All studies have weak-
nesses, of which limitations on inferences that can be drawn
because of the population studied represent only one (and
often not the most important). The evidence must be con-
sidered study by study.
Kotz & von Cramon describe a potentially important
patient with a reduced working memory but normal STM
performances. They report that H.G. performed normally
on syntactic comprehension tasks, had no particular diffi-
culty with sentences with more than one proposition, and
did well on the Token Test. These performances indicate
that H.G. was able to retain considerable sentential se-
mantic content (several propositions, adjectives arbitrarily
associated with nouns) in memory and use that content in
enactment and other tasks. These are the types of post-
interpretive functions that we have found often to be af-
fected in patients with working memory limitations, and we
think that Kotz & von Cramon are right that this case sug-
gests that a working memory limitation as measured on
complex span task does not necessarily lead to this type of
problem.
Kotz & von Cramon also recorded ERPs in their pa-
tient and found that syntactic (word order) and semantic
(selectional restriction) violations did not result in ERP
components that are normally present, and that the P600
was delayed to fast visually presented sentences. They in-
terpret these data as evidence for slowing of language pro-
cessing owing to working memory limitations. This might
be the correct interpretation of these data (if so, they speak
against our hypothesis), but we think it is too early to tell.
The fact that H.G. performed normally despite the absence
of normal ERP components raises questions about the
functional role of these components. According to our non-
practitioner reading of the ERP literature, a delay of the
P600 to 1,000 msec may not be of theoretical significance.
It would be important to know that any delays in ERP com-
ponents were selective, not a general result of the lesion in
the patient. We also note that this is an example in which a
single case cannot resolve an issue (see our discussion of
Warrington & McCarthy above). The two findings could
be unrelated disorders. One way to explore this possibility
is to see whether this finding is replicated across patients,
or whether the magnitude of a working memory deficit is
correlated with delays in the P600.
Bánréti refers to work by Ullman et al. (1997) that re-
ported good rule-based morphological processing in AD
patients and poor processing of this sort in PD patients. Ull-
man et al. related this pattern to the corresponding integrity
and impaired nature of procedural memory in these two
groups of patients, and Bánréti endorses this hypothesis.
Bánréti is right that Ullman et al.’s and our data regarding
PD patients are not compatible if one attempts this synthe-
sis. However, Ullman et al. studied word (past tense) for-
mation, not sentential syntax. Whether the grand synthesis
of all rule-based processing and procedural memory is valid
is uncertain (cf. Dominey et al. 1997).
Martin, like Kotz & von Cramon, presents data from
a single case that speak to the relationship between STM
and sentence comprehension. Patient A.B. (Martin & Ro-
mani 1994) had problems with the retention of semantic in-
formation in immediate recall tasks and with comprehen-
sion of sentences in which semantic information had to be
retained in memory for short periods before being associ-
ated with a construct. Martin argues that A.B.’s compre-
hension problem is part of interpretive processing and re-
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flects a limitation in lexicosemantic mechanisms that sup-
port performance on STM tasks. Assuming that A.B.’s per-
formance reflects a common co-occurrence of problems (as
always, replication of a single case would be reassuring), it
suggests that there are mechanisms common to retaining
unstructured lexical semantic information in comprehen-
sion and in span (as Martin & Romani, 1994, conclude).
One possibility is that there are severe limitations on the
ability to retain unstructured lexical semantic information
in comprehension. Gibson’s model of the difficulties im-
posed by certain syntactic structures is consistent with this
suggestion.
This raises the larger issue of the mechanisms that sup-
port span. Subjects activate and retain phonological and lex-
ical representations in span. The report by Toomela & Al-
lik of reduced span for the same noun in different cases in
Estonian suggests that span is sensitive to morphological
representations. It is tempting to argue that subjects ana-
lyze the stimuli in span tasks to the extent to which they can
linguistically and use all the representations that they ex-
tract from the stimuli to support their performance. The ex-
tent to which STM performance is entirely the result of the
application of normal language-processing mechanisms to
the linguistically degenerate stimuli presented in span and
other STM tasks remains unclear.
R4. Neural mechanisms
We suggested that deficits seen after lesions and functional
neuroimaging using ERPs, magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), and positron emission tomography (PET) suggest
that working memory is a dorsolateral frontal function,
whereas sentence comprehension is a perisylvian function.
Friston argues that two functionally separate systems must
have separate neural substrates and proposes an experi-
ment in which one could see whether there are brain re-
gions in which regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) is in-
fluenced by the interaction of syntactic complexity and
external memory load, such regions, should they exist, be-
ing evidence against our SLIR model. Stowe (1997) carried
out such an experiment, and there were brain regions in
which rCBF was related to the interaction of the variables
of sentence complexity and external load. Unfortunately,
the interaction was not easily interpretable: blood flow
changed in similar ways in some regions in both the low-
complexity/low-load and the high-complexity/high-load
conditions.
Several commentators disagree with our suggestion that
“working memory” tasks involve dorsolateral frontal cortex.
McCarthy & Warrington suggest that the perisylvian re-
gion may be “a core neuroanatomical substrate for ‘working
memory’ in those tasks that have high loading on executive
problem-solving abilities.” The evidence they cite in sup-
port of this is the finding that patients with inferior parietal
lesions have STM deficits, especially affecting storage func-
tions. Martin claims that activation work by Fiez et al.
(1996), and their review of the literature, indicates that the
regions activated by sentence processing and by working
memory tasks overlap.
We agree with McCarthy & Warrington that there is
evidence from neuropsychology that storage and rehearsal
of phonological representations involve inferior parietal
lobe and Broca’s area. PET and fMRI data suggest a simi-
lar picture (Zatorre 1992; see Demonet, 1996, for review).
Tasks that require more “computation” on stored informa-
tion – even a simple comparison of one representation with
another, as in the n-back or missing span task – have con-
sistently activated the dorsolateral frontal lobe (see, e.g.,
Petrides et al. 1993). Most researchers attribute dorsolat-
eral prefrontal (DLPF) activation to executive function in
working memory tasks and perisylvian activation to storage
and rehearsal. However, we agree with Martin that the pic-
ture is not as simple as this. For instance, the study by Fiez
et al. (1996) quoted by Martin tested storage, not manipu-
lation, of verbal material (recall of five items minus a fixa-
tion baseline) and found increased rCBF mainly in DLPF,
not perisylvian cortex (the rCBF increase in Broca’s area
was of borderline significance; decreases in rCBF were
seen in the middle temporal gyrus and the insula). One
analysis in the Petrides et al. (1993) study (the subtraction
of a counting baseline from the externally ordered digit
task) showed increased rCBF in Brodmann’s area 40 of the
left hemisphere. While this might have been due to the
storage requirements of this task, we cannot be sure of this
interpretation. Martin is right that, at present, the picture
is not as clear as we, and others, have suggested, although
we add that the view articulated above remains a distinct
possibility.
This brings us to a reconsideration of the import of lo-
calization findings. We agree with Friston that two func-
tionally separate systems must have separate neural sub-
strates and also with Gibson & Roberts’s view that such
evidence is extremely powerful when it exists. However, we
think the argument from localization to separate functional
systems is unidirectional at present. Evidence for gross
neuroanatomic separation constitutes strong support for
functional specialization, but evidence for gross neu-
roanatomic overlap is still compatible with functional spe-
cialization. The reason for this is the scale factor; it is en-
tirely possible that, at a finer level of description, two
functional systems can utilize different elements such as
neurotransmitters within a single brain region, such that
rCBF increases related to the two functions are not distin-
guishable by available techniques.
R5. Concluding remarks
“Working memory” is a catchy term and an appealing con-
cept. Many tasks, from digit span through inspecting men-
tal images, seem to be capacity limited, and the idea that
these limitations arise because a short-duration memory
system can retain only so much information while it effects
computations is a powerful metaphor. However, the idea of
an undifferentiated central executive that supplies re-
sources to all verbal tasks is much less appealing. Our tar-
get article marshalled evidence that this type of model does
not account for individual differences, interference effects,
and performance of brain damaged subjects in syntactic
processing in sentence comprehension. The commentaries
on our article suggest that there is no evidence that com-
monly used tests of working memory capacity measure a
shared resource pool. We have suggested that “these con-
siderations do not undermine the concept of working mem-
ory as a pool of resources that is used to temporarily store
and to operate on activated representations in a given task.
They direct the question to the delineation of tasks. A ma-
jor distinction that we and others have made is between one
or more resource pools that may be used for aspects of on-
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line psycholinguistic processing and one or more resource
pools that may be used for other verbally-mediated tasks.
How fine a fractionation of resource systems will be needed
to account for capacity limitations in language processing
and other verbally mediated cognitive functions is not
known at this point (Waters & Caplan 1996c).
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